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Abstract 
 
Hybrid optical networks are considered as the most promising architectures for future 
optical networks, in order to achieve both better cost and performance. Dependability is 
a topic of increasing interest in order to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) expected 
for future optical networks. Recently, the 3-Level Integrated Hybrid Optical Network 
(3-LIHON) has been proposed as a new concept for future optical core networks, 
including different transport technologies to support a wide range of services. Due to 
the wide range of future telecommunication services foreseen for next generation 
optical backbone networks, the 3-LIHON architecture must be provided with 
differentiated dependability, in order to offer the availability demanded by the most 
critical services, as well as to utilize network resources efficiently. By focusing in a 
single 3-LIHON node, this thesis employs component redundancy to present a 
differentiated survivability model suitable for the 3-LIHON architecture. Several 
protection mechanisms for two of the three types of traffic supported by 3-LIHON are 
proposed in this research work. These mechanisms are analyzed by means of different 
dependability models, i.e. reliability block diagrams and Markov models; and a 
numerical evaluation of its unavailability is presented. In addition, simulation results 
measuring the impact on performance of some mechanisms are also presented. Then, 
the protection mechanisms are compared and evaluated, taking into account not only its 
unavailability and performance, but also other considerations such as cost and 
complexity. Finally, based on this evaluation, the best suited mechanisms are selected.           
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Over the last decades, the importance of telecommunication services, such as telephony, 
television or web-browsing, has become more and more important for society, playing 
today an essential role in daily life. Nowadays, the most popular telecommunication 
services are transported in separate networks. Despite that fact, telecommunication 
services are expected to be served by a single network in the future. Optical networks 
are envisioned as the paradigm for this single future network. Thus, future optical 
networks must be able to provide and support a very wide range of services and 
applications. In addition, these services will be demanded by heterogeneous users, a 
situation that leads to a scenario where a huge number of services are using the same 
infrastructure. Clearly, different services will have different requirements to Quality of 
Service (QoS). 
 
Basically, three types of QoS demands can be characterized: performance-related, 
dependability-related and security-related. Some new services will request a QoS 
comparable to current services, but in general, more demanding services will arise as 
users expect an increase in QoS as time passes. Thus, this increase in QoS implies 
higher resource demands for some future services. For example, the majority of Internet 
traffic by 2012 is considered to be real-time video [1]. In this kind of traffic offset delay 
and timing-jitter is unacceptable [2], requiring high real-time demands and bandwidth. 
Furthermore, in critical applications such as tele-surgery, reliability demands will also 
be vital. In other critical applications, e.g. bank transactions, security is also a key 
aspect. Due to this huge span of services, it is clear that service differentiation must be 
taken into account when designing future optical networks. Thus, recognizing and 
classifying future services can be seen as a key aspect in the development of future 
optical networks. Although achieving a complete and detailed view of future services 
and QoS requirements is almost impossible, some attempts to catalogue future service 
classes have been performed, e.g. [3] and [4],  based on ITU-T Recommendation 
Y.1541 [5] and IETF RFC 2212 [6]. However, in order to meet the demands of high 
performance traffic classes, QoS requirements are redefined in some cases, e.g. [4] and 
[7]. ITU-T QoS standards for IP-based networks can be consulted in [8].          
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Another important discussion, as a consequence of the expected wide range of future 
services, is regarding which switching scheme(s) should be used in future optical 
networks in order to support service differentiation. But service differentiation is not the 
only aspect of this debate. Cost, utilization of network resources and environmental 
impact [9] can also be listed as crucial implications when discussing the selection of a 
switching scheme. Currently, the two main switching alternatives are Optical Packet 
Switching (OPS) and Optical Circuit Switching (OCS). 
 
OPS is supposed to be one of the best alternatives for a single converged future network 
[10]. Thanks to time division multiplexing in the optical domain, which permits 
statistical multiplexing (SM) of packets, a high utilization of network resources is 
achieved by OPS networks. However, OPS networks can experience packet loss and 
high processing requirements in intermediary nodes. On the other hand, OCS needs 
processing only at the ingress and egress nodes [11]. Furthermore, hardware 
requirements are relatively low, and passive optical components can be used in order to 
implement OCS networks, ensuring high reliability. In contrast, OCS does not depend 
on statistical multiplexing but on static multiplexing, suffering from low granularity. 
Consequently, OCS can lead to low utilization of network resources [10], typically if 
traffic sources are bursty. 
 
Hybrid optical networks seem to be the solution to this dilemma. In general, it is 
considered that combining OCS and OPS properties may achieve both better cost and 
performance [12]. Thus, in order to meet the QoS demands required by future services, 
a hybrid network model merging OCS and OPS could be employed to implement the 
core of future optical networks. The term hybrid in the area of optical networks was 
defined in [13] as: “an optical network architecture is called hybrid if it combines two or 
more basic network technologies at the same time”. During the last ten years, several 
hybrid OPS/OCS networking schemes [14], [4] have been presented as possible 
architectures for future optical networks. 
 
A new switch architecture concept for the future optical core network has been 
proposed called the 3-Level Integrated Hybrid Optical Network (3-LIHON) [3]. The 3-
LIHON concept is based on the Optical Migration Capable Network with Service 
Guaranties (OpMiGua) [4], and its extension [15] employing Optical Codes (OCs) [16]. 
According to [3], 3-LIHON is presented “as a possible solution for future all-services 
integrated network architecture”. However, challenges still remain with regard to 
evaluation of both the general concept and the actual realization(s) with respect to 
performance, dependability, cost and energy consumption / environmental impact. 
 
The main task of this thesis is to perform an analysis of how to locally improve the 
dependability of a 3-LIHON node. This thesis will be centered on failures in the Optical 
Packet Switch (OPS), Electronic Packet Switch (EPS) and Detect Packet Type (DPT) 
subsystems. Several mechanisms for differentiated protection of the OPS and EPS will 
be studied and compared, focusing on extending the architecture of a 3-LIHON node 
and using available resources as well as possible. Optical Cross Connect (OXC) failures 
are assumed to be managed by the network redundancy layer using Generalized Multi-
Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS).  
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1.1 Problem Outline 
 
 
Since the beginning of telecommunication services, dependability has been an important 
issue in the telecommunication industry [17]. Telephony, one of the precursors of 
modern telecommunication services, was designed with high availability requirements, 
although these requirements were not accomplished until the mid 1980s. In fact, the 
ESS 1 (Electronic Switching System 1) was designed with a 10-5 unavailability goal in 
the early 1960s [18]. Furthermore, this unavailability figure has become a de facto 
standard for considering a communications system as “high available”. Also the Internet 
was designed in order to provide robustness and survivability [19]. 
 
These two examples show that dependability of a system must be incorporated in the 
design phase, and not after the system is already designed. Of course, next-generation 
optical networks are not an exception, and several mechanisms and techniques have 
been analyzed in order to improve survivability in optical networks [20], [21]. Clearly, 
this research work is motivated by the heavy impact that survivability has on QoS. The 
total QoS perceived by the end-user is affected by survivability in such a way that some 
researchers have envisioned the quality factor known as Quality of Resilience (QoR) 
[22]. QoR is established by parameters such as availability or mean down time, and can 
be used (in combination with QoS) to achieve service differentiation. 
 
As the range of services foreseen for future optical networks widens, it is clear that 
different services will have different requirements, not only to performance but also to 
dependability. Tele-surgery, for example, considered as a high demanding service, may 
require very low unavailability figures. But some other simple services, such as web 
browsing, can operate with higher unavailability figures. Dependability differentiation 
permits to offer a set of service classes with different availability characteristics. Thus, 
differentiated dependability is a crucial issue in order to achieve cost-efficient networks. 
Furthermore, it will allow network operators to discriminate services, and in general, it 
can be used to accomplish a higher level of dependability than what can be made 
available by traditional architectures [23]. All these considerations undoubtedly call for 
a differentiated survivability model in future optical networks. 
 
However, even if it is clear that dependability differentiation must be taken into account 
when designing next-generation networks, another key aspect must be taken into 
account. Dependability mechanisms implemented in a network can be deployed at one 
or several layers. At least three layers suitable for dependability mechanisms 
(redundancy) can be distinguished [23], [24]: component redundancy, node redundancy 
and network redundancy. In general, network layer mechanisms are the most common 
form of providing survivability, not only for OCS networks [25] but also for OPS 
networks [20].  
 
Although, as stated in [23], dependability methods deployed in higher layers are more 
comprehensive, its response times are slower than lower layer dependability 
mechanisms. Due to the recent development of hybrid optical network architectures, 
such as OpMiGua, node and component redundancy have gained importance because of 
its fast recovery from failures [26], [27], [28].  
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The conclusion to the observations above is that the recently proposed 3-LIHON 
concept must be provided with its own differentiated dependability mechanisms. As the 
architecture of a 3-LIHON node is different from previous designs, and network 
redundancy has been the object of several discussions, this thesis will focus on 
developing component redundancy mechanisms within a 3-LIHON node. With this 
work, differentiated dependability and protection against failures will be integrated in 
the 3-LIHON concept from the start. Thus, 3-LIHON will be allowed to achieve the 
wide range of QoS requirements demanded by the wide range of services that this novel 
architecture will have to support in the future. 
 
 
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to analyze and compare several dependability 
mechanisms that may be used for providing differentiated dependability in the hybrid 
optical network 3-LIHON.  
 
Various node design alternatives are shown and evaluated in terms of asymptotic 
availability, cost, complexity and when necessary, also impact on performance. Failure 
recovery time can also be used to assess the dependability of these alternative solutions, 
but as it will be very similar and difficult to measure, this thesis is not focused on that 
parameter. 
 
Basically, the following failures are analyzed: 
 
• Total failures of the OPS.  
 
• Total failures of the EPS. 
 
• Component failures within the OPS, also choosing the most dependable OPS 
architecture. 
 
• Other component failures within the 3-LIHON node, i.e. the Detect Packet Type 
(DPT) subsystem. 
 
• Fiber cuts. 
 
Although studying component failures within the EPS was also included in the problem 
description, due to the difficulty of analyzing the architecture and the different elements 
of this component, this type of failure was not included in this work. Furthermore, the 
technology involved in an EPS has reached its maturity, and nowadays EPSs are mass-
produced. Because of that, it is more realistic not to considered the dependability 
analysis of an EPS architecture, but consider it as a “building block” used in the 
architecture of a 3-LIHON node.   
 
In addition, discussing the use of Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) to administer 
OPS failures was contemplated as the next step in the dependability analysis. This assay 
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was supposed to be performed only after the main points above were finished, as stated 
in the problem description. Finally, although it would have extended the scope of the 
thesis to the network redundancy layer, the use of MPLS has not been studied. 
 
 
 
1.3 Methods 
 
 
According to [29], when analyzing Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
systems, three general methods can be distinguished: mathematical analysis, simulation 
and measurements on a real system (or prototype). Each method has it pros and cons, 
and these pros and cons can vary substantially depending on the requirements and 
specifications that are going to be analyzed. Furthermore, it is not unusual to combine 
the three methods when dimensioning and evaluating ICT systems, in order to benefit 
from all three approaches.  
 
In general, the first step is to perform a mathematical analysis, in which simplifications 
and assumptions should be made. Then, simulations are performed in order to assess the 
correctness of the previous assumptions and simplifications. Finally, measurements on a 
prototype or on the system are carried out in order to verify the accomplishment of the 
solutions. 
 
As this thesis can be considered as the first step in the analysis of the dependability of 
the 3-LIHON concept, the mathematical analysis method is the best suited for this first 
approach. More precisely, sensitivity analyses have been performed in order to evaluate 
the asymptotic availability. This type of analysis has been chosen due to the difficulty in 
finding trustworthy availability figures for the different components involved in the 
architecture of a 3-LIHON node. In order to carry out the mathematical operations 
needed to perform those analyses, the numerical computing environment Matlab has 
been used [30]. Different dependability models, namely Markov models and structural 
models have been designed as a basis to develop the mathematical analyses.  
 
On the other hand, simulation is the method adopted to calculate the impact on 
performance of some protection mechanisms. Programs simulating both the normal 
operation and the performance in a failure situation have been developed. Those 
programs are implemented using Simula [31] and its context class Demos [32], [33]. 
 
A more comprehensive explanation of the dependability models employed in this thesis 
to perform the mathematical analyses is presented in chapter 2. 
 
 
 
1.4 Limitations 
 
 
Although the work presented in this report tries to carry out an exhaustive availability 
analysis, it is limited by several factors. These limitations are basically determined by 
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the methods employed during the development of the research. First, because of the 
inherited drawbacks of mathematical analysis and simulation, as explained below. 
Second, the dependability models employed require several assumptions, which may be 
different for each model, in order to make them tractable. 
 
Regarding mathematical analysis, it must be clear from the beginning that detailed 
models may become complex and very difficult to solve. In general, the more 
comprehensive a model is, the more difficult it is to solve. Furthermore, usually these 
models are not flexible, so changes to the system may imply redesigning the whole 
analysis. This is also true for the research presented in this report, as the dependability 
and impact on performance analyses are based on the architecture and behavior of a 3-
LIHON node presented in [3]. Again, it is important to keep in mind that the 
assumptions and simplifications made during the mathematical analyses may affect 
heavily the validity of the results. Although all the assumptions and simplifications are 
clarified when presenting the different dependability models in the following chapters, a 
general view of dependability models and its intrinsic assumptions can be found in [29] 
and [34]. 
 
Another very severe limitation is the difficulty of finding trustworthy availability 
figures for the different components of a 3-LIHON node. Parameters such as 
availability, Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) or failure and repair rates for 
components (and subsystems) are extremely difficult to acquire. Moreover, when found, 
those parameters can vary substantially from one source to another. Failure rates, for 
example, can be predicted using a number of prediction models established by different 
organizations. The failure rate of a component, predicted under the same operating 
conditions, can differ by over one order of magnitude depending on the prediction 
model [34]. These divergences, in addition to the reluctance of manufacturers to 
announce dependability parameters, turn the task of obtaining those parameters into a 
highly laborious one. What is more, this uncertainty grows bigger when calculating 
failure and repair rates of more complex subsystems. A more exhaustive discussion of 
this issue is carried out in chapter 2. 
 
As stated in the previous section, the impact on performance of some protection 
mechanisms has been measured by means of simulations. In addition to the drawbacks 
of simulation methods listed in [29], designing a simulation scenario that perfectly 
matches the behavior of a 3-LIHON node in reality can never be completely correct. 
Several considerations such as traffic behavior, traffic loads for the different types of 
traffic or packet length distributions will differ from the real scenario. This is mainly 
because the 3-LIHON architecture is presented as a solution for the core networks of the 
future. Thus, the future service classes considered in the 3-LIHON concept [3] are based 
on estimations [1], so any attempts at defining future traffic patterns and its 
characteristics will always be just estimations. 
 
 
 
1.5 Report Outline 
 
 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: 
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Chapter 2: Background includes previous and ongoing work regarding hybrid optical 
networks, in order to provide the reader with the indispensable concepts to understand 
the rest of this work. As antecessor of 3-LIHON, the hybrid optical architecture 
OpMiGua is presented briefly. Then, the 3-LIHON architecture, whose dependability is 
analyzed in this thesis, is also described. Necessary dependability attributes and notions 
are covered in this chapter, as well as a comprehensive explanation of the methods used 
in this work, including dependability models and its assumptions and limitations. 
 
Chapter 3: Cases of Study describes the different failures evaluated. Namely, as stated 
in section 1.2, those cases are: OPS total failures, EPS total failures, OPS partial 
failures, DPT failures and fiber cuts. 
 
Chapter 4: Availability and Performance Analysis depicts the analysis carried out 
during this research. Particular assumptions of each case of study, as well as the 
different dependability models used are explained in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 5: Results shows the results obtained for each case of study, with the different 
dependability models employed. 
 
Chapter 6: Evaluation and Discussion of Results judges the results presented in the 
previous chapter, and compares them in order to choose the best suited mechanisms for 
each case of study. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work summarizes the work performed in this thesis 
and presents explicitly the best reliability mechanisms for each case of study. This 
chapter also makes some suggestions for future research.          
 
Appendix A: Collected Availability Figures presents all the availabilities figures for 
different network components gathered during the execution of this thesis.  
 
Appendix B: Transition Intensity Matrixes depicts the transition intensity matrixes of 
the different Markov models employed in this work. 
 
Appendix C: Attached Files lists the files attached to this thesis. These files include 
figures, Matlab scripts and the code of the developed simulators. 
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Chapter 2 
2. Background 
 
 
 
This chapter establishes the necessary basis in order to understand the work presented in 
this thesis. Firstly, the OpMiGua concept is briefly explained in section 2.1. OpMiGua 
is the hybrid network architecture in which 3-LIHON is based, so only the main 
concepts of this architecture are presented. In section 2.2, the 3-LIHON architecture is 
introduced. Essential dependability attributes and notions are shown in section 2.3. 
Finally, section 2.4 explains the difficulty of finding trustworthy availability figures, 
and presents the availability figures employed in the following chapters.          
 
 
 
2.1 Optical Migration Capable 3etwork with Service 
Guaranties (OpMiGua) 
 
 
OpMiGua [4] is one of the first hybrid optical network architectures proposed as a 
possible solution for next-generation optical core networks. The main objective of the 
OpMiGua architecture is to combine the service quality of OCS and the high throughput 
of OPS, as shown in Fig. 2.1, extracted from [4]. In addition, this architecture is 
designed to be able to support different services tailored to the specific requirements of 
diverse types of applications. Basically, the OpMiGua concept distinguishes two types 
of service classes; Guaranteed Service Transport (GST) class and Statistically 
Multiplexed (SM) class. 
 
GST class is defined to offer the most demanding service requirements, such as no 
packet loss and fixed low delay. GST packets follow pre-assigned wavelength paths in a 
Wavelength Routed Optical Network (WRON) through OXCs, and are given absolute 
priority when contending with SM packets. This ensures the absolute guarantee of GST 
packets, resulting in no loss because of contention and no header processing.  
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Fig. 2.1: Network model assumed in the OpMiGua network concept 
 
On the other hand, SM packets are designated as the lower quality traffic. SM packets 
are switched according to their header information using an OPS, needing some header 
processing time in the node. Moreover, SM packets can be rejected if contending with 
GST packets and no resources are available. This is perfectly acceptable, as SM traffic 
class is used by non-critical applications allowing reasonable delay, delay variations and 
packet retransmissions. Furthermore, in order to reduce the number of buffers, SM 
traffic can be divided into two QoS classes. The High-Class Transport (HCT) service is 
characterized by low Packet Loss Ratio (PLR) and minimum delay and delay variations. 
In contrast, the Normal Class Transport (NCT) service has moderate PLR and non-
demanding delay and delay variation requirements.    
 
Thanks to these two main types of traffic (GST and SM), OpMiGua presents a high 
throughput efficiency interleaving SM packets in the OPS network with static 
multiplexed GST packets in the WRON. Thus, an efficient use of wavelengths is 
ensured because when GST packets are not present, SM traffic is statistically 
multiplexed in between GST packets. As a result, time-division multiplexing of GST 
and SM packets is achieved, and wavelength efficiency, which is one of the most 
important drawbacks of WRONs, is overcome. Furthermore, the OpMiGua design also 
reduces the required resources in the packet switch. As the OPS is not supporting GST 
traffic, it can be regarded as a small and relatively cheap element, downsizing 
processing and buffer resources. 
 
 
2.1.1 OpMiGua Hybrid 3ode Design 
 
The basic structure of an OpMiGua node is illustrated in Fig. 2.2, taken from [27]. GST 
and SM packets are divided at the input using a Packet Separator (PS). GST packets are 
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forwarded to a cross coupling matrix, i.e. an OXC. SM packets are switched using a 
packet switch, i.e. an OPS. At the output, the packets from the OXC are combined with 
the packets from the OPS using a Packet Multiplexer (PM). Fig. 2.2 shows a single fiber 
input, where n is the number of inputs/outputs of the OXC and P is the number of 
inputs/outputs of the OPS. Normally all inputs may carry both GST and SM packets, so 
generally n is equal to P. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2: Basic structure of an OpMiGua node 
 
An OpMiGua node is designed to work in asynchronous operation, with variable length 
packets arriving at random times. Because of that, providing absolute priority to GST 
packets in case of contention with SM packets may be a challenge, as packets are not 
aligned at the node input. When a GST packet enters an OpMiGua node, it is detected 
using power detectors, and the destined output of a GST packet is reserved, so that 
incoming SM packets cannot employ that output. Then, the GST packet enters a Fiber 
Delay Line (FDL) with a length corresponding to the longest SM packet. This FDL 
allows a SM packet (if any) using that output to finish its transmission. Thus, it is 
ensured that the destined output will not be occupied by the time the GST packet 
reaches it. This mechanism, developed for giving absolute priority to GST packets will 
be expanded and employed in the 3-LIHON architecture. 
 
In order to implement packet division at the input, polarization separation was initially 
considered. GST and SM packets are transmitted using orthogonal states of polarization. 
As a result, Automatic Polarization Controllers (APCs) and Polarization Beam Splitters 
(PBSs) are used to separate the two traffic streams. At the output, polarization 
maintaining couplers are used as PMs to merge again the two types of traffic. 
 
Fig. 2.3 depicts the detailed design of an OpMiGua node containing all the previous 
considerations, obtained from [4]. This design also includes buffers in the OPS, 
although this is not necessary for the general operation of an OpMiGua node. In Fig. 
2.3, N represents the number of input fibers, n is the number of wavelengths per fiber, s 
is the number of switch inputs (s = n*N) and B correspond to the number of buffer 
outputs.    
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Fig. 2.3: Detailed design of an OpMiGua node 
 
Finally, because of the different drawbacks regarding the use of polarization to 
distinguish between GST and SM packets, an alternative method based in Optical Codes 
(OCs) [16] was proposed in [15]. The architecture for the PS based on OCs presented in 
[15] is shown in Fig. 2.4. The use of OCs was chosen due to its simple implementation 
and operation.  
 
 
Fig. 2.4: Basic Architecture for a Packet Separator based on Optical Codes 
 
Basically, the headers and tails of a SM packet are labeled with an OC, while GST 
packets are not labeled. By default, the PS sends incoming packets to the OXC. When a 
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packet enters the PS, it is split and a copy of the signal reaches the Encoder/Decoder. If 
no OC is detected (i.e. the incoming packet is a GST packet), nothing changes and the 
default operation is performed (the GST packet is sent to the OXC). On the other hand, 
if a matched OC is identified (i.e. the incoming packet is a SM packet), the state of the 
two gates will change and the SM packet will be sent to the OPS. When the tail OC is 
detected, the two gates change again to the default position. These gates can be 
implemented employing Semiconductor Optical Amplifiers (SOAs) or lithium niobate 
(LiNbO3) optical gates. 
 
In addition to its simple implementation, another advantage of the PS architecture based 
on OCs is that a range of different OCs can be used for QoS differentiation within the 
OPS. Although the OpMiGua PS can perfectly work with only two OCs, one header and 
one tail, the differentiation between HCT and NCT inside the OPS can be fulfilled by 
means of OCs. Even more, this scheme will also be employed in the 3-LIHON 
architecture in order to distinguish between three types of traffic streams, as shown in 
the next section. 
 
 
 
2.2 3-Level Integrated Hybrid Optical 3etwork (3LIHO3) 
 
 
The 3-Level Integrated Hybrid Optical Network is a new network architecture recently 
proposed as “a possible solution for future all-services integrated network architecture” 
[3]. As a hybrid optical network, 3-LIHON is designed to exploit the advantages of both 
OCS and OPS. In order to do that, 3-LIHON takes advantage of some mechanisms 
already employed in OpMiGua. However, these mechanisms have been improved in 3-
LIHON in such a way that this new architecture attempts to achieve at least three major 
advantages compared to previously proposed hybrid architectures. First, better QoS for 
applications generating short packets with high real-time requirements. Second, better 
resource utilization in terms of bandwidth and last but not least, a lower overall cost 
with respect to other architectures. 
 
In the 3-LIHON concept, three types of transport services are considered in order to 
meet the requirements of current (and future) services. Extending the transport classes 
already introduced in OpMiGua, the three types of traffic discerned in 3-LIHON are 
Guaranteed Service Type (GST), Statistically Multiplexed Real Time (SM/RT) and 
Statistically Multiplexed Best Effort (SM/BE). 
 
The GST traffic class is defined in a very similar way as it was in OpMiGua. GST 
provides no packet loss and no jitter inside the network. Moreover, GST packets are 
given absolute priority when contending with other traffic classes. As in an OCS 
network, GST packets go through OXCs following optical end-to-end circuits. It was 
proven in the OpMiGua architecture that the relative GST packets should be larger than 
SM packets in order to obtain efficient wavelength utilization. Because of that, small 
GST packets should be avoided and GST packets are created at the ingress nodes by 
assembling a number of single packets. A timeout mechanism and a maximum size for 
GST packets are established, just to make sure that the buffering delay at the ingress 
nodes is kept under an acceptable value. GST is best suited for application and services 
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with high bandwidth demands, like video streaming, videoconferences or even music 
streaming if it is high quality music. 
 
The SM/RT transport class is an optical packet switched service with contention for 
bandwidth, handled by an OPS. Although possible packet loss in a 3-LIHON node is 
allowed, no delay (or very limited) should be guaranteed. Contention between GST and 
SM/RT packets is solved the same way it was in OpMiGua, but SM/RT packets have 
priority over SM/BE packets when contending for free wavelengths. As explained 
before, SM/RT packets are expected to be small compared to GST packets, in order to 
achieve bandwidth efficiency. Thus, SM/RT packets are sent as single optical packets 
without any aggregation. SM/RT is best suited for services like traffic control (i.e. 
signaling and routing information) and Internet telephony. 
 
Finally, the SM/BE transport class is also an optical packet switched service managed 
by an EPS (although an OPS with electronic buffering can also be used). SM/BE is the 
lowest priority traffic class, so packet loss inside the nodes is admitted and there is no 
guaranteed delay. However, a small overall packet loss can be accomplished by means 
of retransmission of packets. SM/BE should not be used for applications generating 
large packets, so SM/BE packets are foreseen to be larger than SM/RT packets but 
smaller than GST packets. This type of traffic is best suited for general data transfer and 
for interactive messaging with low real time demands, services that could be mapped to 
the OpMiGua transport classes, but with difficulties.  
 
As in OpMiGua, 3-LIHON achieves a high throughput efficiency statistically 
multiplexing SM/RT and SM/BE packets in between GST packets. However, since 
three types of traffic are struggling for the same wavelengths on output links, contention 
resolution is a little bit more complex in 3-LIHON. Collision avoidance is also managed 
by the Collision Avoidance/Contention Resolution (CA/CR) mechanism, explained in 
the next section. 
 
It is important to take notice that the three switching technologies used in 3-LIHON 
(OXC, OPS and EPS) not only permit to achieve service differentiation, but also permit 
3-LIHON to be a cheap hybrid architecture. OXCs and EPS can be regarded as cheap 
switches, as both components are based on existing and mature technology. The most 
costly switch in the 3-LIHON architecture is the OPS. But GST and SM/BE traffic 
classes are expected to carry the largest traffic volumes while SM/RT traffic, on the 
other hand, will represent a small amount of future traffic. Thus, the OPS handling 
SM/RT packets can be considered as a small and cheap element (at least cheaper than in 
other hybrid architectures) as it is not managing GST and SM/BE traffic. Furthermore, 
since SM/RT transport class guarantees very limited delay, no buffers are employed in 
the OPS, situation that also reduces the cost of this element. Even if buffering is 
allowed, it will be strictly limited so that the cost can be kept under admissible values. 
 
 
2.2.1 The 3-LIHO3 Architecture 
 
Essentially, the architecture of a 3-LIHON node consists of the three switching 
subsystems (OXC, OPS and EPS), the Detect Packet Type subsystem (DPT) and the 
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Collision Avoidance/Contention Resolution (CA/CR) mechanism. The general design 
of a 3-LIHON node with N input fibers with M wavelengths is depicted in Fig. 2.5. 
 
When a packet enters a 3-LIHON node, the DPT subsystem identifies the transport type 
by means of OCs and routes the packet to the correct switching subsystem. GST packets 
are handled by the OXC, typically following already established optical circuits. SM/RT 
packets are managed by the OPS. As explained in the previous section, this OPS is 
expected to be small and without buffering. Finally, an EPS handles the SM/BE 
packets. Alternatively, an OPS with electronic buffering can be used. In order to 
manage contention and collision avoidance, the three switching subsystems are 
provided with the CA/CR mechanism. 
 
 
Fig. 2.5: Architecture of a 3-LIHON node 
 
Each input wavelength is supplied with a Detect Packet Type subsystem. The DPT is in 
charge of identifying the different transport classes and routing the packets to the 
corresponding switching subsystem. Fundamentally, the implementation of the DPT is 
an extension of the Packet Separator based on OCs proposed in [15] for OpMiGua. This 
implementation is illustrated in Fig. 2.6, extracted from [3]. The headers and tails of 
SM/RT and SM/BE packets are marked with OCs, while GST packets are not labeled. 
Different OCs are used for labeling SM/RT and SM/BE packets, so that they can be 
differentiated. On the other hand, a defined and fixed tail-OC value is used for both 
types of packets. The default operation is to send incoming packets directly to the OXC. 
When a matching OC is detected, the corresponding optical gate is closed (and the 
others are opened) in order to send the incoming packet to the OPS or the EPS. When 
the tail-OC value is detected, the DPT comes back to the default operation. That is, the 
default operation is to keep gate I in Fig. 2.6 closed, while the other two gates remain 
open. If an optical code related to a SM/RT packet is detected, gate II is closed while 
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gates I and III are opened. The detection of a SM/BE optical code closes gate III and 
opens gates I and II. 
 
 
Fig. 2.6: Detect Packet Type subsystem implementation based on OCs 
 
The CA/CR mechanism in 3-LIHON is implemented inside the three different switching 
subsystems using detect signals, as shown in Fig. 2.7 (also taken from [3]). In that 
figure, a generic wavelength j on output fiber k is denoted as (j, k).  
 
 
Fig. 2.7: CA/CR mechanism implemented in a 3-LIHON node 
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GST packets are provided with maximum priority, so that when a GST packet arrives, 
two signals are sent to the OPS and the EPS. When this detect signal arrives at the OPS, 
output channel (j, k) is not considered for incoming SM/RT packets. However, in order 
to allow a current SM/RT packet to finish its transmission, GST packets enter a FDL 
(FDL 1) with length equal to the maximum SM/RT length. Thus, the OPS can consider 
channel (j, k) again for contention when the GST packet is over (the delay added by 
FDL1 must be also considered). On the contrary, if the EPS receives a detect signal 
coming from the OXC, output (j, k) is not considered for incoming SM/BE packets and 
the EPS will stop transmitting the current SM/BE packet after a fixed delay equal to 
FDL1. This is called “delayed preemption”, as a SM/BE packet being transmitted after 
that delay will be preempted and destroyed (a tail-OC must be added for 
reconfiguration). This delayed preemption may allow some SM/BE packets to finish its 
transmission, instead of preempting them immediately. Finally, if a detect signal is 
detected in the EPS coming from the OPS, it will immediately stop transmitting and 
cannot consider output (j, k) till the SM/RT packet has finish its transmission. A very 
small delay (FDL2) is needed for SM/RT packets in order to allow the EPS to stop 
transmitting. 
 
Summarizing, GST packets have a non-preemptive priority over SM/RT packets. GST 
packets and SM/RT packets have a preemptive priority over SM/BE packets, but GST 
packets implement the delayed preemption mechanism, while SM/RT packets will force 
the EPS to instantly stop its transmission. Thus, GST packets follow pre-established 
virtual circuits without loss, preempting SM/BE packets if necessary. SM/RT packets 
can be sent through any free wavelength in the corresponding output fiber. If no free 
wavelength is available, SM/RT packets will preempt SM/BE packets. Finally, SM/BE 
packets can only be forwarded using any free wavelength in the correct output fiber, but 
they can be preempted by GST or SM/RT packets. 
 
 
 
2.3 Dependability 
 
 
This section aims to introduce and explain the main concepts of dependability used in 
this thesis. Mainly, the definitions, dependability attributes and dependability models 
employed in this work have been extracted from [29] and [34]. It is not the objective of 
this section to provide an exhaustive discussion of all the concepts covered by the 
dependability field, but just to present and describe the necessary notions in order to 
understand this dissertation. If the reader seeks to gain a broad insight into 
dependability, [29] is a perfect introductory book, and [34] is a little bit more advanced, 
but also indispensable. This section is no more than a simple summary of several 
concepts already presented in these two books. 
 
First of all, dependability is defined in [29] as: “Trustworthiness of a system such that 
reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers”. Dependability is 
intrinsically a characteristic of how the system behave. Internal characteristics of a 
system may determine the dependability, but the inverse is not necessarily true: a 
system is not automatically dependable just for having certain characteristics. In 
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addition, dependability is a recursive term: a system can be used as a subsystem of a 
larger system. 
 
As dependability is an operational characteristic of a system, it is very closely linked 
with the service provided by that system. The type of dependability requirements and 
how strong they are depends largely on the application. In fact, this dependency 
acquires a higher dimension because of the cost of dependability. High dependability is 
expensive. Thus, there is a trade-off between cost and dependability that is not easy to 
solve. 
 
 
2.3.1 Threats to dependability 
 
Basically, there are three main impairments to dependability: failures, errors and faults. 
The following definitions for each term have been extracted from [29]. 
 
A failure is a “deviation of the delivered service from the compliance with the 
specification. Transition from correct service to incorrect service (e.g. the system 
becomes unavailable”.  
 
An error is a “part of the system state which is liable to lead to a failure”.  
 
Finally, a fault is defined as an “adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error”. 
 
In other words, a failure in a system occurs when a system does not work as it was 
considered to work. Delivering a service out of time (too late) is also considered a 
failure, even if the system is working as expected. Failures are divided into benign and 
catastrophic failures. This classification is not straightforward, as it depends on the 
application and the consequences the failure has. 
 
An error is also “a deviation from accuracy or correctness within a system” [34] (e.g. an 
incorrect value of a variable). Faults can be seen as error causes. Faults are the main 
origin of dependability shortage, and thus they have been exhaustively discussed. As a 
result, faults can be classified into six categories: physical, transient, intermittent, 
design, operational and faults caused by the environment. 
 
Physical faults, also known as solid faults, are the causes of errors within the system, 
like degradation of materials for example. In order to remove a physical fault the system 
must be repaired, otherwise physical faults are perpetual. Transient faults are not 
persistent, that is, they last for a short period of time and do not lead to physical changes 
in the system.  Intermittent faults simply appear and disappear, and are very difficult to 
distinguish from transient failures. Design (or logical) faults affect the logic of the 
system and are caused by humans. Bugs (software faults) are the most popular subgroup 
of the design faults. Operational faults are the faults caused by humans operating the 
system. Lastly, examples of faults caused by the environment are floods, fires, 
earthquakes, etcetera. 
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2.3.2 System times 
 
The system times are an essential concept in dependability, and are used in order to 
measure different dependability attributes such as availability or reliability. An excellent 
explanation of system times is given in [29] on pages 27 and 28. For the sake of 
completeness, it will be summarized here. 
 
First, a system can be considered to be in one of these two states: working, if the system 
behaves as expected (remember that providing a service untimely is also considered a 
failure); or failed, if the system does not work as it was intended to work. 
 
Then, I(t) can be defined as a function of time that describes the behavior of the system: 
 
 =  1 if the system is working at time t
0 otherwise
	                                      (2.1) 
 
Considering that at t = 0 the system is new or can be regarded as new, Fig. 2.8 depicts a 
possible behavior of an operating system. The different system times indicated in that 
figure are: 
 
TFF: Time to First Failure. 
 
TCF: Time to first Catastrophic Failure. 
 
TBF: Time Between Failures. 
 
TU: Up Time. It is the duration of the working period. 
 
TD: Down Time. It is the duration of the system outage. 
 
TF: Time to Failure. Time from a random instant when the system is working till it fails. 
 
The expected values of the system times (if they exit) are denoted as: 
 
MTFF = E(TFF): Mean Time to First Failure. 
 
MTCF = E(TCF): Mean Time to Catastrophic Failure. 
 
MTBF = E(TBF): Mean Time Between Failures. 
 
MUT = E(TU): Mean Up Time. 
 
MDT = E(TD): Mean Down Time. 
 
MTTF = E(TF): Mean Time To Failure. 
 
Mainly MTBF, MUT and MDT are the most interesting parameters from the point of 
view of this thesis. Another important system time considered by several authors [35] is  
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MTTR = Mean Time To Repair: the expectation of the time needed to the restoration of 
               the item. Obviously, the system must be able to be repaired in order to 
               consider this time. 
 
In fact, some approximations can be applied to this system times. If measured over a 
long period of time, the MDT can be approximated by the MTTR. However this is only 
true if the down state is caused by a failure and not by a preventive maintenance action, 
because then the time to repair is identical to the down time. Following the same 
reasoning, if the down state is caused by a failure and not by a preventive maintenance 
action, the time between failures is identical to the sum of the down time and the up 
time. Then, over a long period of time the sum of MDT and MUT can be approximated 
by the MTBF.   
 
 
Fig. 2.8: System times 
 
 
2.3.3 Dependability Attributes 
 
Dependability attributes are used in order to describe the dependability properties of a 
system. In fact, dependability is determined by quantifying these attributes. In [29] five 
dependability attributes are distinguished: availability, reliability, safety, integrity and 
maintainability. Availability and reliability can be quantified by means of direct 
measurements. Because the main focus of this thesis is availability, it is briefly 
described in this section. 
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2.3.3.1 Availability 
 
The availability of a system is defined in [34] as “its ability to provide a set of services 
at a given instant of time or at any instant within a given time interval”. The three major 
availability measures are the asymptotic availability, the instantaneous availability and 
the interval availability. The asymptotic availability and the instantaneous availability 
are presented below. 
 
The most common availability measurement is the asymptotic availability, denoted A. 
The asymptotic availability is the probability of finding the system working at a random 
time in the future. 
 

 = lim →   = 1                                                             (2.2) 
 
This can also be expressed as: 
 

 =   +  =  

 =
 − 
            2.3) 
 
The range of values for the asymptotic availability of a system usually varies between 
0.9 and 0.9999999. Generally the asymptotic unavailability, denoted U, is used instead 
of the asymptotic availability. The asymptotic unavailability is the probability of finding 
a system in a failed state at a random time in the future. U is habitually preferred to A 
because U is easier to read, as A is normally very close to one. 
 
 = 1 − 
 =   =  

                                          (2.4) 
 
The asymptotic unavailability typically varies between 10-1 and 10-7.   
 
The instantaneous availability, denoted A(t), is the probability of finding a system 
working at a given instant t. 
 

 =  = 1                                                       (2.5) 
 
Logically, the instantaneous unavailability, U(t), is the probability of finding a system in 
a failed state at a given instant t. 
 
 = 1 − 
                                                                    (2.6) 
 
If the asymptotic availability exists, the instantaneous availability converges to it. 
 

 =  lim → 
                                                                        (2.7) 
  
2.3.3.2 Reliability 
 
In [29], the reliability is the “ability of a system to provide uninterrupted service”. In 
order to assess reliability, two types of system can be considered: new systems and 
systems in steady state. 
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If a system is new (or considered as new) when it starts being used, the TFF is employed 
to determine its reliability. The reliability of a new system can be measured by its 
reliability function (R(t)), MTFF and failure rate (λ(t)). 
 
The reliability function for a new system is the probability that the system provides 
uninterrupted service during [0, t]. 
 
 =  >                                                              (2.8) 
 
MTFF can be measured, if it is finite (i.e. limt→∞ tR(t) = 0), as 
 
 =   


                                                          (2.9) 
Lastly, the failure rate is the probability per time unit for the system failing during a 
short interval of time after having been operational without failure up to time t. The 
relation between the reliability function and the failure rate is 
 
 =  !" # $%&%'(                                                     (2.10) 
 
On the other hand, if the system is not new, but it is in steady state with respect to 
failures and restorations of service, then the reliability is given by the TF. The reliability 
function (Rt) is  
 
) =  >                                                           2.11 
 
If MTTF is finite, then 
 
 =   )


                                                      (2.12) 
 
 
2.3.4 Dependability Models 
 
This section presents the different dependability models used in this thesis to assess the 
dependability attributes. The main focus is to state clearly the different assumptions 
about the system and its behavior required in order to perform a quantitative analysis of 
the dependability of a system. In some cases, these assumptions may be very restrictive, 
so they must be perfectly declared and understood. This is because if the true behavior 
of the system deviates from the assumptions, the analyses lose its precision. In addition, 
notations and formulae employed to calculate the dependability attributes are also 
displayed. 
 
Fundamentally, two groups of dependability models can be differentiated, static models 
and dynamic models. For dependability analysis, the two models employed in this work 
are structural models (static model) and Markov models (dynamic model). The 
structural modeling method utilized is reliability block diagrams, and Markov models 
are represented by state transition diagrams.  
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In some cases, to model large systems, a combination of Markov and structural models 
is used. When dealing with large systems, Markov models can become extremely large 
and unmanageable. On the other hand, the assumptions of reliability block diagrams 
may ignore the system dynamics and dependencies. So, a combination of Markov 
models and structural models is a viable approach to model these large systems. 
 
2.3.4.1 Reliability block diagrams 
 
Reliability block diagrams are the modeling method for structural models. The main 
advantage of reliability block diagrams is that they reproduce the structure and design of 
the system, and can handle large systems. But if reliability block models are used to 
quantitatively analyze the dependability of a system, very strict assumptions are 
imposed. The three assumptions are presented below. 
 
First, if the system is composed by several subsystems, each subsystem fails 
independently of all other subsystems. 
 
Second, if a subsystem has failed, it is repaired independently of the state of all other 
subsystems. 
 
Third, the system behaves as intended. This implies that all service restoration actions 
are successful, and failures (errors) do not propagate to other subsystems. 
 
Because of these three assumptions, structural models do not reflect system dynamics 
and dependencies, which is the main drawback of these models. 
 
Reliability block diagrams are built by reliability blocks. The reliability block represents 
a system, and can be a subsystem of the system being analyzed. Each block has a 
probability that the system is working, denoted Psystem. Then, reliability blocks may be 
seen as relays that connect two end-points (depicted by small circles) with probability 
Psystem. If connection is provided between two end-points, the system works. 
 
In this thesis, reliability block diagrams are used to analyze the asymptotic availability 
of a system (i.e. the objective is to find A). In this analysis, works means that the system 
provides service at a given instant of time, and Psystem = A. Complex systems can be 
modeled by combinations of three simple system structures: series systems, parallel 
systems and k-out-of-n systems. These three basic systems are briefly explained below. 
 
A series system is a system where all the subsystems forming the system must work if 
the system shall work. That is, a system composed of n subsystems has a series structure 
if all n subsystems are required to be working for the system to be working. Fig. 2.9 
depicts a general series system. 
 
 
Fig. 2.9: Reliability block diagram of a series system 
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The asymptotic availability is obtained very easily as 
 

*+,-+* =  . 
-                                                                         (2.13)
/
-01
 
 
where Ai is the asymptotic availability of the i’th element. 
 
A parallel system is a system where at least one of the subsystems forming the system 
must work if the system shall work. That is, a system composed by n subsystems has a 
parallel structure if at least one of the subsystems must be working for the system to be 
working. Fig. 2.10 depicts a general parallel system. 
 
 
Fig. 2.10: Reliability block diagram of a parallel system 
 
The asymptotic availability is obtained as 
 

23,344+4 =  1 − .1 − 
-                                                 (2.14)
/
-01
 
 
where Ai is the asymptotic availability of the i’th element. 
 
A k-out-of-n system is a system where at least k of the subsystems forming the system 
must work if the system shall work. That is, a system composed by n subsystems has a 
k-out-of-n structure if at least k of the subsystems must be working for the system to be 
working. Fig. 2.11 depicts a general k-out-of-n system. 
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The asymptotic availability is a little bit more complex to obtain. In order to calculate 
A, it is necessary to consider all the possible combinations of working and failed 
subsystems which yield a working system. If all subsystems are identical (i.e. Ai = As) 
the asymptotic availability can be easily calculated. 
 

5"6%"67"/ =  8 9:; <
/
=05

*=1 −  
*/"=                             (2.15) 
 
Fig. 2.11: Reliability block diagram of a k-out-of-n system 
 
2.3.4.2 Markov models 
 
Markov models are used to model the dependability of a system by a time continuous 
discrete space Markov process. It is represented by a state transition diagram. The main 
advantage of Markov models is that they describe with great precision the dynamic 
behavior of the system. This helps to identify dependencies between events and between 
events system elements. Also sequences of events and the time between them can be 
easily identified. On the other hand, state transition diagrams can become very large 
even when representing (a priori) simple systems. This will make the model 
unmanageable and very difficult to solve. 
 
The state space of the system is divided into two sets, the set of working (up) states and 
the set of failed (down) states. A working state is a state in which the system provides 
its services according to the specification. This could happen even if a subsystem has 
failed, but the system is still able to deliver its services. Working states are represented 
by circles, as it is shown in Fig. 2.12. A failed state is a state in which in which the 
system does not provide its services according to the specification. Failed stated are 
represented by squares. 
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The transitions between states are represented by arrows. Each arrow has its transition 
intensity, generally denoted as qij. In this thesis, all times in the systems are negatively 
exponentially distributed and thus correspond to a Poisson distribution. Because of that, 
transition intensities are the intensities of the Poisson processes that enforce the 
transition, and are constant. If the transition is from a working state to a failed state, the 
transition intensity is a failure rate and is denoted with the Greek letter λx. If the 
transition is from a failed state to a working state, the transition intensity is a service 
restoration rate (repair rate) and is denoted with the Greek letter µx. 
 
 
Fig. 2.12: Notations for Markov models 
 
In some models, the concept of fault coverage is also taken into account. In general, the 
fault coverage can be seen as the probability that the actions scheduled in order to cover 
a failure succeed. This is not a formal definition, because the fault coverage of a system 
depends on the actions taken by the system to cover a failure, and thus the fault 
coverage can be defined differently for different systems. The fault coverage reflects the 
probability of an error not being detected, or the probability of a backup copy having an 
undetected fault that manifest itself as a failure when this backup system has to replace 
the active system (supposing that no more copies are available). The fault coverage, 
denoted by c, modifies the transition intensities in the model.       
 
In the state transition diagrams, each state has a steady state probability (pi), which is 
the probability of the system being in that state in the long run. If the steady state 
probabilities are found, the asymptotic availability is easily calculated as the sum of the 
steady state probabilities of the working states. As the sum of the steady state 
probabilities of all states is equal to one (normalization condition), the asymptotic 
unavailability is also easily calculated as the sum of the steady state probabilities of the 
failed states. 
 

 =  8 >-
- ∊ @6,5-/A
                                                                     (2.16) 
 
 =  8 >-
- ∊ 3-4+&
                                                                         (2.17) 
 
Two alternatives to calculate the steady state probabilities are perfectly described in [29] 
on pages 142-145. In this thesis, the steady state probabilities are calculated using the 
second proposed alternative; that is, using the matrix form. 
 
In the long run, the number of failures is equal to the number of repairs in the system. 
This leads to the conclusion that the system failure intensity, Λ, can be obtained either 
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from the transitions from the working set of states to the failed set of states, or vice-
versa. 
 
Λ =  8 8 C-=>-
= D 3-4+&
=  8 8 C=->=
= D 3-4+&
 
- D @6,5-/A
 
- D @6,5-/A
          (2.18) 
 
Then MTBF, MUT and MDT can be obtained as 
 
 =  1Λ                                                                                 (2.19) 
                                                                         
 = 
 ∗                                                                     (2.20)                             
 
 =  ∗                                                                     (2.21)        
 
 
 
2.4 Component Availability Figures 
 
 
In order to qualitatively assess the asymptotic availability of a system (a 3-LIHON node 
in this document) with the previously presented models, a set of parameters needs to be 
known. Mainly, the asymptotic availability of the different blocks (components and 
subsystems) is needed in a reliability block diagram. On the other hand, failure rates and 
repair/restoration rates are needed when using Markov models. 
 
The asymptotic availability of the different blocks can be calculated if the MDT and the 
MUT are known. As the objective of the analysis is the asymptotic availability, the 
approximations presented in Section 2.3.2 for measurements over a long period of time 
can be applied, thus the asymptotic availabilities can be calculated from the MTTR and 
the MTBF. Even more, if failure rates and the repair rates are constant (as they are in 
the models considered in this thesis); the MDT and the MUT (thus, the MTTR and the 
MTBF) can be determined from the failure and repair rates. 
 
Basically, each single component (couplers, splitters, etcetera) can be modeled by a 
two-state Markov model, as in Fig. 2.13. In this thesis, a component is understood as 
“single component” if it cannot be considered as a combination of simpler components, 
e.g. couplers, splitters, multiplexers, demultiplexers, etcetera. 
 
 
Fig. 2.13: Two-state Markov model 
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In this simple model, the asymptotic availability can be easily calculated 
 

 =  FFG$                                                                            (2.22) 
 
Since the up and down times are negatively exponentially distributed MUT = λ-1 and 
MDT = µ-1. So, applying the approximations for MTTR and MTBF, it results 
 
 =  =  H"1                                                    (2.23) 
 =  +  =  H"1 +  I"1                           (2.24) 
 
Obviously, (2.3) and (2.4) can also be applied. Thus, the availability of a single 
component can be assessed knowing λ and µ. Then, these single components will be 
modeled in the reliability block diagrams as single reliability blocks, whose availability 
is calculated as shown before. 
 
When modeling a subsystem that comprises a set of simple elements (e.g. the DPT, 
which includes an encoder, photodetectors, optical gates, etcetera) as a reliability block, 
the failure rate is calculated as recommended in [37]. That is, basically the total failure 
rate is determined by summing the failure rate for each of the elements that comprise 
the system.  
 
However, it is important to be aware of the fact that this way of determining the 
availability of a single component (reliability block in a reliability block diagram) 
deviates from the system behavior. By calculating the availability of a reliability block 
this way, it is supposed that each block is repaired independently of the state of the 
other blocks. Although this is an innate assumption of reliability block diagrams, clearly 
deviates from the system behavior, and slants the analyses. In other words, imagine a 3-
LIHON node, as shown in Fig. 2.5 composed by an OXC, an OPS, an EPS, 
multiplexers, demultiplexers… By modeling it employing a reliability block diagram, it 
is supposed that there is a dedicated repairman for the multiplexers, another dedicated 
repairman for the OXC, etcetera. Evidently this is not true, and thus the analysis will not 
be perfectly accurate, but this is the best that can be done when modeling complex 
systems with reliability block diagrams. 
 
 
2.4.1 Difficulty of Finding Trustworthy Availability Figures 
 
This section aims to show the reader how difficult it is to find trustworthy availability 
figures for the work presented in this thesis.  
 
First, the reluctance of manufacturers to announce these parameters makes this a very 
arduous task. This is because the same component may have very diverse values from 
different suppliers, even using the same technology, as shown in [38]. So, when found, 
these values may vary a lot from one source to another. In addition, when consulting 
literature sources, it is frequent to find recent articles based on availability figures from 
old sources. For example [39] dates from 2011, but some availability figures are based 
on [40] and [41], dated from 1998 and 1993 respectively. Clearly those numbers will 
not reflect the maturity obtained by the components in that time gap. Some other times 
the figures employed by literature sources are the results of private communication with 
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different suppliers, which makes knowing the original source impossible. Another 
problem associated to extract availability figures from literature is that usually these 
figures are related to a specific component used in that source. Although this component 
could be similar to the one employed in 3-LIHON, they will not be equal. And of 
course, different sources present different types of reliability figures: some present 
availabilities and unavailabilities (without giving failure rates), some others present 
failure and repair rates, while others present MTBF directly. It is also typical in some 
sources to approximate MTBF = λ-1, although λ-1 is equal to MTTF (not MTBF).  
 
A solution could be to extract the availability figures from a prediction model, but 
again, the same problems arise. A number of models are established to predict the 
failure rate of components, like Telcordia SR-332 [42]  or IEC TR 62380 [43], to name 
but two. These models employ different factors and formulae, thus the predicted failure 
rates may vary substantially, as it is shown in [34]. Furthermore, not all optical 
components are evaluated in these models, so sticking to one model is not a solution 
either. Even worse, some models give different failure rates for the same component 
depending on the materials it is made up of. This also represents a problem when 
dealing with architectures and systems that are in early stage (i.e. 3-LIHON). 
 
Another problem is how to calculate failure rates of state-of-the-art optical devices. 
Tunable Wavelength Converters (TWCs) [44], for example, are becoming increasingly 
important in optical architectures. But this element is in an early phase, still 
experimenting with different technologies [45], [46], [47]; and consequently TWCs are 
not commercially available. Thus, availability figures for these components are almost 
nonexistent. In fact, different TWCs may have different tuning ranges, from fixed 
converters to several wavelengths. Intuitively, the wider the tuning range, the larger the 
failure rate is expected to be. Because of that, the failure rates and availability figures 
employed for these components should be taken as approximations, and not as 
trustworthy figures. 
 
It is also important to keep in mind that failure rates only reflect the effects of physical 
failures. For single components, like couplers or splitters, this could be sufficient. But 
for more complex subsystems other factors should also be taken into account. The DPT 
subsystem, for example, needs some logic to open and close the corresponding optical 
gates. Just summing the failure rates for the different components, as recommended in 
[37], will not reflect this kind of failures (typically software failures). 
 
Besides, if finding trustworthy failure rates for different components is almost 
impossible, finding repair rates is even harder. Calculating a repair rate involves several 
considerations, such as fault localization, technical delay, check out time, logistic delay, 
etcetera. Obviously, it is impossible to perfectly define a failure rate that takes into 
account all these factors. Because of that, very rough repair rates are used (and 
accepted) when assessing the availability of a system. 
 
 
2.4.2 Availability Figures for Single Components 
 
Now that it is clear that finding trustworthy availability figures is virtually impossible, 
the availability figures for single components employed in this work are presented. All 
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the collected availability figures are shown in appendix A. In addition to exemplify the 
previous section, the compilation of figures collected in appendix A can also be used as 
a small database for future work employing these numbers.  
 
It is also important to keep in mind that the collected values for failure rates are referred 
to the useful life period of the components. With respect to the failure rate, the life of a 
component is usually divided into three phases [34]. This is also known as the bathtub 
curve. The initial phase is called the infant mortality phase, because during this period 
the failure rate is relatively high. After that initial phase, the failure rate usually 
decreases fast, and stays on a relatively constant level. This second phase is called the 
useful life period, and in most cases this period constitutes the largest part of the 
component lifetime. After a long period, the failure rate might increase again, due to 
degradation and deterioration. This final phase is called the wear-out phase. As stated 
before, the presented failure rates are referred to the useful life period, because this 
period covers most of the life of a component, and the failure rate can be considered as 
constant during it. 
 
As stated before, a component is understood as single component if it is not a 
combination of simpler components. Thus, simple switches (1x2, 2x2, 1x3…), couplers, 
splitters, regenerators, multiplexers, demultiplexers, amplifiers, SOA (optical gates), 
Arrayed Waveguide Gratings (AWGs), tunable lasers, tunable filters, photodetectors 
and Electrical/Optical (E/O) Optical/Electrical (O/E) converters are considered as single 
components.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, the electronic part of the EPS (i.e. electronic router) is also 
considered as a single component. Obviously, the electronic part of the EPS can be split 
into simpler components, but as it is a commercial component currently being mass-
produced, it is easier (and more trustworthy) to find availability figures for this element 
considering it as a single component. 
 
In Table 2.1, the selected availability figures for the different single components are 
shown. These figures are used in the following chapters to perform availability 
calculations. Failure rates are presented in Failures in Time (FIT), MTTR is presented in 
hours and MTBF is also presented in hours. The FIT rate of a device is the number of 
failures expected in one billion hours of operation. A MTTR of six hours is supposed 
for all the components, because it is the most common value used for MTTR in the 
consulted sources ([40], [48], [35], [41], [49], [50] and [51].  
 
The values obtained from the references could refer to asymptotic availability, failure 
rate, or MTBF. Depending on the parameter given (and always supposing a MTTR of 
six hours), the others parameters shown in Table 2.1 are calculated employing (2.18) or 
(2.20). It is important to remember that when using these two formulae, both the failure 
rate and the repair rate should be expressed in hours-1. 
 
 
Component 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
2x2 Optical Switch 66.67 6 1.5*107 0.9999996 [52] 
1x2 Optical Switch 66.67 6 1.5*107 0.9999996 [52] 
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4x4 Optical Switch 3630 6 2.755*105 0.99997822 [40] 
Splitter 
Coupler 
16.67 6 5.999*107 0.9999999 [52] 
Multiplexer X:1 
Demultiplexer 1:X 
(X = 32) 
25 * X 
(800) 
6 (1.25*106) (0.9999952) [39] 
Regenerator 3355.21 6 2.98*105 0.999979869 [48] 
Amplifier 
(EDFA) 
2850 6 3.509*105 0.999983 [40] 
SOA 1000 6 1*106 0.999994 [40], [41] 
AWG 66.67 6 1.5*107 0.9999996 [52] 
Tunable Laser 745 6 1.342*106  [39] 
Tunable Filter 400 6 2.5*106 0.9999976 [40], [41] 
Photodetector 15 6 6.667*107 0.99999991 
[53], taken 
from [42] 
O/E or E/O 
Converter 
100 6 1*107 0.9999994 [40] 
EPS (electronic 
router) 
5000 6 2*105 0.99997 [35] 
Table 2.1: Selected availability figures for single components 
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Chapter 3 
3. Cases of Study 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the diverse protection schemes considered for the different types 
of failures. Section 3.1 covers the protection mechanisms for total failures of the OPS, 
while section 3.2 introduces the mechanisms for total failures of the EPS. Section 3.3 
makes a review of different OPS architectures, considering OPS partial failures. 
Protection schemes for the DPT subsystem are considered in section 3.4. Finally, 
section 3.5 introduces the small dependability analysis about fiber cuts performed in this 
thesis, including causes and typical failure rates employed in order to assess the 
availability of a fiber (cable).   
 
 
 
3.1 Optical Packet Switch Total Failures 
 
 
This section presents the two different protection schemes considered for the OPS. As 
OPS is considered as one of the most promising technologies for future optical 
networks, a lot of research has been done over the last decade in order to achieve a 
functional architecture for optical packet switches. However, although several 
architectures have been proposed ([57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62]), and even tested on 
demonstrators ([63], [64]), OPSs can only be found in laboratories. Thus, the OPS is 
one of the least mature components that compose a 3-LIHON node. This consideration 
and the complexity of the operations carried out by the OPS (header processing, header 
rewriting, regeneration, etcetera) make the OPS one of the most likely to fail elements 
in a 3-LIHON node. 
 
Two main protection schemes are proposed in order to recover from an OPS failure. 
The first one is to back up the OPS with a spare. The second one consists in rerouting 
the SM/RT traffic to the EPS in case of an OPS failure. 
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3.1.1 Duplicated OPS 
 
Basically, this first way to improve reliability consists in having one spare OPS that can 
be switched in, to replace the failed OPS. Such a design is depicted in Fig. 3.1, where a 
node with N incoming and outgoing fibers is considered, each of them with M 
wavelengths. In that figure, the “OPS CORE” box corresponds to the OPS box in the 
architecture of a 3-LIHON node, Fig. 2.5. After going through the correspondent DPT, 
each wavelength in an input fiber is again multiplexed and split into two by a 50/50 
splitter. The backup OPS can be considered as switched off. 2x1 switches are used at 
the output to select the corresponding OPS. Finally, the different wavelengths are 
demultiplexed and coupled with the signals coming from the OXC and the EPS. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1: Protection scheme for the OPS using another OPS as backup 
 
The main advantage of this solution is that the standard optical switches have typically 
millisecond switching time; thus fast restoration times can be achieved. Although some 
packets can be lost during the substitution of the active copy for the backup one, it will 
not affect significantly the service delivery and can be considered as packet loss within 
the packet switch in normal operation. So, the impact on performance can be considered 
as negligible. 
 
Obviously, a priori this solution can be considered as costly. The OPS is one of the most 
expensive elements in a 3-LIHON node. Even though it is supposed to handle a small 
part of the traffic, and thus it can be considered as cheaper than bigger OPSs, the cost is 
the main drawback of this solution. In addition, the backup copy must contain all the 
routing information of the active copy, so some synchronization is needed. Although it 
is not covered here, this is not a trivial issue. Control messages can be received by either 
copies, or all the routing information can be periodically copied from the active to the 
backup copy. Furthermore, the backup copy can be seen as unused resources while it is 
not handling SM/RT traffic, and it will also consume energy. 
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3.1.2 Rerouting SM/RT traffic to the EPS 
 
The main idea of this second protection scheme is to use the EPS already employed for 
SM/BE traffic as backup for the OPS. Two main options can be considered in order to 
reroute SM/RT packets to the EPS.  
 
The first option is using 2x1 optical switches. Splitters cannot be used because when the 
OPS is working, SM/RT packets should not be redirected to the EPS. The basic scheme 
is illustrated in Fig. 3.2. After passing the DPT, 2x1 switches send the SM/RT packets 
to the OPS or to the EPS. Inside the EPS, SM/RT traffic can be merged with SM/BE 
traffic if both traffic streams come from the same wavelength of the same input fiber. 
Considering that the length of the paths that SM/RT and SM/BE packets follow in its 
way to the EPS are the same, BE and RT packets will not collide, and both traffic 
streams can be merged with a coupler inside the EPS. In addition, there is no need for 
switches at the output. SM/RT packets need a special treatment at the output of the EPS, 
as SM/RT Optical Codes should be added instead of SM/BE codes. Despite that fact, 
SM/RT and SM/BE packets will be combined with GST traffic normally, and in the 
next node, SM/RT packets will be handled again by the OPS.      
 
 
Fig. 3.2: Protection scheme for the OPS rerouting SM/RT traffic to the EPS using 2x1 optical 
switches 
 
The second option consists in using the DPT for sending SM/RT packets to the EPS in 
case of OPS failure as shown in Fig. 3.3. Basically this can be done with a more 
complex logic in the DPT, because in case of OPS failure, a packet labeled with a 
SM/RT OC must be sent to the EPS instead of the OPS. Again, no switches are needed 
at the output, and SM/RT packets will be handled by the OPS in the next node. 
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Fig. 3.3: Protection scheme for the OPS rerouting SM/RT traffic to the EPS using the DPT 
subsystem 
 
This solution will present restoration times very similar to the ones achieved in the 
previous protection scheme. Restoration times using 2x1 switches will be almost 
identical. When employing the DPT for rerouting traffic, the DPT needs to be signaled, 
but the 2x1 switches also need some kind of signaling. In addition, the 2x1 switches 
also employ some time to switch, while the DPT (once signaled) does not need that 
“switching” time, so the second option could accomplish even faster restoration times. 
 
Both ways of rerouting the traffic to the EPS are relatively cheap, and make a good use 
of available resources (the EPS in that case). Again, packets lost during the take over 
can be considered as negligible. It is important to notice that SM/RT packets will not be 
interrupted even if they are handled by the EPS. Because of the delayed preemption 
employed in 3-LIHON, the EPS does not stop sending a packet immediately after 
receiving a signal from the OXC. On the contrary, the EPS continues sending the 
current packet during a time equal to FDL1 (maximum length of a SM/RT packet). 
Thus, any current SM/RT packet being sent by the EPS will be able to finish its 
transmission during that time.     
 
However, the drawbacks of this solution could be very important. First, the EPS will 
have to handle SM/RT and SM/BE traffic flows. Consequently, the packet loss ratio 
could grow to unacceptable values. Moreover, the EPS employs O/E and E/O 
conversion and buffering. Although SM/RT packets can be treated with priority over 
SM/BE packets concerning the buffering, it is important to measure the delay that 
SM/RT packets will experience when being handled by the EPS. SM/RT traffic will be 
used mainly by applications with real-time requirements, so this delay must be tolerable 
for this kind of applications. 
 
Using the DPT for directly rerouting SM/RT traffic was chosen as the preferred 
solution. First, because it is cheaper, as there is no need for additional multiplexers and 
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2x1 switches. Second, as there is no need for switching these 2x1 switches, the 
restoration time is smaller. Last but not least, employing the DPT makes a good use of 
already existing resources, and this option consumes the same energy in normal 
operation and in case of OPS failure. Employing 2x1 switches consumes more energy, 
as the optical switches are active optical devices. 
 
 
      
3.2 Electrical Packet Switch Total Failures 
 
 
In this section, protection methods for the EPS are presented. The EPS is considered to 
carry a relatively high amount of traffic (SM/BE traffic) so it is also a suitable objective 
for an availability analysis. In addition, the EPS also needs to be provided with some 
wavelength conversion, which makes it more likely to fail than a traditional router. 
However, as SM/BE traffic is the lowest priority traffic; delay and loss ratio have 
relaxed requirements. Thus, in general, EPS failures can also be managed by 
mechanisms deployed in upper layers. 
 
The protection mechanism proposed for EPS protection is duplicating the EPS. 
Rerouting the traffic to the OPS could also have been considered as a valid mechanism, 
but it was dismissed because of several reasons. First, the OPS is considered to be 
small, handling a small part of the total traffic. Thus, trying to reroute SM/BE traffic to 
the OPS will imply using a bigger OPS, increasing cost. Also the impact on SM/RT 
traffic performance will be important. Moreover, the use of concentrators [65], [66] at 
the input of the OPS has been taken into account in 3-LIHON. If SM/BE traffic is 
rerouted to the OPS, the OPS will be bigger and the amount of traffic handled by it will 
not allow the use of this kind of devices. 
 
 
3.2.1 Duplicated EPS 
 
This protection mechanism is quite similar to duplicating the OPS. One additional EPS 
will be used as backup for the EPS. The basic design is shown in Fig. 3.4. The “EPS 
CORE” box in Fig. 3.4 corresponds to the EPS box in Fig. 2.5. The description is 
basically the same as for the duplicated OPS. After going through the correspondent 
DPT, each wavelength in an input fiber is again multiplexed and split into two by a 
50/50 splitter. 2x1 switches are used at the output to select the corresponding EPS. 
Finally, the different wavelengths are demultiplexed and coupled with the signals 
coming from the OXC and the OPS. 
 
The advantages of this solution are the same as for the duplicated OPS. First, the 
restoration times achieved can be very small, and the impact on performance can also be 
regarded as negligible. In addition, with a little more switching, the backup EPS can 
also be used as backup for the OPS, rerouting the traffic to it. However, this will also 
imply several challenges in order to manage collision avoidance and contention with the 
active EPS in case of OPS failure. 
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On the other hand, duplicating the EPS can also be regarded as expensive. Although the 
EPS is cheaper than the OPS, the EPS employed in a 3-LIHON node is more expensive 
than a standard electronic router, because of E/O O/E conversion and wavelength 
conversion. In addition, the backup EPS must contain the same routing information as 
the active EPS. Finally, as it happens if the OPS is duplicated, the spare EPS can be 
regarded as unused resources while it is not handling traffic, and it will also consume 
energy. 
      
 
Fig. 3.4: Protection scheme for the EPS using another EPS as backup 
 
 
 
3.3 Optical Packet Switch Partial Failures 
 
 
This section covers partial failures of the OPS. A partial failure is a failure in one or 
more of the internal components of the OPS. Basically, the objective of this availability 
analysis is to compare different OPS architectures in terms of dependability, and select 
the best suited one for implementing the OPS of a 3-LIHON node. 
 
In general, the architecture of an OPS consists of three major parts [67]: the input 
interface, the switching matrix and the output interface. The basic structure of an OPS 
can be seen in Fig. 3.5. 
 
The input interface extracts the packet header for processing. In 3-LIHON, the case of 
in-band headers is assumed. Although nowadays headers are processed electronically, 
the use of OC codes is already being studied as a possible solution for all-optical header 
processing [68]. This reaffirms the use of OCs in 3-LIHON for dividing the types of 
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traffic as an excellent decision in order to reuse them for future header processing. In 
synchronous operation, the input interface also synchronizes the incoming packets in 
the same timeslot. As 3-LIHON is conceived as an asynchronous architecture, this point 
is not relevant. 
 
The output interface may have several functionalities, but basically it is in charge of 
rewriting the packet headers. In addition, this stage can also be used to regenerate the 
signal due to loss or crosstalk inside the switching matrix. 
 
 
Fig. 3.5: Basic structure of an optical packet switch 
 
The switching matrix, also known as switch fabric, is the core of the OPS. Its basic 
functionality is “to selectively transmit packets from a particular input port to a 
particular output port”, as stated in [69]. Mainly, there are two proposed architectures 
for the switching matrix: Broadcast and Select (B&S) architectures and TWC-AWG 
based switch architectures (also known as wavelength routers).  
 
It is also important to keep in mind that the use of concentrators [65], [66] at the input 
of the OPS should be considered. This is one important modification with respect to the 
general OPS architecture based on the assumption that the amount of traffic handled by 
the OPS is very small. Thanks to this modification, the size of the OPS could be kept 
small, reducing also the cost and complexity of the switching matrix. However, the 
impact on control complexity and on delay has still to be measured. 
 
This section will present five different architectures for the switching matrix of the 
OPS, although several other proposals are available. These designs will be compared in 
terms of availability in order to choose the most suitable one for 3-LIHON. 
 
 
3.3.1 Broadcast-and-Select Architectures           
 
B&S architectures have been employed in different European research projects like 
KEOPS [62] and DAVID [57]. The main idea of this approach is to split the input fiber 
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and broadcast it to every output wavelength on every output fiber. Each output 
wavelength has two selection stages, implemented using SOA gates. The first stage 
selects one input fiber. The second selection stage selects one input wavelength within 
the previously selected input fiber. B&S have the advantage of an innate multicast 
capability. On the other hand, the split loss due to splitters imposes the use of 
regenerators and amplifiers.   
 
Fig. 3.6 illustrates the basic structure of the switch matrix used in DAVID, depicting 16 
input fibers and 16 output fibers, each of them with 16 wavelengths. The DAVID 
architecture has been chosen instead of KEOPS because KEOPS is slightly more 
complicated and includes the use of buffers. As buffering is not supposed in the OPS of 
a 3-LIHON node, the KEOPS design is not considered. In addition, the KEOPS switch 
does not scale on number of components and splitting loss [61]. 
 
 
Fig. 3.6: Structure of the switch matrix employed in DAVID 
 
One interesting modification of the B&S architecture previously proposed is the Tune-
and-Select (TAS) switching matrix [58]. With this proposal, the TWC performs 
contention resolution; while the demultiplexer and the SOA gates accomplish the 
switching. The main objective is to reduce cost and signal degradation employing only 
one SOA in the signal path. In addition, this design is strictly non-blocking. Fig. 3.7 
shows the basic TAS architecture, taken from [58]. In the figure N input fibers and N 
output fibers are depicted, each of them with M wavelengths. 
 
41 
 
 
Fig. 3.7: Basic structure of the TAS switching matrix 
 
In order to keep clear the basic differences between these two designs, Table 3.1 
summarizes the recount of components employed in each structure, as well as the 
splitting ratio of the couplers/splitters employed (loss), and the tuning range of the 
TWCs (if those elements are needed) . In the table, N stands for the number of fibers 
and M is the number of wavelengths per fiber. In order to establish the number of 
multiplexers/demultiplexers used, it is considered that every wavelength enters and exits 
the OPS separated from the other wavelengths. That is, every incoming fiber is 
demultiplexed before entering the OPS and also before leaving the OPS. Consequently, 
all the input fiber in the TAS design should be provided with a multiplexer before the 
input amplifier, and also with a demultiplexer after the output amplifier. It is also 
important to keep in mind that the exact number of SOAs and 
multiplexers/demultiplexers employed in the space and wavelength selection stage of 
the DAVID architecture cannot be calculated directly from Fig. 3.6. Thus, these values, 
which are presented in Table 3.1, are taken from [70].       
 
 DAVID Tune-and-select 
Regenerators 2*N*M - 
Mux - Demux N + 2*M*N 3*N 
Amplifiers N 2*N 
Splitters - Couplers N + M*N M*N + N 
Loss 1:M*N 1:N + M:1 
SOA Gates (N*M + M*M)*N N*N*M 
TWC - N*M 
TWC Range - M 
Table 3.1: Number of elements, loss and TWCs tuning range in DAVID and TAS designs 
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3.3.2 TWC-AWG Based Architectures 
 
The TWC-AWG based architecture is another well-known switching technique used in 
order to implement the switching matrix of an OPS. For example, it has been used in 
WASPANET [71] and STOLAS [72]. The main components of this architecture are 
tunable wavelength converters and arrayed waveguide gratings. The operation of the 
AWG is very simple: the signal at one input port of the AWG will exit through one 
output port which is determined by the wavelength of the signal. Then, modifying the 
wavelength of the signal at the input port by means of TWCs we can choose the output 
port through which it will exit the AWG. 
 
The main advantage of this architecture is that its core element is passive: the AWG. In 
addition, it has no split losses. Generally speaking, the regeneration stage present at the 
output interface of the OPS should be sufficient for regenerating the signal, and no 
additional amplifiers or regenerators are needed. 
 
One drawback of this design is that multicast is quite complex. But the main problem, 
as explained in [60], is that the basic design is internally blocking. The blocking 
probability can be minimized using different methods [73], [74]. However, the OPS can 
be transformed into a non-blocking variant at a cost of using TWCs with a wider range 
[60]. 
 
Internal blocking designs can be implemented with fewer and cheaper elements than 
non-blocking designs. Obviously, this cheaper implementation has an impact on 
performance, due to the blocking probability. In general, as explained in [74], when 
there is no synchronization in the nodes, the OPS needs to be strictly non-blocking. 
3LIHON nodes are based on asynchronous operation, but several SM/RT traffic 
characteristics make possible to choose an internally blocking design for the OPS. First, 
the OPS is supposed to handle a small amount of traffic. Second, SM/RT traffic, by 
definition, allows possible packet loss inside the nodes. Due to its good trade-off 
between cost and performance, an internally blocking design can be chosen for the OPS 
as it was done for the OpMiGua architecture in [26]. This design, presented in [59] and 
reproduced in Fig. 3.8, will be our point of departure for the TWC-AWG based 
architectures analysis. Although it was not formally adopted as the chosen design for 
the OPS employed in OpMiGua, this architecture will be referred as OpMiGua OPS 
from now on.   
 
 
Fig. 3.8: Structure of the internally-blocking OPS proposed for OpMiGua 
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However, a strictly non-blocking structure could also be a suitable solution for future 
switching matrixes. Thus, the multiport architecture presented in [60] will also be 
considered and analyzed. The structural scheme is depicted in Fig. 3.9.  
 
 
Fig. 3.9: Structural scheme of the strictly non-blocking multiport architecture 
 
In addition to being non-blocking, the multiport design uses less TWC, as the 
wavelength converters after the AWG are Fixed Wavelength Converters (FWCs). 
Besides, the demultiplexers employed at the output of the AWG are simpler than the 
ones used in the blocking design proposed for OpMiGua, as explained in [60]. 
 
The number of components needed for these two designs in addition to its splitting 
ratios and tuning range of the TWCs are shown in Table 3.2. As it happened in the 
previous section, in order to calculate the number of multiplexers/demultiplexers, each 
wavelength is considered to enter and exit the OPS separately. Because of that, the input 
demultiplexer in the OpMiGua OPS design is considered to be at the output, and the 
demultiplexers/multiplexers at the input/output of the multiport solution are not 
considered in Table 3.2. 
 
 OpMiGua OPS Multiport 
Mux - Demux 2*N M 
TWC 2*M*N N*M 
TWC Range M N*M 
FWC - N*M 
Splitters - Couplers N+M M 
Loss M:1 + N:1 N:1 
AWG 1 1 
AWG Size M M 
Table 3.2: Number of elements, loss and TWCs tuning range in OpMiGua OPS and multiport 
designs 
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3.3.3 Multiplane Architecture 
 
This section proposes a new architecture for implementing the OPS in a 3-LIHON node. 
This architecture, based on the WASPANET switch architecture [71], is illustrated in 
Fig. 3.10. 
 
 
Fig. 3.10: Architecture of the multiplane switch proposed for the OPS in 3-LIHON 
 
Clearly, the main resemblance with WASPANET is the fact that both architectures use 
multiple planes. Each plane operates at a different wavelength. However, the multiplane 
configuration focuses on keeping each of the planes as simple as possible. This is 
achieved thanks to the concentrator [66]. This device was originally conceived as an 
optical buffer, but in general it can be used to merge the N inputs in each plane in only 
one line. Then, a TWC (and only one) and an AWG are used in order to route the traffic 
to the correspondent output fiber. Finally, wavelength converters are used to select the 
output wavelength. These wavelength converters can be fixed or tunable, as will be 
discussed below. 
 
The concentrator, taken from [66] and conceived as a multiple-input single-output FIFO 
optical buffer, is shown in Fig. 3.11. As stated before, the concentrator merges the N 
inputs in each plane into one output. The NxB space switch provides access to any of 
the B delaying elements. As can be seen, each delaying element is connected to the next 
with a 2x1 optical coupler. Thanks to the fact that SM/RT traffic is expected to be very 
small, the number of delaying elements (B-1) can be kept as a small number. Thus, this 
will not have a severe impact on the delay for SM/RT packets, a consideration that 
should be taken into account as SM/RT service class is used by applications with real-
time requirements.  
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Fig. 3.11: Multiple-input single-output FIFO optical buffer used as concentrator in the 
multiplane switch 
 
Now that all the incoming packets using the same wavelength are merged, the switching 
can be performed using only one TWC and a very small AWG. In fact, the AWG is 
used as a demultiplexer in this case. Of course, the concentrator should delay every 
packet a little bit, in order to give time to process the destination of the packet and tune 
the TWC. 
 
Finally, N wavelength converters are used to select the output wavelength. If these 
wavelength converters are fixed, each packet will exit the plane on the same wavelength 
it entered the switch. This will simplify the control, as no communication is needed 
between planes, and of course will decrease the cost of the wavelength converters. On 
the other hand, this decision has an impact on performance. If the output wavelength is 
being used by a GST packet, the SM/RT packet will be lost; even if there are other 
wavelengths available in the same output fiber. Although SM/RT traffic is allowed to 
lose some packets, this point should be taken into consideration. 
 
If TWCs are used at the output, any outgoing wavelength could be used. This will 
increase the cost of the architecture, and also the control complexity. Now, 
communication between planes is needed in order to prevent two planes to use the same 
outgoing wavelength in the same outgoing fiber. However, TWCs provides the 
architecture with more flexibility and the capability of choosing the outgoing 
wavelength for each plane, solving possible contention with GST traffic. Although 
using TWCs is slightly more complicated, the number of TWCs is kept small as well as 
its tuning range so this assumption is not inappropriate. 
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The components needed for this architecture can be seen in Table 3.3. As stated before, 
the number of TWCs is reasonable; so is its tuning range. It can also be deduced from 
the table that the number of active components is kept small and these elements are 
simpler than in other architectures. It is important to remember that the M AWGs can be 
substituted by M 1:N demultiplexers because the AWG performs exactly the same 
function as a demultiplexer in this design. 
 
 Multiplane (FWC at the 
output) 
Multiplane (TWC at the 
output) 
FWC N*M - 
TWC M (1 + N)*M 
TWC Range N 
N (for M TWCs) 
M (for N*M TWCs) 
Concentrators M M 
Splitters - Couplers B-1 B-1 
Loss B B 
AWG M M 
AWG Size 1:N 1:N 
Table 3.3: Number of elements, loss and TWCs tuning range in the multiplane configuration 
 
 
 
3.4 Detect Packet Type Subsystem 
 
 
The Detect Packet Type is one of the most important elements of the 3LIHON 
architecture. The DPT is used in 3LIHON to support service differentiation, based on 
the employment of OCs. The DPT implementation was presented in Fig. 2.6. As it was 
stated in section 2.2.1, its function is to send the different traffic streams to the different 
switching subsystems inside the node, according to the three different types of traffic. 
This block is the first active component a traffic stream will encounter when passing 
through a 3LIHON node.  
 
As every type of traffic has to pass through the DPT, a failure in this element implies 
that the wavelength associated to the failed DPT cannot receive any type of traffic. This 
is especially relevant when a wavelength is being used to transport GST traffic. This 
type of traffic employs virtual optical circuit paths for fast switching, and it is supposed 
to never allowing any information loss inside the network. 
 
The implementation of the DPT block was presented in Fig. 2.6. In principle, the DPT is 
made up of simple components, and many of them are passive elements (splitters, 
FDLs, optical encoders/decoders). Although some active components are required, such 
as optical gates and the detectors, availability can be expected to be high. However, as it 
is explained in [15], there are still problems in the use of OC codes due to optical 
functionality and logic. Furthermore, these devices have been only tested in laboratory 
and field trial experiments. Because of these reasons, DPT protection is considered 
because the technology is not mature enough to be as reliable as is desirable. 
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Three different protection mechanisms will be studied in this section. For the sake of 
simplicity, a single fiber with M wavelengths will be considered. First, the unprotected 
case is presented. The first way to improve reliability is to implement a backup DPT for 
each input fiber. Using two spare DPTs will also be assessed, in order to measure the 
possible improvement with respect to one backup DPT. The last protection method 
consists in organizing the DPTs in an input fiber by groups, and protecting every group 
with one backup DPT. 
  
 
3.4.1 Unprotected DPTs 
 
The unprotected case is used only as reference in order to measure the gain in 
availability that can be achieved with the proposed protection methods. The 
demultiplexer at the input of a 3-LIHON node is also included in the analyses. The 
physic diagram is very simple, and can be seen in Fig. 3.12. 
 
 
Fig. 3.12: Physical scheme for unprotected DPTs in an input fiber 
 
 
3.4.2 One Backup DPT 
 
Using one spare DPT to protect the other M DPTs present in an input fiber is the easiest 
way to improve dependability. This spare DPT can be switched in and replace a failed 
DPT. This principle was used in [75] for protecting a failed Optical Label Swapper 
(OLS). The M DPTs are sharing one backup DPT, and the switching is performed by 
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1x2 optical switches, as shown in Fig. 3.13. In this case, the system will continue 
working if none or one DPT have failed. 
 
 
Fig. 3.13: Protection switching for DPT failure using one backup DPT 
 
The DPT is not a very complex subsystem, but it is not sure if it will be expensive. In 
addition, as one backup DPT is employed on every input fiber, in a 3-LIHON node with 
N input fibers N spare DPTs should be acquired. However, fast restoration times can be 
achieved because of the small switching time of current optical switches. Some packets 
may be lost while the spare DPT is switched in. For SM/RT and SM/BE packets this 
does not represent a grave problem, as both types of traffic allow some packet loss. 
Nevertheless, for GST traffic the loss of packets is not allowed, and should be treated. 
 
This design could present two main drawbacks. The first one is the cost, if the DPT 
works out to be an expensive element, or if the number of input fibers is high. The 
second one is the degradation of the signal going through the backup DPT, if the 
number of couplers at the input of the spare DPT is high. As the signals could be 
regenerated in the switching elements of a 3-LIHON node, it does not seem to have a 
severe impact. 
 
 
3.4.3 Two Backup DPTs 
 
As second choice, using two backup DPTs is considered. The system will not be much 
more complex, as the main difference is that 1x3 optical switches must be used. Now, 
the system will be considered as working even if two DPTs have failed. The protection 
mechanism is depicted in Fig. 3.14. Basically this mechanism is considered in order to 
49 
 
calculate the gain in availability that can be achieved employing more than one spare 
DPT. 
 
 
Fig. 3.14: Protection switching for DPT failure using two backup DPT 
 
As it happens in the previous protection scheme, fast restoration times can be achieved. 
In addition, the packets lost during the switching in of the spare DTPs are not a grave 
drawback for SM/RT and SM/BE packets, but it must be managed for GST packets. 
 
Of course, this scheme will increase the cost as a total of 2*N spare DPTs should be 
implemented in 3-LIHON node with N fiber inputs. If the gain in availability is high 
enough compared with the increase in cost, using two backup DPTs should be preferred. 
The degradation of signals passing through the backup DPTs (due to couplers and 
splitters) should be taken into account, as explained in previous section. Although the 
logic to control the switches is a little bit more complex than in the previous scheme, it 
is something that can be considered as not relevant. 
 
 
3.4.4 Group Protection 
 
Finally, the third protection mechanism consists in organizing the DPTs into groups, 
each group having one backup DPT. Fig. 3.15 shows the case in which the DPTs are 
split into two groups and one spare DPT protects each group. 
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Fig. 3.15: Protection switching for DPT failure using group protection. 
  
The advantages and disadvantages of this protection scheme are basically the same as in 
the previous methods. The main point is that dividing the DPTs into groups, each of 
those groups can be protected independently. Thus, as GST packets typically follow 
virtual optical circuit paths, the DPTs employed by GST packets can be protected, while 
the DPTs used mainly to handle SM/RT and SM/BE traffic can be left unprotected.  
Even more, one specific group of DPTs can be protected using two backup DPTs while 
the other groups are left unprotected, or protected with one spare DPT. So, a wide range 
of combinations can be contemplated. Thus, this protection scheme is studied in order to 
measure the variation in availability compared to the two previously proposed 
protection methods.     
 
 
 
3.5 Fiber Cuts 
 
 
Nowadays, fiber cuts play a major role when considering dependability in an optical 
transport network. Currently, the selection of cables and their reliability in fiber optic 
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telecommunications systems has become one of the most important considerations of 
the system design.  
 
As pointed out in [23], from a dependability point of view, point-to-point redundancy is 
considered as component redundancy. This is true independently of the type of 
protection employed (1+1 or N:M) in order to successfully protect against link failures. 
As this thesis is focused on component redundancy, a small analysis about fiber cuts has 
been performed for the sake of completeness. 
 
This analysis seeks to carry out a small research about fiber cuts, involving causes of 
fiber cuts, in addition to availability figures employed in order to assess the availability 
of a link between two nodes. 
 
The first objective of this small study is to determine the causes of fiber cuts. Generally 
speaking, it is true that excavations are the main cause for this kind of failures, but 
obviously this is only applicable to buried fibers. Besides buried fiber, fiber optic cables 
can also be aerial and submarine, which of course are not affected by this type of 
damage. 
 
Secondly, finding availability figures is also another important objective. Usually, fiber 
cuts are not caused because of manufacturer related reasons. Because of that, 
manufacturers are less reluctant to provide availability figures. In addition, data 
obtained from manufactures can be considered as trustworthy, at least the data regarding 
restoration time. 
 
As this work is the first step in the dependability analysis of 3-LIHON, the results can 
be useful in future dependability analyses of 3-LIHON involving network redundancy. 
The information presented for fiber cuts can be used to extend the reliability analysis to 
upper layers. Parameters such as Total Expected Loss of Traffic (TELT) and the 
Average Expected Loss of Traffic (Average Expected Loss of Traffic) could be 
interesting to assess in future dependability analyses, in order to discuss and compare 
possible network designs [35]. Thus, the data collected in this thesis can be taken as 
point of departure for this kind of studies.   
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Chapter 4 
4. Availability and Performance 
Analysis 
 
 
 
In this chapter, the availability and performance analyses fulfilled for the different cases 
of study are presented. Section 4.1 covers the optical packet switch total failures. The 
electrical packet switch total failures are shown in section 4.2. The proposed 
architectures for the OPS are analyzed in section 4.3. The DPT is treated in section 4.4. 
Finally, the main causes of fiber cuts for buried and aerial cables are displayed in 
section 4.5. 
 
 
 
4.1 Optical Packet Switch Total Failures 
 
 
Two main protection schemes have been presented for the OPS: duplicating the OPS 
and rerouting SM/RT traffic to the EPS. In this section, the reliability block diagrams 
and Markov models used to assess the availability of the proposed protection designs 
are expounded. 
 
 
4.1.1 Duplicated OPS 
 
Three different approaches have been used to analyze the duplication of the OPS. The 
simpler one is the structural model (reliability block diagram). Secondly, a simple 
Markov model is used, and finally a combination of these two models has been 
developed, in order to overcome the deficiencies of the two first approaches. 
 
The objective of the three models is to calculate the asymptotic availability of a SM/RT 
traffic stream through the node. First, it is considered that the traffic stream enters the 
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node trough a particular wavelength in a particular fiber. However, the traffic stream 
leaves the node trough one particular fiber, but any wavelength still working is available 
for use. 
 
A more general approach can also be discussed. If signaling between adjacent nodes is 
assumed, as it was for example in OpMiGua [27], failures in the incoming wavelengths 
could be notified to the previous node. Then, each node can maintain a subset of 
available wavelengths. In that case, the SM/RT traffic stream is supposed to be 
connected to a particular fiber, but not connected to any particular incoming or outgoing 
wavelength. 
4.1.1.1 Reliability Block Diagram for Duplicated OPS 
 
The reliability block diagram is depicted in Fig. 4.1. All the components in a 3-LIHON 
node are considered as likely to fail. This means that no element has been excluded 
from the analysis, as it is done some times arguing that it can be considered as very 
reliable (e.g. splitters, couplers, multiplexers, etcetera). Each fiber (incoming and 
outgoing) is assumed to have M wavelengths. Typically, M will be equal to 32 in almost 
all the following models, unless other value is specified. 
 
Obviously, all the system components and subsystems are assumed to be independent 
with respect to failures and repairs, as a structural model is being used. It is important to 
keep in mind that this is an unrealistic assumption, as there is not a dedicated repairman 
for every component. 
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the notation used. 
 
Element 3otation Element 3otation 
Demultiplexer Ademux DPT ADPT 
Multiplexer Amux Splitter Asplitter 
OPS AOPS Coupler Acoupler 
Switch Aswitch   
Table 4.1: Notation used for the block diagram of the duplicated OPS protection scheme 
 
 
Fig. 4.1: Reliability block diagram for the duplicated OPS protection scheme without signaling 
between adjacent nodes 
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Now, defining AOPSTOT = (1 – (1 – AOPS)
2) and Ap_coupler = (1 – (1 – Acoupler)
M), it can be 
concluded that the availability of this design is 
 

J_LMN = 
&+O%P Q 
JMR Q 
O%P  Q 
*24-+,  
 Q 
LMNRLR Q 
*S-TU Q 
&+O%P                                  (4.1) Q 
2_T6%24+, Q 
O%P 
 
If the premise of local signaling between adjacent nodes is accepted, the block diagram 
is slightly different because any of the DPTs at the input can be used, as it is shown in 
Fig. 4.2. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2: Reliability block diagram for the duplicated OPS protection scheme with signaling 
between adjacent nodes 
 
Defining Ap_DPT = (1 – (1 – ADPT)
M), the asymptotic availability can be calculated as 
 

J_LMN_N-A/34-/A = 
&+O%P  Q 
2_JMR Q 
O%P Q 
*24-+,  
Q 
LMNRLR Q 
*S-TU Q 
&+O%P                                     (4.2) Q 
2_T6%24+, Q 
O%P 
 
4.1.1.2 Markov Model for Duplicated OPS 
 
The Markov model needs several simplifications in order not to become unmanageable. 
First, the SM/RT traffic stream is considered to arrive at the node at one particular 
wavelength of one particular fiber, that is, there is no signaling between adjacent nodes. 
Thus, only one DPT is modelled. The second simplification is that only the DPT and the 
two OPSs (active copy and backup copy) are considered in the model. This implies that 
all the remaining elements (multiplexers, demultiplexers, splitters, couplers and 
switches) are considered reliable and cannot fail.   
 
One important feature of this model is that it permits modelling dependencies between 
subsystems. Now, there is only one repairman available, and only one element can be 
repaired at a time. For example, if the two OPSs fail, the repairman will repair one and 
put it into operation, and then will repair the second. The same occurs if the DPT and 
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one or the two OPSs have failed. As the DPT also manages GST and SM/BE traffic, it 
is assumed that the DPT is the first subsystem that will be repaired if several elements 
have failed.   
 
All times in the system are negatively exponentially distributed, thus all failure and 
service restoration rates are constant. The failure rate of the active OPS is denoted λops 
and the repair rate is denoted µops. This is also applied to the spare OPS when it is put 
into operation. The DPT failure and repair rates are denoted λdpt and µdpt. The Poisson 
process that models the time to replace the active OPS by the spare copy has an 
intensity denoted µr. Failures in the OPSs and the DPT are detected by means of 
monitoring the signal levels at the output of the OPS and at the output of the DPT. 
Although some models consider that an unpowered spare component never fails while 
the active copy is working, that is not the case in this Markov model. The spare OPS, 
when not working, fails according to a Poisson process of intensity λd < λops. Properly 
speaking, the spare OPS is considered as a lukewarm standby component. 
 
The possible states of the active OPS are operational (0) or failed (1). The same is 
applied to the DPT. The possible states for the spare OPS are operational (0), failed (1) 
and exposed to a permanent fault which will only manifest itself as a failure when the 
server is put into operation (x). These faults are called dormant faults, and its associate 
state may occur only when the primary OPS is working.  
 
Then, the Markov model is depicted in Fig. 4.3, while the state space is denoted: 
 
Ω =  WXY Z[, ; , ] ^_Z[_ ` Y a X0, 1_, ; a X0, 1_, ] a X0, Q, 1_, Y + ; ≤ 2, ] = Q ⟹
Y = 0_                                                          (4.3) 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3: Markov model for the duplicated OPS protection scheme 
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In Fig. 4.3, state 1 denotes the situation in which no failure has occurred, and all the 
elements are working. In state 2, the active OPS has failed, but the spare copy has not 
been put into operation yet and the DPT is working. State 2 is considered a failed state 
because there is no service for SM/RT traffic although the other types of traffic are 
served. In state 3, both OPSs have failed but the DPT is still working. State 4 denotes 
the situation in which the active copy has been substituted by the spare OPS, and the 
DPT is working. In state 5, a dormant fault has occurred in the spare OPS, while the 
active OPS and the DPT are working. In state 6, the DPT has failed while the two OPS 
are operational. State 7 denotes a failure in both the active OPS and the DPT, but the 
spare OPS is working (it has not been put into operation). In state 8, there is a dormant 
fault in the backup OPS and the DPT has failed, but the active OPS is still operational. 
In state 9, the DPT has failed, and the spare OPS is also down (it has not been repaired 
yet, for example) while the active OPS is operational. Finally, state 10 denotes the 
situation in which all subsystems have failed. 
 
The whole system is only operational in states 1, 4 and 5. Thus, the asymptotic 
availability is the sum of the steady state probabilities of states 1, 4 and 5. Once the 
steady state probabilities are known, the system failure rate, MTBF, MDT and MUT 
can be calculated with (2.18), (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21). The transition intensity matrix 
of this Markov model can be seen in appendix B. 
 

 =  >1 +  >f + >g                                                                   (4.4) 
 
Λ =  I62* >1 +  I&2>1 +  I62* >f + I&2 >f + I62* >g +  I&2>g      (4.5) 
 
 =  1I62* >1 +  I&2>1 +  I62* >f + I&2 >f +  I62* >g +  I&2>g   (4.6) 
 
 =  >1 +  >f +  >gI62* >1 +  I&2>1 +  I62* >f + I&2 >f +  I62* >g + I&2>g            (4.7) 
 
 =  1 − >1 +  >f +  >gI62* >1 +  I&2>1 +  I62* >f + I&2 >f +  I62* >g + I&2>g            (4.8) 
 
4.1.1.3 Combined Model for Duplicated OPS 
 
The combined approach allows modelling some of the system dynamics, without the 
Markov models becoming cumbersome. In this kind of approach, the whole system is 
divided into a set of subsystems. Each of these subsystems will be modelled by a block 
in a reliability block diagram. As a reliability block diagram, that each of these 
subsystems is restored independently of the state of other subsystems has to be 
assumed. In the scenario under consideration, this is not the true behavior of the system. 
Then, the detailed behavior of each subsystem is modelled by a state transition diagram. 
Now, the Markov models will allow making a more accurate analysis of each 
subsystem, keeping in mind subsystem dynamics and dependencies. Finally, the 
properties of the whole system can be obtained by combining the properties of all the 
subsystems. The combined model for the duplicated OPS protection scheme considers 
three subsystems: the input subsystem, the lukewarm standby subsystem, and the output 
subsystem. The reliability block diagram is depicted in Fig. 4.4.  
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Fig. 4.4: Block diagram of the combined model for the duplicated OPS protection scheme 
 
Although each of the subsystems has to be considered as independent, this is still a 
better approach than a pure reliability block diagram. In the models presented in section 
4.1.1.1, a dedicated repairman for each of the components has to be assumed. That is, 
every coupler, multiplexer, demultiplexer, OPS… in Fig. 4.1 have a dedicated 
repairman. With the combined model, it is supposed that there are three independent 
repairmen, which also deviates from the real behavior, but is a more acceptable 
assumption. 
 
In this combined model, it is supposed that a SM/RT traffic stream arrives at the node at 
one particular fiber and signaling between adjacent nodes is assumed. The same traffic 
stream exits the node through any available wavelength on a particular output fiber. 
Thus, if a fiber has M wavelengths, any available wavelength can be used as incoming 
wavelength. Then, the input subsystem includes the M DPTs in the incoming fiber, the 
detection of an error in any of the DPTs, and the communication system with the 
previous adjacent node. 
 
The lukewarm standby subsystem models the active OPS, the spare OPS and the 
mechanism to recover from a failure. This mechanism includes the take over of the 
service by the spare OPS. In addition, all the other elements (splitters, switches…) 
needed to manage the take over are also taken into account in this subsystem. 
 
Finally, the output subsystem depicts the behavior of the M output couplers and the 
mechanism to recover from a failure in these couplers. This mechanism detects a failure 
in one of the output wavelengths (typically measuring the output signal) and signals to 
the OPS control in order not to use the failed output. 
 
Input Subsystem 
 
As stated before, the input subsystem takes into account the M DPTs present in each 
input wavelength (remember that only one fiber is being modelled). The demultiplexer 
at the input is not considered in the analysis. This system can be seen as a load shared 
system described in [34]. All the DPTs are active and provide the same kind of service, 
but each DPT handles different service requests (shared load). 
 
If one or more DPTs fail, other copies can be used without the system performance 
being deteriorated. In case of failure, the previous node will be signaled, and will stop 
sending packets through the failed wavelength. Also, the failure detection process and 
the communication with the previous node can fail. The probability that it succeeds is 
the fault coverage.     
 
The Markov model used for modelling the Input subsystem can be seen as a K-out-of-N 
system. But, the big difference with the block diagram is that the different DPTs are not 
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assumed to fail or be repaired independently. K will not be a fixed value in this analysis. 
If K is equal to 1, it is a pure parallel system and it means that the node is able to 
continue providing services with only one DPT. This is very optimistic, as probably a 
lot of packets will be lost if only one wavelength is available for transmission. That is 
the reason why in the analysis K will be a variable parameter.    
 
The failure rate of a DPT is λ. The covered failure of a DPT reduces the number of 
active copies by one, but it will not bring the system down. If uncovered, it is assumed 
to bring the system down, because the previous node will continue sending packets 
using the wavelength associated to that DPT, and these packets will be lost. The fault 
coverage, denoted by c, is defined as c = P(W|F) where W is the event in which the 
system continues to provide service without disruption. F represents the event in which 
the system does not continue to provide service. An uncovered failure may represent a 
failure detecting the failed DPT or a failure in the communication with the previous 
node. However, fiber-cuts are not taken into account in the model. 
 
A failed copy is repaired with a rate µ, while an uncovered failure is repaired with rate 
µc. Copies are repaired one after another in the order they failed and all the times are 
considered to be negative exponentially distributed. In the model, the restoration after 
an uncovered failure implies the repair of the failure detection system (by means of 
rebooting, for example) and the repair of the communication with the previous node, but 
it does not cover the repair of the failed DPT. The restoration time after an uncovered 
failure is considered to be larger than the repair time, µc < µ. Fig. 4.5 illustrates the 
Markov model for the input subsystem.  
 
 
Fig. 4.5: Markov model of the input subsystem for the combined model of the duplicated OPS 
protection scheme 
 
How to determine the asymptotic availability for arbitrary N and K is showed in [34], 
from where the following formula has been taken. 
 

-/2% =  
h! ∑ kIHl
- 1
h − Y!m"n-0
1 + h! 91 +  H1 − opT < ∑ k
I
Hl
- 1
h − Y!m-01
   Y = 1, … , h (4.9) 
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Lukewarm standby subsystem 
 
The lukewarm standby subsystem models the two OPSs present in this architecture. One 
of them is the active copy, and the other one is supposed to be unpowered. Again, a 
lukewarm standby approach is used for the spare OPS. Thus, the failure rate of the spare 
OPS when it has not been put into operation is different from zero, but it is smaller than 
the failure rate of an operational OPS. 
 
An error in the active copy could be detected by different mechanisms. Once detected, 
the failed active copy will be replaced by the lukewarm standby. As before, the 
probability that the take over fails is taken into account. Again, the probability that this 
procedure succeeds is the fault coverage, c = P(W|F) where W is the event in which the 
standby takes over the service, and F is the event in which the take over is not 
successful. 
 
In addition, this model also includes the switches and splitters needed to send the traffic 
to one OPS or the other. These elements, which are not fault tolerant, are referred as the 
hard-core. The failure rate of the hard-core will be denoted by λH, and its repair rate by 
µH. In order to keep a simple model, and as the hard-core in this case is very unlikely to 
fail; it is assumed that the hardcore can only fail when the system is working. 
 
The failure rate of the active OPS is λ, while the failure rate of the lukewarm standby is 
λs, with λ > λs. The repair rate µ denotes the repair of one OPS. µ2 denotes the recovery 
rate after an uncovered failure in the active OPS. It is assumed that this recovery rate 
implies the repair of the take over, and the manually substitution of the active OPS by 
the lukewarm standby, but it does not include the repair of the failed OPS. It is assumed 
that µ < µ2. 
 
The Markov model is presented in Fig. 4.6. 
 
Notice that in the transition from state 2 to state 3, the fault coverage is not used. This is 
correct because in state 2 one OPS has already failed, so no take over can be performed, 
and thus it cannot fail. The transition intensity matrix of this Markov model can be seen 
in appendix B. 
 
To obtain the asymptotic availability the set of linear equations must be resolved and 
the steady state probabilities must be obtained. As the working states are state 1 and 
state 2, the asymptotic availability is 
 

4%5+S3,O =  >1 +  >r                                                           (4.10) 
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Fig. 4.6: Markov model of the lukewarm standby subsystem for the combined model of the 
duplicated OPS protection scheme 
 
Output subsystem 
 
The last block of the model is the output system. The physical diagram of the duplicated 
OPS reveals that the output subsystem will be very similar to the input subsystem. The 
output subsystem considers the M couplers at the output of the 3LIHON node used to 
combine the traffic coming from the OXC, the OPS and the EPS. The multiplexer at the 
output is not considered. An outgoing packet can be sent through any available output 
wavelength on a particular fiber. Thus, as the input subsystem, the output subsystem can 
be regarded as a K-out-of-N system.  
 
If a coupler at the output fails, any other of the remaining couplers (outgoing 
wavelengths) can be used to continue providing the service. The failure at the output is 
detected monitoring the signal at the output, and the OPS control is signaled in order to 
change the output wavelength. Again, the probability of this process succeeding is the 
fault coverage c.   Here, it is defined as, c = P(W|F) where W is the event in which the 
system continues to provide service without disruption. F represents the event in which 
the system does not continue to provide service. An uncovered failure may represent a 
failure detecting the failed coupler, a failure in the OPS control logic or a failure in the 
signaling. 
 
A coupler fails with a rate λ and is repaired with a rate µ, while an uncovered failure is 
repaired with rate µc. Copies are repaired one after another in the order they failed and 
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all the times are considered to be negative exponentially distributed. In the model, the 
restoration after an uncovered failure implies the repair of the failure detection system 
and the logic in the OPS control (by means of rebooting, for example). The restoration 
time after an uncovered failure is considered to be shorter than the repair time, µc > µ. 
Then, the Markov model used is the same as in the input subsystem (Fig. 4.5), and the 
asymptotic availability is calculated using (4.9). 
 
The Markov model (both in the input and output subsystems) could be expanded in 
order to include failures in the (de)multiplexer at the input/output, but it will add 2N + 1 
states to the diagram, so it has not been considered. 
 
Combining the Markov models 
 
Now that the three subsystems (input, lukewarm standby and output) have been 
modelled, the asymptotic availability of the whole system can be easily calculated as 
 

 = 
-/2% Q 
4%5+S3,O Q 
6%2%                                     (4.11)  
 
4.1.1.4 Performance Analysis 
 
The performance analysis has been performed employing Simula [31] and the discrete 
event simulator tool DEMOS [32], [33]. The main aim of the simulator is to calculate 
the delay experienced by SM/RT packets when they are rerouted to the EPS.  
 
However, a simulation study of the normal operation of a 3-LIHON node has also been 
performed, in order to serve as reference for measuring the impact on performance in a 
rerouted scenario. In ideal conditions, the performance achieved when a backup OPS is 
employed can be considered as equal to the normal operation of a 3-LIHON node. Thus, 
the simulator of the normal operation of a 3-LIHON node can be used to present the 
performance when the OPS is duplicated. In addition, as the simulator considers also 
SM/BE traffic, it is also used to assess the performance of the duplicated EPS protection 
mechanism. 
 
The developed simulator considers a mix of GST, SM/RT and SM/BE traffic. GST 
traffic has no loss inside the node, while SM/RT and SM/BE are sent as they are 
intended in a 3-LIHON node. SM/RT packets are sent in between GST packets, and can 
be sent in any available wavelength. However, the OPS has no buffering, thus if all 
output wavelengths are occupied, SM/RT packets are lost.  
 
SM/BE packets can be sent in any wavelength that is not being used by GST or SM/RT 
packets. The EPS has electrical buffering of infinite length, thus there is no loss for 
SM/BE traffic. SM/BE packets can be interrupted by GST packets (with delayed 
preemption), or by SM/RT packets (immediate preemption). When a SM/BE packet is 
interrupted, it is assumed to reenter the buffer, and wait there till a wavelength is 
available. There is no priority in the electronic buffer, thus it uses a first-come first 
served policy. While a SM/BE packet is being sent, some other packets could arrive at 
the node. Then, if the packet being sent is interrupted, it will enter the buffer after the 
packets that are already in the buffer. 
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Packet Loss Probability (PLP) and packet delay for SM/RT packets are evaluated in a 
single output fiber with 32 wavelengths, as it was done in previous simulations of 3-
LIHON [3].  32 independent generators for each type of traffic (32 GST generators, 32 
SM/RT generators and 32 SM/BE generators) with negative exponential distributed 
arrival times are employed as input. The packets lengths are also negatively 
exponentially distributed, with a mean value of 625000 bits for GST packets, 555.6 bits 
for SM/RT packets and 20000 bits for SM/BE packets. These values were chosen 
according to some values employed in previous simulations of 3-LIHON [3]. As can be 
seen, GST packets are big with respect to SM/RT packets, as it was previously 
recommended for OpMiGua [4] and 3-LIHON [3]. However, a maximum length for 
SM/RT packets is assumed, in order not to generate large SM/RT packets. The 
maximum length of a SM/RT packet is 2778 bits (5 times the mean value). 
 
The code of the developed simulator can be found in the files attached to this thesis 
(listed in appendix C), and the results for the normal operation scenario, which are 
considered as the results achieved by the duplicated OPS protection mechanism, are 
presented in chapter 5.   
 
 
4.1.2 Rerouting SM/RT Traffic to the EPS 
 
Although two different structural designs were proposed in order to reroute the traffic to 
the EPS, using the DPT to directly reroute SM/RT packets to the EPS is the chosen and 
analyzed design. The dependability models used in this section are basically the same as 
in the previous one, but adapted to the new structure of the protection mechanism. Thus, 
unless it is explicitly stated, all the assumptions already explained regarding the three 
models employed in the previous section are also applicable in this section. 
 
4.1.2.1 Reliability Block Diagram for Rerouted SM/RT Traffic 
 
First, no signaling between adjacent nodes is assumed. The reliability block diagram is 
depicted in Fig. 4.7 , and obviously is very similar to the block diagram for the 
duplicated OPS design, but slightly simpler. Table 4.2 summarizes the notation used for 
the different blocks in this section. As the DPT in this design performs the rerouting of 
the traffic, it is not expected to have the same availability as the DPT in section 4.1.1. 
Thus, a different notation is employed for this element.  
 
Element 3otation Element 3otation 
Demultiplexer Ademux DPT ADPT_R 
Multiplexer Amux EPS AEPS 
OPS AOPS Coupler Acoupler 
Table 4.2: Notation used for the block diagram of the rerouted SM/RT traffic protection scheme 
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Fig. 4.7: Reliability block diagram for the rerouted SM/RT traffic protection scheme without 
signaling between adjacent nodes 
 
Denoting AOPSEPS = (1 – ((1 – AOPS) x (1 – AEPS))) and Ap_coupler = (1 – (1 – Acoupler)
M), 
the asymptotic availability can be expressed as   
  
 

s_LMN = 
&+O%P Q 
JMR_s Q 
LMNtMN  Q 
2_T6%24+, Q 
O%P                                       (4.12) 
 
If signaling between adjacent nodes is assumed, the block diagram changes as shown in 
Fig. 4.8. 
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Fig. 4.8: Reliability block diagram for the rerouted SM/RT traffic protection scheme with 
signaling between adjacent nodes 
 
Finally, denoting Ap_DPT_R = (1 – (1 – ADPT_R)
M), the asymptotic availability can be 
calculated as 
 

s_LMN_N-A/34-/A = 
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 Q 
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O%P                                    (4.13) 
 
4.1.2.2 Markov Model for Rerouted SM/RT Traffic 
 
The Markov model used to analyze the rerouting of SM/RT traffic to the EPS is very 
similar to the Markov model employed in section 4.1.1.2. The model takes into account 
one DPT, the OPS and the EPS. Again, a SM/RT traffic stream arrives at a particular 
wavelength on a particular fiber. If several elements fail, the DPT is repaired the first in 
order to continue providing service to the other types of traffic. 
 
All times in the system are negatively exponentially distributed, so failure and 
restoration times are constant. The failure rate of the OPS is λops and the repair rate is 
denoted µops. The DPT failure and repair rates are denoted λdpt and µdpt. Please 
remember that although the notation is the same, the value of λdpt is not the same as in 
section 4.1.1.2. In the same way, the failure rate of the EPS is λeps and the repair rate of 
the EPS is denoted µeps. Finally, the Poisson process that models the time needed to 
reroute the traffic to the EPS has and intensity denoted µre. This time includes detection 
of OPS failures, and time to signal the DPT. 
 
The OPS has two possible states, operational (0) or failed (1), and exactly the same for 
the DPT. The possible states for the EPS are operational (0), failed (1) and receiving 
SM/RT traffic (R). The Markov model is shown in Fig. 4.9 and the state space is 
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Ω =  WXY Z[, ; , ] u[_ ` Y a X0, 1_, ; a X0, 1_, ] a X0, , 1_, Y + ; ≤ 2, ] =  ⟹
Y = 1_                                                          (4.14) 
 
 
Fig. 4.9: Markov model for the rerouted SM/RT traffic protection scheme 
 
The system states follow basically the same description as the Markov model presented 
in section 4.1.1.2. State 1 denotes the situation in which no failure has occurred, and all 
the elements are working. In state 2, the OPS has failed, but the SM/RT traffic has not 
been rerouted yet and the DPT is working. State 2 is considered a failed state because 
there is no service for SM/RT traffic although the other types of traffic are being served. 
In state 3, both the OPS and the EPS have failed but the DPT is still working. State 4 
denotes the situation in which the OPS has been substituted by EPS, and the DPT is 
working. In state 5, the OPS and the DPT are working, but the EPS has failed. This 
means that SM/BE traffic is not operational, but SM/RT traffic (which is the case of 
study) is being served, so it is a working state.  In state 6, the DPT has failed while the 
OPS and the EPS are operational. In state 7, The OPS and the DPT have failed, but the 
EPS is still operational. State 8 denotes a failure in both the EPS and the DPT, but the 
OPS is working. In state 9, the DPT has failed, and the OPS is also down, while the EPS 
is operational and handling SM/RT traffic. Finally, state 10 denotes the situation in 
which all subsystems have failed. 
 
In state 3, when the OPS and the EPS have failed, there is no transition to state 4. This 
is because the model supposes that the OPS is repaired before the EPS as SM/RT traffic 
is considered to have higher priority. The transition intensity matrix of this Markov 
model can be seen in appendix B. 
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The system is operational in states 1, 4 and 5. Thus, the asymptotic availability and 
other parameters can be calculated as: 
 

 =  >1 +  >f + >g                                                                   (4.15) 
 
Λ =  I62* >1 +  I&2>1 + I+2* >f + I&2 >f + I62* >g +  I&2>g      (4.16) 
 
 =  1I62* >1 + I&2>1 +  I+2* >f + I&2 >f +  I62* >g +  I&2>g   (4.17) 
 
 =  >1 + >f +  >gI62* >1 +  I&2>1 +  I+2* >f + I&2 >f +  I62* >g + I&2>g            (4.18) 
 
 =  1 − >1 + >f +  >gI62* >1 +  I&2>1 +  I+2* >f + I&2 >f +  I62* >g + I&2>g            (4.19) 
 
4.1.2.3 Combined Model for Rerouted SM/RT Traffic 
 
The combined model in this section presents all the advantages and disadvantages as the 
one presented in section 4.1.1.3. The whole system is again divided in three subsystems: 
the input subsystem, the OPS-EPS subsystem and the output subsystem. Each of these 
subsystems is modelled by a block in the block diagram that models the whole system, 
and the detailed behavior of each subsystem is modelled by a Markov model. The 
reliability block diagram modelling the whole system is depicted in Fig. 4.10.  
 
 
Fig. 4.10: Block diagram of the combined model for the rerouted SM/RT traffic protection 
scheme 
 
Signaling between adjacent nodes is assumed, so any available wavelength of the M 
wavelengths present on a fiber can be used as incoming wavelength. Then, the input 
subsystem includes the M DPTs on the incoming fiber, the detection of an error in any 
of the DPTs, and the communication system with the previous adjacent node. In 
conclusion, the input subsystem is exactly the same as in section 4.1.1.3. 
 
The OPS-EPS subsystem models the OPS, the EPS and the mechanism to recover from 
a failure. This mechanism basically consists of the take over mechanism. No other 
elements are considered in this subsystem as no splitters or switches are needed to 
reroute SM/BE traffic to the EPS. 
 
Finally, the output subsystem depicts the behavior of the M output couplers and the 
mechanism to recover against a failure in those couplers. This mechanism detects a 
failure in one of the output wavelengths (typically measuring the output signal) and 
signals to the OPS or the EPS control in order not to use the failed output. Again, this 
subsystem is exactly the same as in section 4.1.1.3. In fact, the OPS-EPS subsystem is 
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the only one that is different from the model employed in section 4.1.1.3. Although the 
assumptions presented below are an extrapolation of the assumptions already explained, 
they are reformulated here for better comprehension. If an assumption is not 
reformulated it is because it can be applied directly to this combined model, and thus it 
is not repeated here. 
 
Input Subsystem 
 
As stated before, the input subsystem is exactly the same as in section 4.1.2.3. This 
system can be seen as the load shared system described in [34]. The model dynamics are 
the same, and thus, all the consideration regarding the model are the same. The same 
notation for failure and repair rates is used, and the definition of the fault coverage c is 
also the same. In conclusion, the Markov model that models this subsystem is equal to 
the model shown in Fig. 4.5, and the asymptotic availability can be calculated using 
(4.9). However, it is important to keep in mind that although the model is the same, the 
value of the DPT failure rate is slightly larger, as it has to reroute SM/RT traffic to the 
EPS in case of OPS failure.   
 
OPS-EPS subsystem 
 
The OPS-EPS subsystem models the OPS and the EPS present in this architecture. In 
normal operation, OPS handles SM/RT traffic while EPS handles SM/BE traffic. 
 
An error in the OPS could be detected by different mechanisms. Once detected, SM/RT 
traffic will be rerouted to the EPS. The probability that the take over fails is taken into 
account and the probability that this procedure succeeds is the fault coverage, c = 
P(W|F) where W is the event in which the EPS takes over the service, and F is the event 
in which the take over does not succeed (e.g. a failure in control). 
 
No additional elements are needed in order to reroute SM/RT traffic to the EPS. 
Consequently, no hard-core is considered in this model.   
 
The failure rate of the OPS is λops, while the failure rate of the EPS is λeps. The repair 
rate µOPS denotes the repair of the OPS and µEPS is the repair rate of the EPS. µ2 denotes 
the recovery rate after an uncovered failure in the OPS. It is assumed that this recovery 
rate implies the repair of the take over and the manually substitution of the OPS by the 
EPS, but not the repair of the OPS. It is assumed that µ < µ2. Fig. 4.11 shows the 
Markov model. 
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Fig. 4.11: Markov model of the OPS-EPS subsystem for the combined model of the rerouted 
SM/RT traffic protection scheme 
 
It is important to notice that when both the EPS and the OPS have failed, the model 
repairs the EPS first. This is because the EPS can handle both SM/RT and SM/BE 
traffic services, while repairing the OPS will restore only the SM/RT traffic service. The 
transition intensity matrix of this Markov model can be seen in appendix B. As the 
working states are state 1, state 2 and state 3, the asymptotic availability can be obtained 
from the steady state probabilities as 
 

62*"+2* =  >1 +  >r +  >v                                                   (4.20) 
 
Output subsystem 
 
As it happened in the input subsystem case, the output subsystem is exactly the same as 
the one presented in section 4.1.1.3. All the considerations and dynamics are the same, 
and the notation is also the same (even the values of the failure and repair rates). Thus, 
the Markov model is the same as in Fig. 4.5, and the asymptotic availability can also be 
calculated using (4.9).  
 
Combining the Markov models 
 
Finally, the asymptotic availability of the whole system can be easily calculated as 
 

 = 
-/2% Q 
62*"+2* Q 
6%2%                                     (4.21) 
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4.1.2.4 Performance Analysis 
 
As was explained in section 4.1.1.4, a simulator has been developed to assess the impact 
on performance of this protection mechanism. The main objective is to measure the 
delay that SM/RT and SM/BE packets experiment when SM/RT traffic is rerouted to 
the EPS. 
 
Packets are generated in the same way as it was explained for the performance analysis 
of the duplicated OPS protection scheme. The only difference is that SM/RT packets are 
treated by the EPS as if they were SM/BE packets. Basically, this implies that SM/RT 
packets can no longer interrupt a SM/BE packet, and if no available wavelength can be 
found, they are stored in electronic buffers. Thus, SM/BE packets can only be 
interrupted by GST packets. It is important to keep in mind that a SM/RT packet 
handled by the EPS cannot be interrupted because of the delayed preemption 
mechanism. As the EPS is allowed to continue sending a packet during a time equal to 
the maximum length of a SM/RT packet, this ensures that SM/RT packets handled by 
the EPS will always finish its transmission. The buffering for SM/BE packets is the 
same as in section 4.1.1.4, but SM/RT packets have priority in the buffers. That is, if a 
SM/RT packet enters the buffers and there are not other SM/RT packets, it will be 
served the first. If a SM/RT packet enters the buffers and there are other SM/RT 
packets, it will be served after the last SM/RT packet, but before any SM/BE packet in 
the buffer. 
 
The code of the developed simulator can be found in the files attached to this thesis 
(listed in appendix C), and the results when SM/RT traffic is rerouted to the EPS (with 
priority in buffers), are presented in chapter 5.  
 
 
 
4.2 Electrical Packet Switch Total Failures 
 
 
Duplicating the EPS is the protection mechanism chosen for increasing the 
dependability of SM/BE traffic. The models employed to evaluate the asymptotic 
availability of this mechanism are presented in this section. 
 
 
4.2.1 Duplicated EPS 
 
The approaches used to measure the availability of this mechanism are the same than in 
section 4.1.1. From the modelling point of view, the models employed in this section 
are almost the same as the ones used in section 4.1.1; the only difference is that two 
EPSs are employed instead of two OPSs. Consequently, the assumptions and 
simplifications already explained in that section are the same, and are briefly reminded 
when describing the models. However, the particular considerations differing from the 
models in section 4.1.1 are clearly stated in order to define the models for the duplicated 
EPS protection mechanism properly.    
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4.2.1.1 Reliability Block Diagram for Duplicated EPS 
 
The premises assumed in section 4.1.1.1 are applicable in this section too. Every 
component can fail and each fiber has M wavelengths. All the components are assumed 
to be independent with respect to failures and repairs. Table 4.3 collects the notation 
used in this section. The DPT is not being used to reroute any kind of traffic, so it is 
exactly the same as in section 4.1.1.1. 
 
Element 3otation Element 3otation 
Demultiplexer Ademux DPT ADPT 
Multiplexer Amux Splitter Asplitter 
EPS AEPS Coupler Acoupler 
Switch Aswitch   
Table 4.3: Notation used for the block diagram of the duplicated EPS protection scheme 
 
Fig. 4.12 shows the reliability block diagram supposing that a SM/BE traffic stream 
arrives at one particular wavelength on a particular fiber (signaling between adjacent 
nodes is not considered), but it can leave the node trough any available wavelength on a 
particular fiber. 
 
 
Fig. 4.12: Reliability block diagram for the duplicated EPS protection scheme without signaling 
between adjacent nodes 
Considering AEPSTOT = (1 – (1 – AEPS)
2) and Ap_coupler = (1 – (1 – Acoupler)
M), the 
asymptotic availability of this design is 
 

J_tMN = 
&+O%P Q 
JMR Q 
O%P  Q 
*24-+,  
 Q 
tMNRLR Q 
*S-TU Q 
&+O%P                                  (4.22) Q 
2_T6%24+, Q 
O%P 
 
If signaling between adjacent nodes is assumed, any input wavelength of the particular 
fiber being considered can be used to receive SM/BE traffic, thus the block diagram 
becomes as illustrated in Fig. 4.13.  
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Fig. 4.13: Reliability block diagram for the duplicated EPS protection scheme with signaling 
between adjacent nodes 
 
Defining Ap_DPT = (1 – (1 – ADPT)
M), the asymptotic availability is 
 

J_tMN_N-A/34-/A = 
&+O%P  Q 
2_JMR Q 
O%P  Q 
*24-+,  
Q 
tMNRLR Q 
*S-TU Q 
&+O%P                                      (4.23) Q 
2_T6%24+, Q 
O%P 
 
4.2.1.2 Markov Model for Duplicated EPS 
 
In order to implement the Markov model for the duplicated EPS protection mechanism, 
the SM/BE traffic stream is assumed to arrive at the node at one particular wavelength 
on a particular fiber. Thus, only one DPT and the two EPSs are modelled. In addition, 
the DPT is the first element being repaired in case of multiple failures, in order to 
continue providing GST and SM/RT traffic services. 
 
All times in the system are negatively exponentially distributed and all failure and repair 
rates are constant. The failure rate of the active EPS (and of the spare EPS when put into 
operation) is λeps while the repair rate is µeps. The DPT failure and repair rates are λdpt 
and µdpt respectively. The time needed to replace the active EPS by the spare one is 
modelled by a Poisson process of intensity µr. The backup EPS is considered as a 
lukewarm standby, with a failure rate denoted λd < λeps. 
 
The possible states of the active EPS and the DPT are operational (0) or failed (1). The 
possible states for the spare EPS are operational (0), failed (1) and exposed to a 
permanent fault which will only manifest itself as a failure when the server is put into 
operation (x) (dormant faults).  
 
Then, the Markov model is depicted in Fig. 4.14, while the state space is denoted: 
 
Ω =  WXY u[, ; , ] ^_u[_ ` Y a X0, 1_, ; a X0, 1_, ] a X0, Q, 1_, Y + ; ≤ 2, ] = Q ⟹
Y = 0_                                                          (4.24) 
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Fig. 4.14: Markov model for duplicated EPS protection scheme 
 
As the Markov model is basically the same as in section 4.1.1.2, the description of the 
different states is equal, just taking into account that two EPSs are being modeled 
instead of two OPSs. The transition intensity matrix of this Markov model can be seen 
in appendix B. 
 
After calculating the steady state probabilities, the asymptotic availability, the system 
failure rate, MTBF, MDT and MUT can be assessed as: 
 

 =  >1 +  >f + >g                                                                   (4.25) 
 
Λ =  I+2* >1 +  I&2>1 +  I+2* >f + I&2 >f +  I+2* >g +  I&2>g      (4.26) 
 
 =  1I+2* >1 +  I&2>1 +  I+2* >f + I&2 >f +  I+2* >g +  I&2>g   (4.27) 
 
 =  >1 + >f +  >gI+2* >1 + I&2>1 +  I+2* >f + I&2 >f +  I+2* >g + I&2>g            (4.28) 
 
 =  1 − >1 + >f +  >gI+2* >1 + I&2>1 +  I+2* >f + I&2 >f +  I+2* >g + I&2>g            (4.29) 
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4.2.1.3 Combined Model for Duplicated EPS 
 
This combined model is a straightforward modification of the combined model used for 
the duplicated OPS protection mechanism. Because of that, the description of this 
model is very brief, as it is equal to the model presented in section 4.1.1.3 but with some 
changes in notation. 
 
The system block diagram is shown in Fig. 4.15. The input subsystem models the M 
DPTs at the input fiber (signaling between adjacent nodes is assumed). The lukewarm 
standby subsystem models the two EPSs and the output subsystem models the M 
couplers at the output. 
 
 
Fig. 4.15: Block diagram of the combined model for duplicated EPS protection scheme 
 
All the assumptions and premises are exactly the same as in section 4.1.1.3. In fact, the 
only difference is that the lukewarm standby subsystem is formed by two EPSs instead 
of two OPSs. Thus, the Markov model for the lukewarm standby subsystem is 
essentially the same, with some minor changes in notation, as can be seen in Fig. 4.16. 
In this case, λ denotes the failure rate of the EPS and λs is the failure rate of the 
lukewarm standby EPS. On the other hand µ denotes the repair rate of an EPS. The 
other parameters are exactly the same as in the duplicated OPS case. The transition 
intensity matrix of this Markov model can be seen in appendix B. 
 
This situation leads to a combined model in which the three subsystems have already 
been presented and discussed. Just as a reminder, the input and output subsystem can be 
modeled with the state transition diagram depicted in Fig. 4.5. 
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Fig. 4.16: Markov model of the lukewarm standby subsystem for the combined model of the 
duplicated EPS protection scheme  
 
4.2.1.4 Performance Analysis 
 
The simulator developed to assess the behavior of a 3-LIHON node in normal operation 
also calculates the delay experienced by SM/BE traffic. Thus, these results are perfectly 
valid to calculate the delay experienced by SM/BE packets in this protection 
mechanism, assuming that its performance is the same as in a normal operation 
situation. 
 
The simulation scenario has already been presented in section 4.1.1.4. The code of the 
simulator can be found in the files attached to this thesis (listed in appendix C), while 
the results are displayed in chapter 5. 
 
 
 
4.3 Optical Packet Switch Partial Failures 
 
 
In this section, the models designed to calculate the asymptotic availability of the five 
different architectures presented in section 3.3 are detailed. Reliability block diagrams 
are employed, as it is done in [41] and [40] for example, although it means that all the 
elements are supposed to be independent with respect to failures and repairs. 
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The aim is to calculate the asymptotic availability of a SM/RT traffic stream through the 
OPS. The two approaches already explained in previous sections will be used also in 
this section. The first approach is to consider that the traffic stream enters the node 
trough a particular wavelength on a particular fiber. However, the traffic stream leaves 
the node trough a particular fiber, but any wavelength still working is available for use. 
 
The second approach is to allow signaling between adjacent nodes. Then, failures in 
incoming wavelengths can be notified to the previous node and each node can maintain 
a subset of available wavelengths. In that case, the SM/RT traffic stream is supposed to 
be connected to a particular fiber, but not connected to any particular incoming or 
outgoing wavelength. 
 
The notation employed in the rest of this section is collected in Table 4.4. As a 
reminder, M denotes the number of wavelengths on a fiber, and N denotes the number 
of incoming or outgoing fibers (the number of incoming fibers is the same as the 
number of outgoing wavelengths). In order to keep the models simple, couplers, 
splitters, multiplexers and demultiplexers are considered reliable and are not included in 
the analyses. 
 
Element 3otation Element 3otation 
Regenerator Areg Amplifier Aamp 
SOA Asoa TWC range M Atwc_M 
TWC range M*N Atwc_MN TWC range N Atwc_N 
AWG Aawg Concentrator Aconcentrator 
FWC Afwc   
Table 4.4: Notation used for the block diagrams of the OPS architectures 
 
 
4.3.1 Broadcast-and-select Architectures 
  
Considering that there is not signaling between adjacent nodes, the reliability block 
diagram for the TAS design is shown in Fig. 4.17, while the diagram corresponding to 
the DAVID architecture is illustrated in Fig. 4.18. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.17: Reliability block diagram for the TAS design without signaling between adjacent 
nodes 
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Fig. 4.18: Reliability block diagram for the DAVID architecture without signaling between 
adjacent nodes 
 
The asymptotic availability of each design can be calculated employing (4.30) and 
(4.31) respectively. 
 

RwN =  
3O2Q 
ST_x Q 
*63 Q 
3O2                                       (4.30) 
 

JwyzJ =  
,+A Q 
3O2 Q 91 −  k1 −  {
*63r  Q 
,+A |l
x<     (4.31) 
   
When signaling between adjacent nodes is assumed, the reliability block diagrams are 
slightly different. Fig. 4.19 corresponds to the TAS design, while Fig. 4.20 corresponds 
to the DAVID approach. 
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Fig. 4.19: Reliability block diagram for the TAS design with signaling between adjacent nodes 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.20: Reliability block diagram for the DAVID architecture with signaling between 
adjacent nodes 
 
The asymptotic availabilities follow the next equations: 
 

RwN_N-A/34-/A =  
3O2Q 91 − k1 −  {
ST_xQ
*63  |l
x< Q
3O2   (4.32) 
 

JwyzJ_N-A/34-/A = k1 − {1 −  
,+A|xl Q
3O2Q 91 −  k1 −  {
*63r Q
,+A |l
x<     (4.33) 
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4.3.2 TWC-AWG Based Architectures 
 
The two TWC-AWG based architectures proposed as a suitable OPS for a 3-LIHON 
node are the OpMiGua OPS and the multiport solution (section 3.3.1). When no 
signaling between adjacent nodes is allowed, Fig. 4.21 represents the block diagram of 
the OpMiGua OPS while Fig. 4.22 is the block diagram of the multiport solution. 
 
 
Fig. 4.21: Reliability block diagram for the OpMiGua OPS without signaling between adjacent 
nodes 
 
Fig. 4.22: Reliability block diagram for the multiport solution without signaling between 
adjacent nodes  
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The expressions for the asymptotic availability are: 
 

L2x-}%3 =  
ST_x Q k1 − {1 −  
ST_x|xl Q 
3SA     (4.34) 
 

x%4-26, =  
ST_xQ 
3SA Q k1 −  {1 −  
7ST|xl         (4.35) 
   
Assuming signaling between adjacent nodes leads to the block diagrams presented in 
Fig. 4.23 and Fig. 4.24 for the OpMiGua OPS and the multiport solution respectively. 
The asymptotic availabilities follow the expressions (4.36) and (4.37). 
 
 
Fig. 4.23: Reliability block diagram for the OpMiGua OPS with signaling between adjacent 
nodes 
 
Fig. 4.24: Reliability block diagram for the multiport solution with signaling between adjacent 
nodes 
81 
 
 

L2x-}%3_N-A/34-/A =  k1 −  {1 −  
ST_x|xl  Q k1 − {1 −  
ST_x|xl Q 
3SA   (4.36) 
 

x%4-26,_*-A/34-/A =  k1 − {1 −  
ST_x|xl  Q 
3SA Q k1 −  {1 −  
7ST|xl   (4.37) 
   
 
4.3.3 Multiplane Architecture 
 
For the availability analysis of the multiplane architecture, it is considered that TWCs 
with a tuning range of M are used at the output of the AWG in Fig. 3.10. Although the 
control is slightly more complicated in this case, it fits better with the behavior of a 3-
LIHON node. Using TWCs allows to select any output wavelength in the correspondent 
output fiber.  As it is discussed in section 3.3.3, the number of TWCs is not high 
compared to other architectures, and its tuning range is also acceptable. The use of FWC 
is dismissed because it implies that a SM/RT packet has to exit the OPS trough the same 
wavelength it entered, reducing the performance of the OPS. 
 
Then, the reliability block diagram is shown in Fig. 4.25 (considering that there is no 
signaling between adjacent nodes) and the asymptotic availability follows equation 
(4.38). 
 
 
Fig. 4.25: Reliability block diagram for the multiplane architecture without signaling between 
adjacent nodes 
 

x%4-243/+ =  
T6/T+/,36, Q 
ST_m Q 
3SA Q 
ST_mx        (4.38) 
 
On the other hand, if adjacent nodes are allowed to communicate, any input wavelength 
on a particular incoming fiber could be used. This implies that any plane in the OPS 
could be employed, leading to the block diagram in Fig. 4.26 and an asymptotic 
availability following equation (4.39). 
 

x%4-243/+_*-A/34-/A =  91 −  k1 −  {
T6/T+/,36, Q
ST_mQ
3SAQ
ST_mx|l
x< (4.39) 
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Fig. 4.26: Reliability block diagram for the multiplane architecture with signaling between 
adjacent nodes 
 
 
 
4.4 Detect Packet Type Subsystem 
 
 
This section illustrates the reliability block diagrams used to model the three protection 
mechanisms for the DPT subsystem. The unprotected case is also modeled, but it is 
trivial and it is only analyzed in order to be used as a reference to assess the gain in 
availability of the protection schemes. 
 
Obviously, all the assumptions related to structural models are also applied. A single 
input fiber with M wavelengths is considered in the analyses. Thus, the models include 
M DPTs, the multiplexer at the input and the elements needed for each protection 
mechanism. The system modeled is regarded as working if M wavelengths are ready to 
receive traffic, and if one (or more) wavelengths are down, the system is considered 
down. Although it might seem a very restrictive condition, it is not randomly chosen. 
SM/RT and SM/BE traffic allow packet loss, and the system can recover from a failure 
in one DPT just using another wavelength (with signaling to the previous node, for 
example). But GST traffic does not allow packet loss. Furthermore, in principle, any 
wavelength can transport any type of traffic (although some wavelengths can be 
reserved for GST or SM/RT traffic), so any of them can transport GST traffic. Thus all 
the DPTs must be working for the system to be considered “up”. 
 
The notation employed to denote the availabilities of the different components (blocks) 
is shown in Table 4.5. The 1x2 and the 1x3 switches are supposed to have the same 
availability, although the 1x2 switches are simpler. 
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Element 3otation Element 3otation 
Demultiplexer Ademux DPT ADPT 
Switch Aswitch Coupler Acoupler 
Splitter Asplitter   
Table 4.5: Notation used for the block diagrams of the DPT protection schemes 
 
 
4.4.1 Unprotected DPTs 
 
The unprotected case gives a first idea about the availability that can be achieved 
without any protection. The block diagram is depicted in Fig. 4.27, and the asymptotic 
availability can be assessed using equation (4.40). As the M DPTs have to be working 
in order to consider the system as working, the block diagram is a series structure, but 
the M DPTs have been merged in a single block. 
 
 
Fig. 4.27: Reliability block diagram for the unprotected DPT design 
 

/6_2,6+T-6/ =  
&+O%PQ 
JMRx                                        (4.40) 
 
 
4.4.2 One Backup DPT 
 
This protection scheme employs M DPTs plus one backup DPT. Basically, M DPTs 
have to work for the system to be considered as working (only one DPT can fail). In 
fact, this M+1 DPTs configuration is no more than a M-out-of-M+1 system, as can be 
seen in Fig. 4.28.  
 
 
Fig. 4.28: Reliability block diagram for the one backup DPT design 
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The couplers and splitters are included in the backup DPT branch. A close look to Fig. 
3.13 reveals that M-1 couplers are needed at the input of the backup DPT, while (M-
1)*3 splitters are needed at the output. All the couplers are merged in one block in the 
backup DPT branch, and the same is done for all the splitters. 
 
All the switches have to be operational in order to provide the service. If a switch 
associated to a wavelength fails, it implies that the DPT in that wavelength cannot be 
used, but the backup DPT cannot be used either, so the system is considered as failed as 
one wavelength is out of service. On the other hand, if one switch at the output fails, the 
associated wavelength still provides service to two of the three types of traffic, but in 
this case the system is also considered as failed. In order to keep the model simple, all 
the M input switches are merged in a single block, and the same is done for the 3*M 
output switches. 
 
The availability of the backup DPT branch (defined AS_DPT) is 
 

N_JMR =  
T6%24+,x"1  Q 
JMR Q 
*24-+,v∗x"1                             (4.41) 
 
The availability of the M-out-of-M+1 system is calculated as follows. The three cases in 
which the system is working are when every DPT is working; when one of the normal 
DPT has failed but the backup DPT is working; and when the M normal DPTs are 
working, even if the backup has failed. Thus, the availability of the M-out-of-M+1 
system (called ADPT_SYSTEM_1P) becomes 
 

JMR_N~NRtx_1M =  
JMRx  Q 
N_JMR +   Q 1 − 
JMRQ 
JMRx"1 Q 
N_JMR + 
JMRx Q1 −  
N_JMR                                                           (4.42) 
 
So, the asymptotic availability of this protection scheme, defined as A1P, is 
 

1M =  
&+O%PQ 
*S-TUx  Q 
JMR_N~NRtx_1MQ 
*S-TUv∗x    4.43) 
 
 
4.4.3 Two Backup DPTs  
  
With this protection scheme, two spare DPTs are used as backup for the M DPTs 
present in each fiber. Again, the M wavelengths have to be available for the system to 
be considered as working (only two DPTs can fail). Now, the M+2 DPTs configuration 
can be seen as a M-out-of-M+2 subsystem. The block diagram is shown in Fig. 4.29. 
 
The couplers and splitters are included in the backup DPT branches. As in the previous 
section, M-1 couplers are needed at the input of each of the backup DPTs, while (M-
1)*3 splitters are needed at the output. All the couplers are merged in one block in the 
backup DPT branches, and the same is done for all the splitters. In addition, all the M 
input switches are merged in a single block, and the same is done for the 3*M output 
switches.  
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Fig. 4.29: Reliability block diagram for the two backup DPTs design 
 
The availability of one backup DPT branch is defined AS_DPT as in the previous section, 
following equation (4.41). However, the asymptotic availability of the M-out-of-M+2 
subsystem is slightly more complicated. First, the cases in which this subsystem is 
considered as working are 
 
• All the M+2 DPTs are working 
• One normal DPT has failed (all the other DPTs are working) 
• Two normal DPTs have failed (all the other DPTs are working) 
• One  backup DPT has failed (all the other DPTs are working) 
• The two backup DPTs have failed (all the other DPTs are working) 
• One normal DPT and one backup DPT have failed (all the other DPTs are 
working) 
 
Keeping this in mind, the availability expression for the M-out-of-M+2 subsystem, 
defined as ADPT_SYSTEM_2P, can be written as shown below (each of the addends 
corresponds to a case in which the system is working).  
 

JMR_N~NRtx_rM =  
JMRx  Q 
N_JMRr +   Q 1 − 
JMRQ 
JMRx"1 Q 
N_JMRr  
+ 92 <  Q 1 − 
JMRr Q 
JMR
x"rQ 
N_JMRr  
+ 2 Q 
JMRx  Q {1 −  
N_JMR|                                            (4.44) 
+ 
JMRx  Q {1 −  
N_JMR|r 
+ 2 Q  Q 1 − 
JMR Q 
JMRx"1 Q 
 N_JMR Q {1 −  
N_JMR| 
 
Finally, the asymptotic availability of the whole system, defined as A2P, is 
 

rM =  
&+O%PQ 
*S-TUx  Q 
JMR_N~NRtx_rMQ 
*S-TUv∗x     4.45)  
 
86 
 
4.4.4 Group Protection 
 
The scheme considered here, as explained before, divides the M DPTs into groups. 
Then, each group will have one backup DPT. A priori, it is obvious that the availability 
of this scheme will be smaller than in the previous case (two backup DPTs). 
 
But this scheme can be suitable for several situations. Basically, on the 3LIHON 
architecture, every wavelength can be used by every type of traffic. But it could be 
desirable to reserve some wavelengths for GST traffic, or for some subclasses of 
SM/RT traffic. In those cases, it may be interesting to protect the wavelength associated 
to the high priority traffic, while the DPTs used by SM/BE traffic will remain 
unprotected.  
 
Of course, this protection scheme is not trivial: a lot of combinations can be established, 
and the needs of the network can change quickly. Thus, if the number of DPTs per 
group can be changed it will suppose a great advantage not only in availability, but also 
in flexibility and cost. The counterpart will be the complexity of the control and logic. 
This group protection mechanism could be very difficult to analyze, as several variables 
can be included in the study: the variation of the availability with the number of groups, 
or with the number of DPTs per group. In addition, some of the groups can be kept 
unprotected, so the availability of the whole system will change. 
 
As point of departure, this section considers a very simple case. The M DPTs will be 
split into two groups, and each group has one backup DPT. Again, at least M 
wavelengths must be available in order to consider the whole system as working. Then, 
as depicted below, each of the DPT groups can be considered as a M/2-out-of-(M/2+1) 
subsystem, and both subsystems must be working. The block diagram becomes as 
shown in Fig. 4.30. 
 
The availability of the backup DPT branches, called AS_DPT_G, is 
 

N_JMR_} =  
T6%24+,
x r "1 Q 
JMR Q 
*24-+,v∗{
x r |"1                     (4.46) 
 
The availability of each of the M/2-out-of-(M/2+1) subsystems, denoted ADPT_SYSTEM_G, 
follows the expression: 
 

JMR_N~NRtx_} =  
JMR
x r  Q 
N_JMR +  2  Q 1 − 
JMRQ 
JMR
{x r |"1 Q 
N_JMR 
+ 
JMR
x r  Q 1 −  
N_JMR                                                           (4.47) 
 
Finally, the asymptotic availability of the whole system, called AGP, is 
 

}M =  
&+O%PQ 
*S-TUx  Q 
JMR_N~NRtx_}r  Q 
*S-TUv∗x    4.48) 
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Fig. 4.30: Reliability block diagram for the group protection design  
 
 
 
4.5 Causes of Fiber Cuts 
 
 
This section collects the information compiled about the causes of fiber cuts. Basically, 
the information presented was obtained from Bellcore and Alcoa Fujikura Ltd., 
extracted from [76]. The data is for installed cables from 1986 through 1998 in the 
United States. Although this information can be considered as old, it gives a good 
approximation to the most typical causes of fiber cuts. 
 
In [76], a fault is defined as an event that produces interruption of the operations of the 
system and that requires restoration on the cable. 
 
 
4.5.1 Causes of Fiber Cuts in Buried Fibers     
 
Table 4.6 presents the statistics for fiber cuts in buried fibers. This data considers two 
types of buried cables: direct buried cables and cables installed in ducts. 
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Cause 3umber of cuts Percentage 
Excavation 256 73.99 % 
Workmen 22 6.36 % 
Rodents 14 4.05 % 
Flood 4 1.16 % 
Lighting 4 1.16 % 
Extreme Temperatures 4 1.16 % 
Steam 2 0.57 % 
Unknown 40 11.55 % 
Table 4.6: Causes of fiber cuts in buried fibers 
  
Excavations or dig-ups are the main cause of failures in buried fibers, due to damage 
performed to the fiber during an attempt to penetrate the ground. Typically, these 
failures are external to the cable owner. In addition, not all failures caused by 
excavations damage every fiber in the cable. 
 
Workman errors are caused by employees of the telcos (telephone companies) when 
performing maintenance or other activities. 
 
Rodents (rats, mice, etcetera) are also another cause of fiber cuts. Curiously, not all 
failures caused by rodents damage every fiber in a cable, and usually only partial 
failures are provoked. 
 
Cuts caused by flood, lighting, extreme temperatures and steam are very unlikely. 
However, it is also stated in [76] that usually failures caused by lighting do not damage 
all fibers in a cable. 
 
Finally, an important number of cable breaks are caused by unknown reasons. These 
reasons could be vandalism, intentional cuts, ice, etcetera. 
 
The fact that not all buried cable cuts damage all the fibers present in a cable is 
remarkable. In fact, usually it is assumed that a cable cut affects all fibers in a duct, 
while the data presented in [76] suggest that this is not always the case in reality. 
 
4.5.2 Causes of Fiber Cuts in Aerial Fibers 
 
The information for aerial cables is taken from Alcoa Fujikura Ltd., and includes two 
types of optical cables sold by this company. Table 4.7 summarizes the statistics of the 
typical fiber cuts.   
 
Cause 3umber of cuts Percentage 
Installation Defect 19 26.76 % 
Firearms 15 21.13 % 
Lighting 11 15.49 % 
High Winds 11 15.49 % 
Unknown 15 21.13 % 
Table 4.7: Causes of fiber cuts in aerial fibers 
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Installation defects cover several situations such as damage in the hardware, or bad 
installations. Gunshots are also an important cause of aerial fiber cuts. Typically, it is 
because of hunters shooting birds which are standing in the cables. Generally, gunshots 
do not damage all fibers in a cable. Lighting and high winds (e.g. tornadoes) are also a 
cause, but not very common. Again, unknown causes include vandalism or intentional 
cuts.  
  
90 
 
  
91 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
5. Results 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the results obtained from the analyses displayed in chapter 4. 
Section 5.1 presents how the availability figures of complex components are calculated. 
Section 5.2 and section 5.3 show the results achieved by the two protection mechanisms 
against total failures of the OPS and the EPS respectively. Section 5.4 presents the 
unavailability of the proposed architectures for the OPS in case of partial failures within 
the OPS. The unavailability achieved by the protection mechanisms for the DPT is 
presented in section 5.5. Finally, section 5.6 illustrates some of the models and 
availability figures employed to model fiber cuts. 
 
The results achieved by each model are presented in graphs, performing a sensitivity 
analysis. Typically, the graphs show the variation of the asymptotic unavailability 
achieved by the system when one parameter of that model varies. Also, the value for 
asymptotic unavailability attained when employing the fixed values (reference values) 
calculated in sections 2.4.2 and 5.1 is shown in the graphs. This is called the reference 
unavailability. Then, it is possible to measure not only the asymptotic availability of 
each protection mechanisms, but also which elements influence more on the asymptotic 
availability of the system. In addition, it is also possible to measure which asymptotic 
availability could be achieved by the system if the components had different availability 
figures, instead of the reference values presented in section 2.4.2 and section 5.1. Notice 
that usually the graphs present the asymptotic unavailability instead of the asymptotic 
availability, but both parameters are easily related by equation (2.4). The Matlab scripts 
used to perform the mathematical calculations can be found in the files attached to this 
thesis (listed in appendix C). 
 
This chapter also presents the impact on performance of some of the protection 
mechanisms. Basically, the two parameters measured are the PLP of SM/RT packets 
when they are handled by the OPS, and the delay experienced by SM traffic (both RT 
and BE). These results have been measured with the simulators presented in the 
previous chapter, and the code of these simulators can be found in the files attached to 
this thesis (listed in appendix C). 
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5.1 Availability Figures for Complex Components 
 
 
This section shows how the availability, failure rate and MTBF of more complex 
elements (i.e. OPS, EPS, DPT, TWCs and concentrators) are calculated. The reason to 
present these values now (and not in section 2.4) is because at this point, the inner 
structure of the different complex components has already been explained in previous 
chapters. These values are assessed as it is recommended in [37]. Basically, the failure 
rate of a complex element is calculated as the sum of the failure rates of the single 
components composing the complex element. The failure rates for single components 
are collected in section 2.4.2, Table 2.1. Knowing the failure rate and the repair rate of a 
complex component, the availability and MTBF can be easily calculated as explained in 
section 2.4. 
 
The complex components studied in this section are the OPS, the EPS, the DPT, 
different wavelength converters (Fixed Wavelength Converters and Tunable 
Wavelength Converters with different tuning ranges) and concentrators. In some cases, 
the analysis is quite straightforward. However, some other cases, such as the OPS, may 
present different inner architectures. In these cases, the obtained figures cannot be 
regarded as very accurate, but at least approximate values can be attained. 
 
 
5.1.1 Availability Figures for Wavelength Converters 
 
In order to calculate the availability figures for wavelength converters, it is necessary to 
present the inner structure of these elements. According to [44], there are 4 main classes 
of wavelength converters: opto-electronic converters, laser converters, coherent 
converters and converters based on optically controlled optical gates. In [44], it is also 
stated that the converters based on optically controlled optical gates are the most 
promising devices, especially the ones based on cross phase modulation gates. Using 
the 3-port Mach-Zender interferometric converter (also presented in [44]) as reference, 
these wavelength converters are composed by a tunable laser, two SOAs, a tunable filter 
at the output, and four couplers/splitters. Of course, this is a rough approximation, as 
[44] only presents a schematic design for this TWC. 
 
Then, knowing the components that make up the tunable wavelength converters, the 
calculation to assess the failure rate can be performed as shown in Table 5.1. This table 
also shows the calculation of MTBF and availability, using equations (2.24) and (2.22). 
 
Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
Tunable Laser 1 745 745 
SOA 2 1000 2000 
Tunable Filter 1 400 400 
Splitter/Coupler 4 16.67 66.68 
Total 3211.68 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 3.21168*10-6 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 3.114*105 
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Availability = 0.99998 Unavailability = 2*10-5 
Table 5.1: TWC failure rate and availability calculation 
If instead of a tunable wavelength converter, a fixed wavelength converter is 
considered, a fixed laser can be employed instead of a tunable laser. Then, the 
calculation becomes as shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
Fixed Laser 1 186 186 
SOA 2 1000 2000 
Tunable Filter 1 400 400 
Splitter/Coupler 4 16.67 66.68 
Total 2652.68 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 2.65268*10-6 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 3.77*105 
Availability = 0.999984 Unavailability = 1.6*10-5 
Table 5.2: FWC failure rate and availability calculation 
However, the calculation in Table 5.1 does not take into account the tuning range of the 
wavelength converters. At least intuitively, it is expected that the wider the tuning range 
is, the less reliable the TWC is. In order to express that, TWCs with a tuning range 
equal to N (number of fibers) are assumed to present the data calculated in Table 5.1.  
TWCs with wider tuning ranges will be assumed to present larger failure rates. For 
TWC with a tuning range equal to M (number of wavelengths) a failure rate of 4000 
FITs is assumed, while the failure rate of a TWC with tuning range equal to M*N will 
be 5000 FITs. Of course, these numbers are only approximations, but at least they give 
a rough idea about the availability that can be expected for TWCs. Now that the failures 
rates of the different TWCs have been established, the availability figures for each type 
of TWC can be calculated. The availability figures employed for TWCs in this chapter 
are collected in Table 5.3. 
 
Component 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
Failure Rate 
(h
-1
) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability 
FWC 2652.68 2.65268*10-6 6 3.77*105 0.999984 
TWC range N 3211.68 3.21168*10-6 6 3.114*105 0.99998 
TWC range M 4000 4*10-6 6 2.5*10-5 0.999976 
TWC range 
N*M 
5000 5*10-6 6 2*10-5 0.99997 
Table 5.3: Availability figures for wavelength converters 
 
 
5.1.2 Availability Figures for Concentrators 
 
Concentrators are used in the multiplane architecture proposed for the OPS in section 
3.3.3. These devices were originally conceived as buffers (multiple-input single-output 
FIFO optical buffer) in [66]. Its structure is depicted in Fig. 3.11, and basically consists 
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of an optical switch and B-1 couplers. For the following calculations, the number of 
input fibers is assumed to be 4 (why this value has been chosen is explained in the next 
section). As the number of input fibers is equal to 4, and each plane in the multiplane 
solution handles one particular wavelength of each input fiber, the number of inputs to 
the concentrator is 4. Probably, with a value of B equal to two, it could be possible to 
manage all the SM/RT traffic, as it is a small percentage of the total traffic flow. 
However, the worst case is considered, and a value of B equal to 4 is chosen. Then, the 
concentrator is made up of one 4x4 optical switch and 3 couplers. 
 
Then, it is easy to calculate the availability figures of a concentrator, as it is done in 
Table 5.4. 
 
Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
4x4 Switch 1 3630 3630 
Splitter/Coupler 3 16.67 50.01 
Total 3680.01 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 3.68*10-6 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 2.717*105 
Availability = 0.9999779 Unavailability = 2.21*10-5 
Table 5.4: Concentrator failure rate and availability calculation 
 
          
5.1.3 Availability Figures for the Optical Packet Switch 
 
Section 3.3 presented five different architectures for the OPS. The availability, failure 
rate, repair rate and MTBF of each architecture are assessed in this section. For these 
calculations, it is supposed that the number of incoming fibers is equal to the number of 
outgoing fibers, and both are equal to 4. Each fiber is considered to carry 32 
wavelengths and then the total number of incoming/outgoing wavelengths is 128 
(4*32). Although 4 incoming/outgoing fibers can be regarded as a small number, it was 
chosen because the OPS is considered to be small, as SM/RT traffic represents a small 
percentage of the total traffic flow. 32 wavelengths per fiber is a widely used value in 
literature, and it has been chosen because previous research about the 3-LIHON concept 
and OpMiGua adopted it [3], [4]. 
 
The first analyzed design is the DAVID architecture. Its inner structure can be seen in 
Fig. 3.6. Making use of Table 3.1, that lists the number of components employed by this 
architecture, and assuming N equal to 4 and M equal to 32, it is very easy to perform the 
calculation of the failure rate for the DAVID architecture. Then, knowing the failure 
rate and the repair rate (i.e. the MTTR), the MTBF and availability are calculated using 
(2.24) and (2.22). This calculation is shown in Table 5.5.  
 
Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
Regenerator 256 3355.21 858933.76 
Mux – Demux 
(32:1 – 1:32) 
260 800 20800 
Amplifier 4 2850 11400 
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Splitter/Coupler 132 16.67 2200.44 
SOA 4608 1000 4608000 
Total 5501334.2 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 5.5013342*10-3 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 187.77 
Availability = 0.968 Unavailability = 0.032 
Table 5.5: DAVID architecture failure rate and availability calculation 
 
The same procedure is applied to the TAS architecture. The structure of the TAS 
architecture can be seen in Fig. 3.7. Again, employing Table 3.1 with N equal to four 
and M equal to 32, the failure rate of the TAS design can be calculated as shown in 
Table 5.6. 
 
Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
Mux – Demux 
(32:1 – 1:32) 
12 800 9600 
Amplifier 8 2850 22800 
Splitter/Coupler 132 16.67 2200.44 
SOA 512 1000 512000 
TWC 
(range M=32) 
128 4000 512000 
Total 1058600.44 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 1.0586*10-3 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 950.64 
Availability = 0.99369 Unavailability = 6.31*10-3 
Table 5.6: TAS architecture failure rate and availability calculation 
 
The same calculations can be applied to the OpMiGua OPS design (Fig. 3.8), the 
multiport solution (Fig. 3.9) and the multiplane architecture (Fig. 3.10). The 
components of the OpMiGua OPS design and the multiport solution are shown in Table 
3.2. The multiport architecture is supposed to employ TWCs at the output (third column 
in Table 3.3). The availability calculations for these three designs are presented in Table 
5.7, Table 5.8 and Table 5.9. 
 
Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
Mux – Demux 
(32:1 – 1:32) 
8 800 6400 
TWC (range M=32) 256 4000 1024000 
Splitter/Coupler 36 16.67 600.12 
AWG 1 66.67 66.67 
Total 1031066.79 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 1.031*10-3 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 975.87 
Availability = 0.99385 Unavailability = 6.15*10-3 
Table 5.7: OpMiGua OPS design failure rate and availability calculation 
96 
 
Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
Mux – Demux  
(4:1 – 1:4) 
32 100 3200 
TWC 
(range N*M=128) 
128 5000 640000 
FWC 128 2652.68 339543.04 
Splitter/Coupler  4 16.67 66.68 
AWG 1 66.67 66.67 
Total 982876.39 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 9.82876*10-4 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 1023.42 
Availability = 0.99414 Unavailability = 5.86*10-3 
Table 5.8: Multiport solution failure rate and availability calculation 
Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
TWC 
(range N=4) 
32 3211.68 102773.76 
TWC 
(range M=32) 
128 4000 512000 
Concentrator 32 3680.01 117760.32 
AWG 32 66.67 2133.44 
Total 734667.52 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 7.34667*10-4 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 1367.16 
Availability = 0.99561 Unavailability = 4.39*10-3 
Table 5.9: Multiplane architecture failure rate and availability calculation 
 
Logically, the five architectures present different availability figures. However, the last 
four designs have a very similar availability, around 0.995. Thus, this will be the chosen 
value for the OPS availability. Assuming a MTTR of 6 hours, the rest of the availability 
figures can be easily calculated and are presented in Table 5.10. 
 
Component 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
Failure Rate 
(h
-1
) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability 
OPS 8.375*105 8.375*10-4 6 1200 0.995 
Table 5.10: Availability figures for Optical Packet Switch 
 
    
5.1.4 Availability Figures for the Electrical Packet Switch 
 
In order to calculate the failure rate and the availability of the EPS, this component is 
considered to be made up of one electronic router, O/E converters at the input and E/O 
converters at the output. It is assumed that every wavelength at the input needs an O/E 
converter, and the same is assumed for every wavelength at the output. Consequently, 
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M*N O/E converters and M*N E/O converters are needed. The calculations are shown 
in Table 5.11. 
 
Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
Electronic Router 1 5000 5000 
O/E or E/O 
Converters 
256 100 25600 
Total 30600 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 3.06*10-5 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 3.269*104 
Availability = 0.999816 Unavailability = 1.84*10-4 
Table 5.11: EPS failure rate and availability calculation 
 
5.1.5 Availability Figures for the Detect Packet Type Subsystem 
 
The structure of the DPT subsystem was introduced in section 2.2.1, Fig. 2.6. Basically, 
the EPS consists of two splitters, three SOAs, one encoder/decoder and a number of 
photodetectors. Although the DPT subsystem can perfectly work with 3 OCs, the 
number of photodetectors will be set to ten, as probably more OCs could be use in the 
3-LIHON architecture. 
 
In order to assess the failure rate of the optical encoder/decoder, the basic structure for 
this element presented in [77] is used. According to this source, an optical 
encoder/decoder is composed of two multimode interference couplers and a waveguide 
grating router. Considering the two multimode interference couplers as simple couplers, 
and the waveguide grating router as an AWG, the failure rate and availability of the 
optical encoder/decoder can be calculated as shown in Table 5.12. 
 
 
Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
Splitter/Coupler 2 16.67 33.34 
AWG 1 66.67 66.67 
Total 100.01 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 1*10-7 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 107 
Availability = 0.9999994 Unavailability = 6*10-7 
Table 5.12: Optical encoder/decoder failure rate and availability calculation 
 
Then, the failure rate and availability of the DPT is calculated in Table 5.13. However, 
it is assumed that the DPT employed when the SM/RT traffic is rerouted to the EPS is 
slightly more complicated than the “normal” DPT (because the logic is more complex). 
Thus, the failure rate of this second kind of DPT is considered to be larger. The failure 
rates and availabilities assumed for the each type of DPT are presented in Table 5.14.  
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Component Quantity Unit FIT rate Total FITs 
Splitter/Coupler 2 16.67 33.34 
SOA 3 1000 3000 
Encoder/Decoder 1 100.01 100.01 
Photodetector 10 15 150 
Total 3283.35 
 
Failure Rate (h-1), λ = 3.28335*10-6 MTTR (h) = 6 
Repair Rate (h-1), µ = 1/6 MTBF (h) = 3.046*105 
Availability = 0.99998 Unavailability = 2*10-5 
Table 5.13: DPT failure rate and availability calculation 
 
 
Component 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
Failure Rate 
(h
-1
) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability 
“normal” DPT 3283.35 3.28335*10-6 6 3.046*105 0.99998 
DPT rerouting 
traffic to EPS 
4000 4*10-6 6 2.5*105 0.999976 
Table 5.14: Availability figures for DPTs 
 
 
 
5.2 Optical Packet Switch Total Failures 
 
 
This section presents the results of the sensitivity analyses for the duplicated OPS and 
the rerouted SM/RT traffic protection schemes. Also the reference unavailability 
achieved by each protection mechanism when applying the availability figures selected 
for each component (reference values) is shown. The selected availability figures 
(reference values) for single components are listed in section 2.4.2, Table 2.1, and the 
availability figures for complex components have been calculated in the previous 
section. However, each section will collect again the reference values employed in the 
correspondent model, so that these values are readily accessible. 
 
 
5.2.1 Duplicated OPS  
 
The results achieved by the duplicated OPS protection mechanism are presented in this 
section. First, section 5.2.1.1 shows the asymptotic unavailability results obtained when 
employing reliability block diagrams. Section 5.2.1.2 displays the results obtained when 
solving the Markov model for the duplicated OPS. This section shows the asymptotic 
unavailability, the MTBF and the MDT. Section 5.2.1.3 presents the asymptotic 
unavailability results obtained with the combined model. Finally, section 5.2.1.4 shows 
the performance of this mechanism assessed with the simulator. 
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5.2.1.1 Reliability Block Diagram Results 
 
The asymptotic availability achieved by the two reliability block diagrams that model 
the duplicated OPS protection mechanism can be calculated employing equations (4.1) 
and (4.2). In the first model (Fig. 4.1), signaling between adjacent nodes is not allowed. 
In the second model (Fig. 4.2), signaling between adjacent nodes is assumed. The 
reference values for each component are shown in Table 5.15. 
     
Element 3otation 
Availability 
Value 
Mux - Demux Ademux = Amux  0.9999952 
DPT ADPT 0.99998 
Switch Aswitch 0.9999996 
Splitter - Coupler Asplitter = Acoupler 0.9999999 
OPS AOPS 0.995 
Number of 
Wavelengths 
(Number of DPTs) 
M 32 
Table 5.15: Reference values employed in the block diagrams for the duplicated OPS protection 
scheme 
 
Fig. 5.1 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by the duplicated OPS 
protection mechanism when the model does not consider signaling between adjacent 
nodes. The red line shows the reference unavailability, with a value of 6.47*10-5. The 
blue line shows how the unavailability of the system varies when the unavailability of 
the multiplexers/demultiplexers varies from 10-7 to 10-2. The cyan line represents the 
variation of the asymptotic unavailability when the unavailability of the DPT varies. In 
the same way, the yellow, pink and black lines represent the variation of the asymptotic 
unavailability when the unavailability of the splitters, the OPS and the switches 
(respectively) vary. Note that the yellow line is hidden behind the black line. 
 
On the other hand, Fig. 5.2 shows the asymptotic unavailability of this mechanism when 
the model considers signaling between adjacent nodes. The reference availability (red 
line) is 4.47*10-5. Again, the blue, cyan, yellow, pink and black lines represent the 
variation of the asymptotic unavailability when the unavailability of the 
multiplexer/demultiplexer, the DPT, the splitters, the OPS and the switches 
(respectively) vary. Note that the cyan line is behind the red (reference) line, and the 
yellow line is still behind the black line. 
 
Although in the following figures all the parameters are varying, the most important 
lines are the ones corresponding to the availability of the OPS and the DPT. This is 
because the OPS and the DPT are the newest elements, and its availability figures have 
been calculated in section 5.1. Consequently, these are the more uncertain figures. The 
availability figures of the rest of the elements can be considered as more trustworthy, 
thus it is unlikely that they vary a lot.      
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Fig. 5.1: Unavailability results for the duplicated OPS block diagram without signaling between 
adjacent nodes 
 
Fig. 5.2: Unavailability results for the duplicated OPS block diagram with signaling between 
adjacent nodes 
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5.2.1.2 Markov Model Results 
 
Once the Markov model presented in section 4.1.1.2, Fig. 4.3, is solved and the steady 
state probabilities are known, the asymptotic availability, the MTBF and the MDT can 
be calculated using equations (4.4), (4.6) and (4.8) respectively. The reference values 
for the parameters employed in this Markov model are shown in Table 5.16. 
 
Parameter 3otation Value 
OPS Failure Rate λOPS 8.375*10
-4 
DPT Failure Rate λDPT 3.28*10
-6 
Backup OPS 
Failure Rate 
λd 10
-5 
Rate to Replace 
Active OPS 
µr 10
5 
OPS Repair Rate µOPS 1/6 
DPT Repair Rate µDPT 1/6 
Table 5.16: Reference values employed in the Markov model for the duplicated OPS protection 
scheme 
 
Fig. 5.3 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by the duplicated OPS 
protection mechanism with the Markov model. The red line shows the reference 
unavailability, with a value of 1.076*10-4. The blue line shows how the unavailability of 
the system varies when the failure rate of the OPS varies from 10-5 to 10-2. The black 
line represents the variation of the asymptotic unavailability when the failure rate of the 
DPT varies from 10-7 to 10-4. 
 
Fig. 5.4 represents the MTBF of the system. The red line shows the reference MTBF, 
which is equal to 1135 hours. The blue and black lines show how the MTBF varies 
when the failure rates of the OPS and the DPT vary (respectively). The failure rate of 
the OPS varies from 10-5 to 10-2, and the failure rate of the DPT varies from 10-7 to 10-4.    
 
Finally, Fig. 5.5 represents the MDT of the system. The reference MDT (red line) is 
0.1221 hours. Again, the blue and black lines represent the variation of the MDT when 
the failure rates of the OPS and the DPT vary in the same range as before. 
 
The two parameters varying in the following graphs are the failure rates of the OPS and 
the DPT. Those parameters were chosen because they are the most uncertain parameters 
of the model.  
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Fig. 5.3: Unavailability results for the duplicated OPS Markov model 
 
Fig. 5.4: MTBF results for the duplicated OPS Markov model 
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Fig. 5.5: MDT results for the duplicated OPS Markov model 
 
5.2.1.3 Combined Model Results 
 
The combined model employed to model the duplicated OPS protection mechanism 
consists of three subsystems: the input subsystem, the lukewarm standby subsystem and 
the output subsystem. Once the availability of the three subsystems is calculated, the 
asymptotic availability of the whole system can be assessed employing equation (4.11). 
 
Input Subsystem 
 
The input subsystem was introduced in section 4.1.1.3, and is modeled by the Markov 
model shown in Fig. 4.5. The asymptotic availability can be calculated employing 
equation (4.9). The reference values for the different parameters are listed in Table 5.17. 
Note that in this case N is the number of DPTs and not the number of fibers. 
 
 
Parameter 3otation Value 
DPT Failure Rate λ 3.28*10
-6 
DPT Repair Rate µ 1/6 
Uncovered Failure 
Repair Rate 
µc 1/12
 
Number of 
Wavelengths 
(Number of DPTs) 
N 32 
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Fault Coverage c 0.775 
Number of DPTs 
Needed for the 
system to Work 
k 1 
Table 5.17: Reference values employed in the Markov model of the input subsystem for the 
combined model of the duplicated OPS protection scheme 
 
Fig. 5.6 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by the input 
subsystem. No reference value is shown in the graph, but with the reference values of 
Table 5.17, an unavailability of 2.833*10-4 is achieved. The figure shows the 
unavailability of the input subsystem for different values of the fault coverage and k. 
The fault coverage is varying because it is very difficult to select a value for it. 
Parameter k is varying too, so that it can be seen how the unavailability varies when the 
number of DPTs needed for the system to work varies. The bigger k is, the less DPTs 
can be used as backup. When k is equal to 32, all the DPTs in the input fiber must work 
for the system to work.  
 
Making k a variable parameter was chosen because it represents better the behavior of 
the system. If one DPT fails, and there is signaling between adjacent nodes, it is not 
illogical to consider that the traffic can be sent through another wavelength without a 
heavy impact on performance. However, it is unreal to consider that if 30 or 31 DPTs 
fail, the system will continue providing the service without consequences for the 
performance. This is one of the main drawbacks of the block diagram modeling the 
system when signaling between adjacent nodes is allowed. Varying k, the number of 
DPTs needed for the system to work can be selected, and thus the behavior of the 
system is better modeled. 
 
 
Fig. 5.6: Unavailability results for the input subsystem of the duplicated OPS combined model 
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Lukewarm Standby Subsystem 
 
The asymptotic unavailability of the lukewarm standby subsystem modeled by the 
Markov model in Fig. 4.6 is shown in Fig. 5.7. The reference values of the model are in 
Table 5.18. 
Parameter 3otation Value 
OPS Failure Rate λOPS 8.375*10
-4 
Hardcore Failure 
Rate 
λH 8.334*10
-8 
Backup OPS 
Failure Rate 
λs 10
-5 
OPS Repair Rate µOPS 1/6 
Uncovered Failure 
Repair Rate 
µ2 1/4 
Hardcore Repair 
Rate 
µH 1/6 
Fault Coverage c 0.85 
Table 5.18: Reference values employed in the Markov model of the lukewarm standby 
subsystem for the combined model of the duplicated OPS protection scheme 
Fig. 5.7 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by the lukewarm input 
subsystem when varying the OPS failure rate and the fault coverage. With the reference 
values of Table 5.18, an unavailability of 5.124*10-4 is achieved. Again, the fault 
coverage is varying because it is very difficult to select a value for it. The same is true 
for the failure rate of the OPS. 
 
 
Fig. 5.7: Unavailability results for the lukewarm standby subsystem of the duplicated OPS 
combined model 
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Output Subsystem 
 
The output subsystem, described in section 4.1.1.3 is essentially equal to the input 
subsystem, but the reference values change, as it is shown in Table 5.19. 
 
Parameter 3otation Value 
Coupler Failure 
Rate 
λ 1.667*10
-8 
Coupler Repair 
Rate 
µ 1/6 
Uncovered Failure 
Repair Rate 
µc 1/2
 
Number of 
Wavelengths 
(Number of 
Couplers) 
N 32 
Fault Coverage c 0.925 
Number of 
Couplers Needed 
for the system to 
Work 
k 1 
Table 5.19: Reference values employed in the Markov model of the output subsystem for the 
combined model of the duplicated OPS protection scheme 
Fig. 5.8 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by the lukewarm input 
subsystem when varying c and k. With the reference values of Table 5.19, an 
unavailability of 8.002*10-8 is achieved. The explanation for varying these parameters 
(c and k) is the same as in the input subsystem. 
 
 
Fig. 5.8: Unavailability results for the output subsystem of the duplicated OPS combined model 
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Combining the Markov models 
 
Finally, the asymptotic unavailability of the whole system is shown in Fig. 5.9. The 
failure rate of the OPS and k are the varying parameters. The other parameters of the 
model take the reference values presented before. The asymptotic unavailability 
achieved by the whole system with the reference values is 7.96*10-4. The lines that 
cannot be seen (blue, red, green and yellow) are behind the black line corresponding to 
k=31. 
 
 
Fig. 5.9: Unavailability results for the duplicated OPS combined model 
 
5.2.1.4 Performance Results 
 
In this section, the results of the simulation for the normal operation of a 3-LIHON node 
are presented. As it was explained in section 4.1.1.4, the performance of the duplicated 
OPS protection mechanism can be regarded as if the node was in normal operation, 
because the active OPS is replaced by the backup OPS. The simulation scenario has 
already been described in section 4.1.1.4. 
 
Fig. 5.10 shows the Packet Loss Ratio for SM/RT traffic. In this figure, the total load 
varies from 0.5 to 0.8. SM/BE traffic represents a 60% of the total load, while the 
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relative percentages of GST and SM/RT traffic vary along the y axis. This figure is not 
very interesting, because the PLP in all the cases is 0. 
 
On the other hand, Fig. 5.11 represents the PLP of SM/RT packets when this type of 
traffic is the 7% of the total load. The relative percentages of GST and SM/BE traffic 
vary along the y axis. Again, the total load goes from 0.5 to 0.8. 
 
The relative percentages of each type of traffic have been chosen accordingly to what is 
expected to be the traffic pattern in future optical networks. As can be seen, SM/RT 
traffic is a small percentage of the total traffic (never larger than a 15%). The relative 
percentages of GST and SM/BE traffic are more uncertain, so the variation range of its 
relative percentage is wider. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.10: SM/RT PLP for the duplicated OPS protection mechanism when 60% of the traffic is 
SM/BE 
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Fig. 5.11: SM/RT PLP for the duplicated OPS protection mechanism when 7% of the traffic is 
SM/RT 
 
 
5.2.2 Rerouting SM/RT Traffic to the EPS 
 
The results achieved by the protection mechanism that reroutes SM/RT traffic to the 
EPS are presented in this section. First, section 5.2.2.1 shows the asymptotic 
unavailability obtained when employing reliability block diagrams. Section 5.2.2.2 
displays the results obtained when solving the simple Markov model. This section 
shows the asymptotic unavailability, the MTBF and the MDT. Section 5.2.2.3 presents 
the asymptotic unavailability obtained with the combined model. Finally, section 5.2.2.4 
shows the performance of this mechanism. 
 
5.2.2.1 Reliability Block Diagram Results 
 
The asymptotic availability achieved by the two reliability block diagrams modelling 
this protection mechanism can be calculating employing equations (4.12) and (4.13). In 
the first model (Fig. 4.7), signaling between adjacent nodes is not allowed. In the 
second model (Fig. 4.8), signaling between adjacent nodes is assumed. The reference 
values for each component are shown in Table 5.20. Note that the availability of the 
DPT is different from the duplicated OPS case. 
     
Element 3otation 
Availability 
Value 
Mux - Demux Ademux = Amux  0.9999952 
DPT ADPT2 0.999976 
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EPS AEPS 0.999816 
Splitter - Coupler Asplitter = Acoupler 0.9999999 
OPS AOPS 0.995 
Number of 
Wavelengths 
(Number of DPTs) 
M 32 
Table 5.20: Reference values employed in the block diagrams of the rerouted SM/RT traffic 
protection scheme 
Fig. 5.12 shows the asymptotic unavailability when the model does not consider 
signaling between adjacent nodes. The red line shows the reference unavailability, with 
a value of 3.415*10-5. The blue line shows how the unavailability of the system varies 
when the unavailability of the multiplexers/demultiplexers varies from 10-7 to 10-2. The 
cyan line represents the variation of the asymptotic unavailability when the DPT 
unavailability varies. The yellow, pink and black lines represent the variation of the 
asymptotic unavailability when the unavailability of the splitters, the OPS and the EPS 
vary. In Fig. 5.12, the yellow and pink lines are behind the red (reference) line. 
 
Then again, Fig. 5.13 shows the asymptotic unavailability of this mechanism when 
signaling between adjacent nodes is considered. The reference unavailability (red line) 
is 1.015*10-5. Again, the blue, cyan, yellow, pink and black lines represent the variation 
of the asymptotic unavailability when the unavailability of the multiplexer/ 
demultiplexer, the DPT, the splitters, the OPS and the EPS vary. The cyan, pink and 
yellow lines are hard to see, but they are depicted just behind the red (reference) line. 
The most interesting lines are the ones corresponding to the availability of the OPS and 
the DPT because their availability value cannot be regarded as trustworthy. 
 
Fig. 5.12: Unavailability results for the rerouted SM/RT traffic block diagram without signaling 
between nodes 
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Fig. 5.13: Unavailability results for the rerouted SM/RT block diagram with signaling between 
nodes 
 
5.2.2.2 Markov Model Results 
 
Once the Markov model presented in section 4.1.2.2, Fig. 4.9, is solved and the steady 
state probabilities are known, the asymptotic availability, the MTBF and the MDT can 
be calculated using equations (4.15), (4.17) and (4.19) respectively. The reference 
values for the parameters employed in this Markov model are shown in Table 5.21. 
 
Parameter 3otation Value 
OPS Failure Rate λOPS 8.375*10
-4 
DPT Failure Rate λDPT 4*10
-6 
EPS Failure Rate λEPS 3.06*10
-5 
Rate to Reroute 
traffic to EPS 
µre 10
5 
OPS Repair Rate µOPS 1/6 
DPT Repair Rate µDPT 1/6 
EPS Repair Rate µEPS 1/6 
Table 5.21: Reference values employed in the Markov model of the rerouted SM/RT protection 
scheme 
 
Fig. 5.14 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by this protection 
mechanism when it is modeled by the Markov model. The red line shows the reference 
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unavailability, with a value of 2.508*10-5. The blue line shows how the unavailability of 
the system varies when the failure rate of the OPS varies from 10-5 to 10-2. The black 
line represents the variation of the asymptotic unavailability when the failure rate of the 
DPT varies from 10-7 to 10-4. The green line shows how the unavailability of the system 
varies when the failure rate of the EPS varies from 10-6 to 10-3. 
 
Fig. 5.15 represents the MTBF of the system. The red line shows the reference MTBF, 
which is equal to 1140 hours. The blue, black and green lines show how the MTBF 
varies when the failure rates of the OPS, the DPT and the EPS vary. The failure rate of 
the OPS varies from 10-5 to 10-2, the failure rate of the DPT varies from 10-7 to 10-4 and 
the failure rate of the EPS varies from 10-6 to 10-3. The green line cannot be seen, hiding 
behind the red (reference) line.    
 
Finally, Fig. 5.16 represents the MDT of the system. The reference MDT (red line) is 
0.0286 hours. Again, the blue, black and green lines represent the variation of the MDT 
when the failure rates of the OPS, the DPT and the EPS vary in the same range as 
before. 
 
The three parameters varying in the following graphs are the failure rates of the OPS, 
the DPT and the EPS. Those parameters were chosen because they are the most 
uncertain parameters of the model. 
 
 
Fig. 5.14: Unavailability results for the rerouted SM/RT traffic Markov model 
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Fig. 5.15: MTBF results for the rerouted SM/RT traffic Markov model 
 
Fig. 5.16: MDT results for the rerouted SM/RT traffic Markov model 
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5.2.2.3 Combined Model Results 
 
This combined model has already been presented in section 4.1.2.3, and consists of 
three subsystems: the input subsystem, the OPS-EPS subsystem and the output 
subsystem. Once the availability of the three subsystems is calculated, the asymptotic 
availability of the whole system can be assessed employing equation (4.21). 
 
Input Subsystem 
 
The only difference between this input subsystem and the input subsystem of the 
duplicated OPS protection mechanism is the DPT failure rate (as this DPT is in charge 
of rerouting the SM/RT traffic to the EPS). The asymptotic availability can be 
calculated employing equation (4.9) and the reference values are listed in Table 5.22. 
 
Parameter 3otation Value 
DPT Failure Rate λ 4*10
-6 
DPT Repair Rate µ 1/6 
Uncovered Failure 
Repair Rate 
µc 1/12
 
Number of 
Wavelengths 
(Number of DPTs) 
N 32 
Fault Coverage c 0.775 
Number of DPTs 
Needed for the 
system to Work 
k 1 
Table 5.22: Reference values employed in the Markov model of the input subsystem for the 
combined model of the rerouted SM/RT protection scheme 
 
Fig. 5.17 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by the input 
subsystem. The reference unavailability value 3.455*10-4. The results in Fig. 5.17 are 
shown in the same way as they were for the input subsystem of the duplicated OPS. 
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Fig. 5.17: Unavailability results for the input subsystem of the rerouted SM/RT combined model 
 
OPS-EPS Subsystem 
 
The asymptotic unavailability of the OPS-EPS subsystem modeled by the Markov 
model in Fig. 4.11 is shown in Fig. 5.18. The reference values of the model are in Table 
5.23. 
 
Parameter 3otation Value 
OPS Failure Rate λOPS 8.375*10
-4 
EPS Failure Rate λEPS 3.06*10
-5 
OPS Repair Rate µOPS 1/6 
EPS Repair Rate µEPS 1/6 
Uncovered Failure 
Repair Rate 
µ2 1/4 
Fault Coverage c 0.85 
Table 5.23: Reference values employed in the Markov model of the OPS-EPS subsystem for the 
combined model of the rerouted SM/RT protection scheme 
Fig. 5.18 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by the OPS-EPS 
subsystem when varying the OPS failure rate and the fault coverage. With the reference 
values of Table 5.23, an unavailability of 4.886*10-4 is achieved. Again, the fault 
coverage is varying because it is very difficult to select a value for it. The same is true 
for the failure rate of the OPS. 
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Fig. 5.18: Unavailability results for the OPS-EPS subsystem of the rerouted SM/RT combined 
model 
 
Output Subsystem 
 
The output subsystem is exactly the same as in the duplicated OPS case. In fact, the 
same reference values are employed. Thus, the reference unavailability achieved is 
8.002*10-8 and the asymptotic unavailability can be seen in Fig. 5.8. 
 
Combining the Markov models 
 
The asymptotic unavailability of the whole system is shown in Fig. 5.9. The failure rate 
of the OPS and k are the varying parameters. The other parameters of the model take the 
reference values presented before. The asymptotic unavailability achieved by the whole 
system with the reference values is 8.345*10-4. The blue, red, green and yellow lines are 
hidden behind the black line.  
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Fig. 5.19: Unavailability results for the rerouted SM/RT combined model 
 
5.2.2.4 Performance Results 
 
In this section, the results of the simulation when SM/RT traffic is rerouted to the EPS 
are presented. The simulation scenario has already been described in section 4.1.2.4. It 
is important to remember that SM/RT traffic has priority over SM/BE packets in the 
buffering.   
 
Fig. 5.20 shows the delay experienced by SM/RT and SM/BE traffic. In this figure, the 
total load varies from 0.5 to 0.8. SM/BE traffic represents a 60% of the total load, while 
the relative percentages of GST and SM/RT traffic vary along the y axis.  
 
On the other hand, Fig. 5.21 represents the delay of the two types of traffic when 
SM/RT traffic represents the 7% of the total load. The relative percentages of GST and 
SM/BE traffic vary along the y axis. Again, the total load varies from 0.5 to 0.8. 
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Fig. 5.20: SM/RT and SM/BE delay for the rerouted SM/RT protection mechanism when 60% 
of the traffic is SM/BE 
 
 
Fig. 5.21: SM/RT and SM/BE delay for the rerouted SM/RT protection mechanism when 7% of 
the traffic is SM/RT 
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5.3 Electrical Packet Switch Total Failures 
 
 
In this section, the results of the sensitivity analyses for the different models employed 
to assess the availability of the duplicated EPS protection mechanism are presented. 
Also the reference unavailability achieved by the protection mechanism when applying 
the availability figures selected for each component (reference values) is shown. The 
selected availability figures (reference values) for single components are listed in 
section 2.4.2, Table 2.1, and the availability figures for complex components have been 
calculated in section 5.1. However, each section will collect again the reference values 
employed in the correspondent model, so that these values are accessible. 
 
 
5.3.1 Duplicated EPS  
 
The results achieved by the duplicated EPS protection mechanism are presented in this 
section. First, section 5.3.1.1 shows the results obtained when employing reliability 
block diagrams. Section 5.3.1.2 displays the results obtained when solving the Markov 
model for the duplicated EPS. This section shows the asymptotic unavailability, the 
MTBF and the MDT. Section 5.3.1.3 presents the asymptotic unavailability results 
obtained with the combined model. Finally, section 5.2.1.4 shows the performance of 
this mechanism calculated with the simulator, assuming that it will behave as if the 3-
LIHON node was in normal operation. 
 
5.3.1.1 Reliability Block Diagram Results 
 
The asymptotic availability achieved by the two reliability block diagrams that model 
the duplicated EPS protection mechanism can be calculating employing equations 
(4.22) and (4.23). The first model (Fig. 4.12) considers that signaling between adjacent 
nodes is not allowed. In the second model (Fig. 4.13), signaling between adjacent nodes 
is assumed. The reference values for each component are shown in Table 5.24. 
     
Element 3otation 
Availability 
Value 
Mux - Demux Ademux = Amux  0.9999952 
DPT ADPT 0.99998 
Switch Aswitch 0.9999996 
Splitter - Coupler Asplitter = Acoupler 0.9999999 
EPS AEPS 0.999816 
Number of 
Wavelengths 
(Number of DPTs) 
M 32 
Table 5.24: Reference values employed in the block diagrams of the duplicated EPS protection 
scheme 
Fig. 5.22 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by the duplicated 
EPS protection mechanism when the model does not consider signaling between 
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adjacent nodes. As usually, the red line shows the reference unavailability, with a value 
of 3.971*10-5. The blue line shows how the unavailability of the system varies when the 
unavailability of the multiplexers/demultiplexers varies from 10-7 to 10-2. The cyan line 
represents the variation of the asymptotic unavailability when the unavailability of the 
DPT varies. In the same way, the yellow, pink and black lines represent the variation of 
the asymptotic unavailability when the unavailability of the splitters, the EPS and the 
switches vary. Note that the yellow line is behind the black line.  
 
Fig. 5.23 shows the asymptotic unavailability by this mechanism when the model 
considers signaling between adjacent nodes. The reference availability achieved (red 
line) is 1.971*10-5. Again, the blue, cyan, yellow, pink and black lines represent the 
variation of the asymptotic unavailability when the unavailability of the 
multiplexer/demultiplexer, the DPT, the splitters, the EPS and the switches vary. The 
cyan line is difficult to identify because it is hidden behind the red (reference) line. The 
splitters (yellow line) influence the asymptotic unavailability in the same way as the 
switches (black line) do. 
 
Although in the following figures all the parameters are varying, the most important 
lines are the ones corresponding to the availability of the EPS and the DPT. This is 
because the EPS and the DPT availability figures are the least trustworthy values of the 
model, and may vary from the reference values. 
 
 
Fig. 5.22: Unavailability results for the duplicated EPS block diagram without signaling 
between nodes 
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Fig. 5.23: Unavailability results for the duplicated EPS block diagram with signaling between 
nodes 
 
5.3.1.2 Markov Model Results 
 
After solving the Markov model presented in section 4.2.1.2, Fig. 4.14, the steady state 
probabilities are known, and the asymptotic availability, the MTBF and the MDT can be 
calculated using equations (4.25), (4.27) and (4.29) respectively. The reference values 
for the parameters employed in this Markov model are shown in Table 5.25. 
 
Parameter 3otation Value 
EPS Failure Rate λEPS 3.06*10
-5 
DPT Failure Rate λDPT 3.28*10
-6 
Backup EPS 
Failure Rate 
λd 10
-7 
Rate to Replace 
Active EPS 
µr 10
5 
EPS Repair Rate µOPS 1/6 
DPT Repair Rate µDPT 1/6 
Table 5.25: Reference values employed in the Markov model of the duplicated EPS protection 
scheme 
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Fig. 5.24 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by the duplicated 
EPS protection mechanism with the Markov model. The red line shows the reference 
unavailability, 2.461*10-5. The blue line shows how the unavailability of the system 
varies when the failure rate of the EPS varies from 10-5 to 10-2. The black line represents 
the variation of the asymptotic unavailability when the failure rate of the DPT varies 
from 10-7 to 10-4. 
 
Fig. 5.25 represents the MTBF of the system. The red line shows the reference MTBF, 
which is equal to 47620 hours. The blue and black lines show how the MTBF varies 
when the failure rates of the EPS and the DPT vary in the same range as before.   
 
Fig. 5.26 represents the MDT of the system. The reference MDT (red line) is 1.172 
hours. Again, the blue and black lines represent the variation of the MDT when the 
failure rates of the EPS and the DPT vary in the same range as before. 
 
The two parameters varying in the following graphs are the failure rates of the EPS and 
the DPT. The reason why these parameters were chosen is the same as in previous 
sections: because they are the most uncertain parameters of the model.  
 
 
Fig. 5.24: Unavailability results for the duplicated EPS Markov model 
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Fig. 5.25: MTBF results for the duplicated EPS Markov model 
 
Fig. 5.26: MDT results for the duplicated EPS Markov model 
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5.3.1.3 Combined Model Results 
 
The combined model of the duplicated EPS protection mechanism is, as explained in 
section 4.2.1.3, very similar as the combined model of the duplicated OPS mechanism. 
The input subsystem and the output subsystems are exactly the same, as even the 
reference values are equal. The lukewarm standby subsystem can be modeled in the 
same way it was for the duplicated OPS with some changes in notation (Fig. 4.16), but 
in this case the reference values for the parameters are not the same, thus the results of 
the whole system change. Because of that, only the results for the lukewarm standby 
subsystem and the total model will be presented. 
 
Lukewarm Standby Subsystem 
 
The asymptotic unavailability of the lukewarm standby subsystem for the duplicated 
EPS is shown in Fig. 5.27. The reference values of the model are in Table 5.26. 
 
Parameter 3otation Value 
EPS Failure Rate λEPS 3.06*10
-5 
Hardcore Failure 
Rate 
λH 8.334e-8
 
Backup EPS 
Failure Rate 
λs 10
-7 
EPS Repair Rate µEPS 1/6 
Uncovered Failure 
Repair Rate 
µ2 1/4 
Hardcore Repair 
Rate 
µH 1/6 
Fault Coverage c 0.85 
Table 5.26: Reference values employed in the Markov model of the lukewarm standby 
subsystem for the combined model of the duplicated EPS protection scheme 
Fig. 5.27 shows the asymptotic unavailability that can be achieved by the lukewarm 
input subsystem when varying the EPS failure rate and the fault coverage. With the 
reference values of Table 5.26, an unavailability of 1.93*10-5 is achieved. Again, the 
fault coverage is varying because it is very difficult to select a value for it, and the same 
for the failure rate of the EPS. 
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Fig. 5.27: Unavailability results for the lukewarm standby subsystem of the duplicated EPS 
combined model 
 
Combining the Markov models 
 
The asymptotic unavailability of the whole system is shown in Fig. 5.28. The failure 
rate of the EPS and k are the varying parameters. The other parameters of the model 
take the reference values presented before. The asymptotic unavailability achieved by 
the whole system with the reference values is 3.031*10-4. The lines that cannot be seen 
are behind the black line corresponding to k=31. 
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Fig. 5.28: Unavailability results for the duplicated EPS combined model 
   
5.3.1.4 Performance Results 
 
The results regarding SM/BE traffic of the simulation for the normal operation of a 3-
LIHON node are presented in this section. The simulation scenario has already been 
described in section 4.1.1.4. 
 
Fig. 5.29 and Fig. 5.30 show the delay experienced by SM/BE traffic in a normal 
operation scenario In the first figure, the total load varies from 0.5 to 0.8 and SM/BE 
traffic represents a 60% of the total load, while the relative percentages of GST and 
SM/RT traffic vary along the y axis. In the second figure, the relative percentage of 
SM/RT traffic is fixed to 7%, and the relative percentages of GST and SM/BE traffic 
are varying.  
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Fig. 5.29: SM/BE delay for the duplicated EPS protection mechanism when 60% of the traffic is 
SM/BE 
 
Fig. 5.30: SM/BE delay for the duplicated EPS protection mechanism when 7% of the traffic is 
SM/RT 
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5.4 Optical Packet Switch Partial Failures 
 
 
In this section, the results of the sensitivity analyses of the different OPS architectures 
are shown. The five different architectures were presented in section 3.3 and analyzed in 
section 4.3. The analyses performed for these architectures were all performed by means 
of reliability block diagrams, but considering two different approaches. The first 
approach consists in assuming that there is not communication between adjacent nodes. 
On the other hand, the second approach considers that there is signaling between 
adjacent nodes. 
 
The figures in this section, in addition to show how the asymptotic unavailability varies 
when the different parameters of the model change, also include the asymptotic 
unavailability that can be achieved employing the reference values selected for each 
component. The reference values employed in this section are presented in Table 5.27. 
 
Element 3otation 
Availability 
Value 
Regenerator Areg 0.99998 
Amplifier Aamp 0.999983 
SOA Asoa 0.999994 
FWC Afwc 0.999984 
TWC (range N) Atwc_N 0.9999996 
TWC (range M) Atwc_M 0.999976 
TWC  
(range N*M) 
Atwc_NM 0.99997 
AWG Aawg 0.9999996 
Concentrator Aconcentrator 0.9999779 
Table 5.27: Reference values employed in the block diagrams of the different OPS architectures 
 
 
5.4.1 Broadcast-and-Select Architectures 
 
The unavailability results for the two B&S architectures (DAVID and TAS) can be 
assessed with equations (4.30), (4.31), (4.32) and (4.33). Equations (4.30) and (4.31) 
correspond to the TAS and DAVID architectures when no communication between 
adjacent nodes is allowed. The other two equations consider this communication. 
 
Fig. 5.31 and Fig. 5.32 show the unavailability results for the TAS architecture without 
and with signaling between adjacent nodes respectively. The reference unavailabilities 
achieved with the reference parameters on Table 5.27 are 6.4*10-5 and 3.4*10-5 
respectively (red lines in both figures). Black, blue and cyan lines show how the 
asymptotic unavailability of the two approaches vary when the unavailability of the 
amplifiers, the SOAs and the TWCs (range M) vary. In Fig. 5.32, the blue and cyan 
lines are behind the red (reference) line.    
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Fig. 5.31: Unavailability results for the TAS architecture block diagram without signaling 
between nodes 
 
Fig. 5.32: Unavailability results for the TAS architecture block diagram with signaling between 
nodes 
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Fig. 5.33 and Fig. 5.34 show the unavailability results for the DAVID architecture 
without and with signaling between nodes respectively. The reference unavailabilities 
achieved with the reference parameters on Table 5.27 are 3.7*10-5 and 1.7*10-5 
respectively (red lines in both figures). Black, blue and cyan lines show how the 
asymptotic unavailability of the two approaches vary when the unavailability of the 
amplifiers, the SOAs and the regenerators vary. In Fig. 5.33 the blue line is behind the 
red (reference) line, while in Fig. 5.34, the blue and cyan lines are behind the red 
(reference) line. 
 
 
Fig. 5.33: Unavailability results for the DAVID architecture block diagram without signaling 
between nodes 
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Fig. 5.34: Unavailability results for the DAVID architecture block diagram with signaling 
between nodes 
 
 
5.4.2 TWC-AWG Based Architectures 
 
The unavailability results for the two TWC-AWG based architectures (OpMiGua OPS 
and multiport solution) can be calculated with equations (4.34), (4.35), (4.36) and 
(4.37). Equations (4.34) and (4.35) correspond to the OpMiGua OPS and the multiport 
solution when no communication between adjacent nodes is allowed. The other two 
equations consider this communication as allowed. 
 
Fig. 5.35 and Fig. 5.36 show the unavailability results for the OpMiGua OPS 
architecture without and with signaling between nodes respectively. The reference 
unavailabilities achieved with the reference parameters on Table 5.27 are 2.44*10-5 and 
4*10-7 respectively (red lines in both figures). Black, and blue lines show how the 
asymptotic unavailability of the two approaches vary when the unavailability of the 
AWG and the TWCs (range M) vary. In Fig. 5.36, the blue line is hidden behind the red 
(reference) line. 
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Fig. 5.35: Unavailability results for the OpMiGua OPS block diagram without signaling 
between nodes 
 
Fig. 5.36: Unavailability results for the OpMiGua OPS block diagram with signaling between 
nodes 
10
-7
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-7
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
Unavailability for OpMiGua Architecture - Block Diagram. No Communication Between Nodes
Uawg, Utwc
m
U
n
a
v
a
ila
b
ili
ty
x axis = Uawg
x axis = Utwc
m
Reference = 2.44e-5
10
-7
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-7
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
Unavailability for OpMiGua Architecture - Block Diagram. With Communication Between Nodes
Uawg, Utwc
m
U
n
a
v
a
ila
b
ili
ty
x axis = Uawg
x axis = Utwc
m
Reference = 4e-7
133 
 
Fig. 5.37 and Fig. 5.38 show the unavailability results for the multiport solution without 
and with signaling between nodes respectively. The reference unavailabilities achieved 
with the reference parameters on Table 5.27 are 3.04*10-5 and 4*10-7 respectively (red 
lines in both figures). Black, blue and green lines show how the asymptotic 
unavailability of the two approaches vary when the unavailability of the AWG, the 
TWCs (range N*M) and the FWC vary. In Fig. 5.37 the green line is behind the red 
(reference) line, while in Fig. 5.38, the blue and green lines are behind the red 
(reference) line. 
 
 
Fig. 5.37: Unavailability results for the multiport solution block diagram without signaling 
between nodes 
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Fig. 5.38: Unavailability results for the multiport solution block diagram with signaling between 
nodes 
 
 
5.4.3 Multiplane Architecture 
 
The analysis of the multiplane architecture was performed in section 4.3.3. The 
unavailability achieved by this architecture can be calculated employing equations 
(4.38) and (4.39), depending on whether signaling between adjacent nodes is assumed 
or not. 
 
Fig. 5.39 and Fig. 5.40 show the unavailability results for this architecture without and 
with signaling between nodes respectively. The reference unavailabilities achieved with 
the reference parameters on Table 5.27 are 6.74*10-5 and 0 respectively (red lines in 
both figures). Of course, the 0 value do not imply that that this configuration is 100% 
reliable. This value appears because the calculated value is so small that Matlab 
approximates it by 0. The figure is depicted here just to show that the unavailability 
value is very small. Pink, black, blue and green lines show how the asymptotic 
unavailability of the two approaches vary when the unavailability of the concentrators, 
the AWG, the TWCs with tuning range N and the TWCs with tuning range M vary. In 
Fig. 5.40, all the lines are hidden behind the red (reference) line. 
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Fig. 5.39: Unavailability results for the multiplane architecture block diagram without signaling 
between nodes 
 
 
Fig. 5.40: Unavailability results for the multiplane architecture block diagram with signaling 
between nodes 
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5.5 Detect Packet Type Subsystem 
 
 
In this section, the results of the sensitivity analyses for the three protection mechanisms 
for the DPT subsystem are shown. These three mechanisms have been analyzed in 
section 4.4. The analyses carried out for these designs were all performed by means of 
reliability block diagrams, considering that there is no signaling between adjacent 
nodes. Consequently, in every model, at least M wavelengths must be available to 
receive traffic in order to consider the system as working. 
 
The figures in this section, in addition to show how the asymptotic unavailability varies 
when the different parameters of the model change, also include the asymptotic 
unavailability that can be achieved employing the reference values selected for each 
component. The reference values employed in this section are presented in Table 5.28. 
 
Element 3otation 
Availability 
Value 
Mux Amux 0.9999952 
Switch Aswitch 0.9999996 
Splitter - Coupler Asplitter 0.9999999 
DPT ADPT 0.99998 
Number of 
Wavelengths 
M 32 
Table 5.28: Reference values employed in the block diagrams of the different OPS architectures 
 
 
5.5.1 Unprotected DPTs 
 
The block diagram of the unprotected DPT is very simple (Fig. 4.27), and the results 
achieved are presented in Fig. 5.41. The asymptotic unavailability can be calculated 
employing equation (4.40). The asymptotic unavailability achieved with the reference 
values in Table 5.28 has a value of 6.446*10-4. The black and blue lines show how the 
asymptotic unavailability of the whole system changes when the unavailability of the 
multiplexer and the DPTs vary from 10-7 to 10-2. 
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Fig. 5.41: Unavailability results for the unprotected DPT 
 
5.5.2 One Backup DPT 
 
The block diagram when one backup DPT is employed was depicted in Fig. 4.28, and 
the results achieved are presented in Fig. 5.42. The asymptotic unavailability can be 
calculated employing equation (4.43). The asymptotic unavailability achieved with the 
reference values in Table 5.28 is 5.622*10-5. The black, pink, yellow, and blue lines 
show how the asymptotic unavailability of the whole system changes when the 
unavailability of the multiplexer, the switches, the splitters and the DPTs vary. 
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Fig. 5.42: Unavailability results for the one backup DPT design 
 
5.5.3 Two Backup DPTs 
 
The results achieved when two DPTs are used as backup are presented in Fig. 5.43. The 
asymptotic unavailability can be calculated employing equation (4.45). The asymptotic 
unavailability achieved with the reference values in Table 5.28 is 5.6*10-5. The black, 
pink, yellow, and blue lines show how the asymptotic unavailability of the whole 
system changes when the unavailability of the multiplexer, the switches, the splitters 
and the DPTs vary in the same range as before (from 10-7 to 10-2). 
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Fig. 5.43: Unavailability results for the two backup DPTs design 
 
 
5.5.4 Group Protection 
 
Finally, the model illustrated in Fig. 4.30 is assessed. In this model, the DPTs are split 
into two groups (16 DPTs by group), and each group has one backup DPT. The results 
achieved are shown in Fig. 5.44. The asymptotic unavailability is calculated employing 
equation (4.48). The asymptotic unavailability achieved with the reference values in 
Table 5.28 is 5.611*10-5. As in the previous figures, the black, pink, yellow, and blue 
lines show how the asymptotic unavailability of the whole system changes when the 
unavailability of the multiplexer, the switches, the splitters and the DPTs vary. 
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Fig. 5.44: Unavailability results for the group protection design 
 
 
 
5.6 Fiber Cuts 
 
 
In this section, a brief review of the different methods and figures employed in literature 
to model fiber cuts is performed. As it happens when trying to collect availability 
figures for components, these numbers and methods are laborious to find. In general, 
manufactures are willing to give these figures only when the fibers they manufacture 
have a better availability than the rest of fibers. 
 
In some sources, the availability of a fiber is calculated from its failure rate. This failure 
rate is typically measured in FITs per kilometer. Employing this approach ensures that 
longer fibers have worse availability figures than shorter fibers, which obviously is a 
realistic approach. The different figures for the failure rate of an optical fiber employing 
this approach can be seen in Table 5.29. In [76], this FITs/km failure rate is calculated 
based on collected data from the field (from 1986 to 1993) employing equation (5.1). In 
this equation, NXX represents the number of cable cuts in 19XX and LXX represents the 
cumulative cable kilometers installed and in service in 19XX. 
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Component 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT/km) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
Reference 
Buried Fiber 
100 21 [50] 
100 21 [49] 
243.15 13.8 [76] 
Aerial Fiber 9.703 < 2 [76] 
Table 5.29: Failure rates and MTTR figures for optical fibers 
 
Another approach consists in calculating the MTBF for the optical cable employing 
equation (5.2). In this equation, the Cable-Cuts (CC) indicates the average cable length 
suffering from 1 cable cut a year. Again, the idea is to express the fact that the 
probability to have a cable cut is larger for a longer link. Then, this CC parameter can 
be adjusted depending on the terrain, the type of fiber, the population, etcetera, giving 
more flexibility to the availability calculation. Table 5.30 shows different CC values 
and MTTR for different types of fibers. 
 
 ℎ =   ] ∗ 365 ∗ 24!:ℎ ]                                           (5.2) 
 
Component CC (km) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
Reference 
Buried Fiber 
450 24 [35] 
300 12 [36] 
Aerial Fiber 20 6 [36] 
Submarine Fiber 5300 540 [36] 
Table 5.30: CC and MTTR figures for optical fibers 
 
However, it is important to keep in mind that in fact both approaches are different ways 
to express the same idea: longer fibers are more likely to fail than shorter fibers. In 
order to measure the length of a fiber, typically the geographical distance between nodes 
is calculated employing the Haversine formula ([78] in [50]), although later the 
distances can be modified in order to represent link lengths more accurately. 
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Chapter 6 
6. Evaluation and Discussion of Results 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the results presented in chapter 5. The main objective is to assess 
the validity of the different protection schemes presented in this thesis, considering the 
limitations of the analyses. Section 6.1 and section 6.2 evaluate the results of the 
protection mechanisms that handle OPS and EPS total failures. In section 6.3, the most 
suitable architecture for the OPS (from a dependability point of view) is chosen. Section 
6.4 discusses the results of the different protection mechanisms for the DPT subsystem. 
Finally, section 6.5 presents a small review and some considerations about the modeling 
of fiber cuts.      
 
 
 
6.1 Optical Packet Switch Total Failures 
 
 
Two protection mechanisms have been proposed and analyzed in order to handle OPS 
total failures, namely duplicating the OPS and rerouting SM/RT traffic to the EPS. 
These two methods have been analyzed regarding two different scenarios, without and 
with signaling between adjacent nodes. The second approach allows selecting any 
available incoming wavelength in case the wavelength being used is not available. 
 
 
6.1.1 Duplicated OPS 
 
Duplicating the OPS can be regarded as the most straightforward protection mechanism. 
When this mechanism is analyzed employing reliability block diagrams (Fig. 4.1) and 
supposing no communication between adjacent nodes, an unavailability of 6.47*10-5 
can be achieved. This a very good unavailability, even though it does not achieve the 
“five nines” availability (unavailability of 10-5). Although the unavailability depends 
largely on the elements in charge of the switching between the two OPS (multiplexers, 
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splitters and switches), this does not represent a worrying issue. Typically these 
elements can be regarded as very reliable components, with good availability figures. In 
fact, it is also very common in literature to exclude these elements from the analyses 
arguing that they are very reliable. On the other hand, the OPS does not represent a 
threat to dependability because it is duplicated. Even if it is considered as a very likely 
to fail element, with a high unavailability, the total unavailability of the system is not 
heavily affected. On the contrary, the DPT subsystem is a more controversial element. 
First, it is difficult to calculate trustworthy availability figures for this element. Second, 
the DPT is based on OC technology. This technology, although can be seen as very 
promising, can only be found in laboratories, thus it is not unreal to consider the DPT as 
a likely to fail element which could compromise the unavailability of the system, as can 
be seen in Fig. 5.1. This is the main reason why signaling between adjacent nodes is 
considered. 
 
If communication between nodes is assumed, any node can communicate with the 
previous node, and recover from failures in the DPT. This way, the M DPTs are 
regarded as a parallel system. Then the availability of the M parallel DPTs grows very 
close to one, and does not affect the total unavailability of the system (the cyan line in 
Fig. 5.2 is behind the red reference line). The unavailability of the system can be 
improved to 4.47*10-5, with the same dependencies with respect to the rest of 
components. This improvement in unavailability is based on an unavailability value of 
2*10-5 for the DPT. If a higher unavailability value is considered for the DPT (situation 
that is not unreal) bigger relative availability gains can be achieved. This can be seen 
comparing the cyan lines in Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2. 
 
However, the limitations of structural models reveal this analysis a very optimistic one. 
The results of the Markov model showed on section 5.2.1.2 prove this fact. In this 
Markov model, the dependencies between the DPT (no communication between 
adjacent nodes) and the two OPSs are modeled, resulting in a higher unavailability 
(1.076*10-4) for the same reference values as in the block diagram (6.47*10-5). The 
Markov model also reveals that the unavailability, the MTBF and the MDT of the 
system depends to a great extent on the failure rate of the OPS. Curiously, the MDT 
goes smaller when the failure rate of the OPS increases, but after some point it starts 
growing again. This is because when the failure rate of the OPS grows, a lot of failures 
occur (the MTBF is smaller) but the system recovers quickly from this failures simply 
switching to the backup OPS. When the failure rate of the OPS is sufficiently large, 
both OPSs (active and spare) fail at the same time, and the MDT grows bigger. This is 
because the recovery from the failure is done by means of repairing one of the OPS, 
instead of switching to the backup OPS. In conclusion, this small Markov model reveals 
that the unavailability calculated with the block diagrams can be seen as very optimistic. 
 
The final model, employing a combined approach, is a powerful tool that could provide 
more reliable data than the two previous models. First, it considers the possibility of the 
recovery systems not working properly, and is able to capture the dependencies of its 
subsystems. However, it is also a complex model with a lot of parameters, whose values 
are very difficult to determine. This model considers communication between nodes, 
but it is far more realistic than the simpler block diagram. The reference value 
calculated with this model shows an unavailability of 7.96*10-4, clearly larger than the 
values calculated with other models. In fact, Fig. 5.9 also reveals that the same 
unavailability can be achieved with k varying from 1 to 31. Remember that in this 
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model, k is the number of DPTs (in the input subsystem) and couplers (in the output 
subsystem) needed for the system to be considered as working. This means that if all the 
wavelengths are backed up by only another wavelength in the same fiber (k = 31), the 
unavailability is almost the same than when all the wavelengths are used to back up any 
failed wavelength (k=1). However, this conclusion cannot be taken as true so easily. If k 
is equal to 1, it means that the system continues providing service without appreciable 
degradation even if all the SM/RT traffic in one fiber is handled employing only one 
wavelength. Obviously, even though SM/RT traffic is considered to be a small 
percentage of the total traffic, the previous statement is largely unreal. But it can be 
considered as true for some other values of k (30,29…). This leads to the conclusion 
that if the DPTs (incoming wavelengths) are backed up locally with one or two spare 
DPTs, a gain in availability can be achieved without implementing signaling between 
adjacent nodes. 
 
The main advantage of this protection mechanism is that the performance is the same as 
the performance achieved in a normal operation situation. When the GST traffic is not a 
large percentage of the total traffic flow (Fig. 5.10), SM/RT packets experiment no loss, 
or at least a small figure for the PLP. This is because of two main reasons. First, as the 
percentage of GST traffic is small, it is very unlikely that a large number of wavelengths 
are occupied by GST packets. Second, SM/RT packets can preempt any SM/BE packet 
being sent, so SM/RT packets could use wavelengths occupied by SM/BE traffic, which 
is the common situation in Fig. 5.10 (SM/BE traffic represents a 60% of the total 
traffic). SM/RT packets start experiencing loss when GST traffic is very large (Fig. 
5.11) and all the wavelengths are occupied by GST packets. However, the PLP is kept 
under reasonable values, unless the total load is high and the GST percentage is also 
high. 
 
On the other hand, the main drawback of this protection mechanism is the cost. First, 
Optical Packet Switches are state-of-the-art devices, and thus can be expected to be very 
expensive, even if they are small. In addition, in order to keep the failure recovery time 
small, the spare OPS should be synchronized with the active OPS, storing all the routing 
information. Obviously, the spare OPS will consume energy, and can be regarded as a 
very expensive unused resource when the active OPS is working. 
 
 
6.1.2 Rerouting SM/RT Traffic to the EPS 
 
In principle, the availability figures for this protection mechanism are expected to be 
higher (lower unavailability) than the duplicated OPS protection scheme, because the 
EPS is considered more reliable than the spare OPS. Fig. 5.12 (no communication 
between adjacent nodes) and Fig. 5.13 (communication between adjacent nodes) show 
this improvement in unavailability. 
 
In Fig. 5.12, the reference unavailability has a value of 3.415*10-5. In addition, as the 
DPT reroutes the SM/RT traffic directly to the EPS, the unavailability practically does 
not depend on the splitters availability (the yellow line is behind the red reference line). 
Also the unavailability of the system does not depend on the availability of the OPS 
(pink line is behind the red reference line), because the EPS is used as backup. 
However, the unavailability of the system depends to a great extent on the 
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multiplexers/demultiplexers and on the DPT. Typically, the multiplexers can be 
considered as reliable, and its unavailability figures are usually small. Again, the DPT 
could represent a bottleneck for availability. In addition, this DPT is considered as more 
likely to fail than the “normal” DPT, because it has to reroute the traffic to the EPS in 
case of failure. 
 
In Fig. 5.13, almost the “five nines” availability figure is achieved. As the M DPTs are 
regarded as a parallel structure, the total unavailability does not depend on them (the 
cyan line is behind the red reference line). Then, the unavailability of the whole system 
is mainly affected by the multiplexers/demultiplexers, but as these elements are reliable 
and typically present small unavailability figures, this could be seen as a minor problem. 
 
The results of the Markov model considering one DPT, the OPS and the EPS show that 
the unavailability calculated with the block diagrams can be regarded as reasonable. The 
unavailability assessed with this model (2.508*10-5) is very similar to the unavailability 
calculated with the block diagram (3.415*10-5). In fact, it is even a better unavailability 
because the other elements (multiplexers, demultiplexers, splitters) are not considered in 
the Markov model. Fig. 5.14 confirms that the unavailability of this protection 
mechanism depends largely on the reliability of the DPT. In fact, this figure also shows 
that the reliability of the OPS does not entail a big impact on the total unavailability, 
because the EPS (which is more reliable) is used as backup. Paying attention to Fig. 
5.15 and Fig. 5.16, the behavior of the system can be deduced. The MTBF practically 
does not depend on the DPT failure rate or the EPS failure rate. This implies that 
failures in the system are typically caused by the OPS failing, and that the DPT 
typically fails when the OPS has already failed, and the whole system was in a failed 
state. Fig. 5.16 shows that the MDT grows rapidly with the failure rate of the DPT. The 
explanation to this behavior is as follows. When the failure rate of the DPT is large, the 
DPT typically fails when the OPS has already failed and the system is in a down state. 
Consequently, to recover from a failure, the DPT must be repaired and the OPS must be 
replaced with the EPS. Thus, the time to recover from a failure (and the MDT) grows 
with the failure rate of the DPT because the system has to recover from the failures in 
the DPT and in the OPS. If the failure rate of the DPT is not very large, the MDT is 
smaller because the system only has to replace the OPS with the EPS to recover from a 
failure. Finally, as the MTBF and the MDT practically do not depend on the EPS failure 
rate, it can be concluded that a failure in the EPS does not affect too much the reliability 
of the whole system; because it is very unlikely that the EPS fails when the OPS has 
already failed. 
 
The results obtained with the combined model also reinforce the idea that the 
asymptotic availability of the system is highly affected by the availability of the DPT. 
As expected, the results for the OPS-EPS subsystem of the combined model (Fig. 5.18) 
show that this subsystem is more reliable than the lukewarm standby subsystem present 
in the duplicated OPS combined model. However, the total unavailability achieved by 
the combined model when SM/RT traffic is rerouted, is typically higher than the value 
achieved with the same modeling in the duplicated OPS protection scheme. Clearly, this 
is because the input subsystem when the EPS is used as backup for the OPS (Fig. 5.17) 
is less reliable than in the duplicated OPS case. Thus, the DPTs can be considered as a 
threat to the availability of both protection mechanisms. 
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Fig. 5.20 and Fig. 5.21 measure the performance that a 3-LIHON node achieves when 
SM/RT traffic is rerouted to the EPS. When the SM/BE traffic represents a large 
percentage of the total traffic flow (Fig. 5.20), the delay experienced by SM/RT and 
SM/BE packets grows when the total load or the percentage of GST traffic grow. This 
seems to be a logical trend, because if the percentage of GST traffic grows, output 
wavelengths will be occupied by GST packets. As SM/RT packets cannot interrupt 
SM/BE packets, they have to wait till GST and SM/BE packets have finish its 
transmission. However, the delay is kept under reasonable values for the SM/RT traffic 
requirements.  
 
When the percentage of SM/RT traffic is fixed to a 7% of the total flow (Fig. 5.21), the 
delay experienced by SM/RT traffic presents a particular trend. If the relative GST load 
is small, the SM/RT delay is also small (even smaller than in Fig. 5.20). This is because 
of two reasons. First, because output wavelengths are not occupied by GST packets, so 
a large number of wavelengths are free for SM/RT and SM/BE packets. Second, 
because SM/RT packets have priority in the buffering over SM/BE packets, and thus 
SM/RT packets can employ the free output wavelengths. But, as the relative GST load 
grows (and the relative SM/BE load decreases), the SM/RT delay increases. This is 
because more wavelengths are occupied by GST traffic, so there are fewer wavelengths 
for SM/RT and SM/BE packets. In addition, as SM/RT packets have to wait till GST 
and SM/BE packets finish its transmission (SM/RT packets cannot interrupt SM/BE 
packets), the delay increases. 
 
However, when the relative GST load is very high (83%), the SM/RT delay decreases 
again. The explanation is that as SM/BE traffic is a small percentage of the total traffic, 
output wavelengths are mainly being used by GST traffic. Consequently, SM/RT 
packets do not have to wait for SM/BE packets to finish it transmission, and SM/RT 
packets can be sent in between GST packets. Again, the delay experienced by SM/RT 
packets can be considered as reasonable. In the scenario illustrated by this figure, the 
delay for SM/BE packets increases when the total load or the relative GST load 
increase. This can be regarded as logical, as the SM/BE cannot be sent on wavelengths 
being used by GST packets, and SM/RT packets have priority in the buffers. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the values presented in Fig. 5.20 and Fig. 5.21 
are average values of the total time lost in a node. SM/RT packets could experiment 
jitter when rerouted to the EPS, and that should also be taken into account. In addition, 
it is also important to be aware of the fact that these figures represent the total lost time 
within a node. For SM/RT packets, this time is equal to the time waiting in the buffer 
for a free wavelength. But for SM/BE packets, this total lost time also takes into account 
the fact that SM/BE packets can be interrupted by GST packets, and thus the time since 
the packet started its transmission till it is interrupted is also considered as lost time. 
 
The observations above show that the protection mechanism based on rerouting the 
traffic to the EPS presents a number of advantages. This protection mechanism is cheap 
and makes a good use of available resources, as it exploits the architecture of a 3-
LIHON node to protect SM/RT traffic without additional components. Furthermore, the 
impact of performance is not a heavy drawback, because the delay experienced by 
packets in the EPS (both SM/RT and SM/BE) is kept under acceptable values. Finally, 
there is no waste of energy in unused resources, and the failure recovery time can be 
kept in the order of milliseconds. Nevertheless, it is true that the EPS must store all the 
148 
 
routing information of the OPS, and also the information about SM/RT Optical Codes. 
In addition, SM/RT packets could experiment larger delays than the results shown in 
this work because of O/E and E/O conversion, and the time needed to add the 
correspondent OC at the output of the EPS.                                          
 
 
 
6.2 Electrical Packet Switch Total Failures 
 
 
The protection mechanism proposed in order to manage EPS total failures consist in 
duplicating the EPS. This method has been analyzed employing two different 
approaches, without and with signaling between adjacent nodes. 
 
 
6.2.1 Duplicated EPS 
 
The duplicated EPS protection mechanism is, in essence, very similar to the duplicated 
OPS protection mechanism, and thus the discussion of results is also quite analogous. 
 
When this mechanism is analyzed employing reliability block diagrams with no 
communication between nodes (Fig. 5.22), a reference unavailability of 3.971*10-5 is 
achieved. The unavailability depends largely on the elements in charge of the switching 
between the two EPS, but these elements can be regarded as very reliable components, 
with good availability figures. On the other hand, the EPS does not represent a threat to 
dependability because it is duplicated and has a reasonable high reliability. As it 
happened in previous sections, the DPT subsystem represents the most important threat 
to availability, and the asymptotic unavailability depicted in Fig. 5.22 depends to a great 
extent on it. 
 
If communication between nodes is assumed, the availability of the M parallel DPTs 
grows very close to one, and does not affect the total unavailability of the system (the 
cyan line in Fig. 5.23 is behind the red reference line). The unavailability of the system 
decreases to a reference value of 1.971*10-5. The dependencies with respect to other 
components remain in a similar way. As it happened with the duplicated OPS protection 
mechanism, if a higher unavailability is considered for the DPT the relative gain in 
availability would be larger, as can be seen comparing the cyan lines in Fig. 5.22 and 
Fig. 5.23. 
 
The Markov model employed to analyze this protection mechanism presents very 
similar results. First, the reference unavailability achieved by the Markov model is 
slightly smaller (2.461*10-5) than in the block diagram (3.971*10-5). This is because 
some elements (splitters, couplers, multiplexers/demultiplexers and switches) are not 
included in the model. As shown in Fig. 5.24, the total unavailability of the system is 
affected by the EPS failure rate only when this parameter is very large, while the DPT 
failure rate has a big impact on the total unavailability. However, the MTBF largely 
depends on the EPS failure rate, because this is the most likely to fail element (the 
failure rate of the EPS is larger than the failure rate of the DPT). On the other hand, the 
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MDT decreases when the EPS failure rate increases. This is because when the failure 
rate of the EPS grows, a lot of failures occur (the MTBF is smaller) but the system 
recovers quickly from this failures simply switching to the backup EPS. 
 
The final analysis, employing the combined approach, models the behavior of the 
system in a better way, because considers the possibility of the recovery systems not 
working properly, and is able to capture the dependencies of the elements that make up 
every subsystem. This model considers communication between nodes, but it can be 
regarded as more realistic than the simpler block diagram. The reference unavailability 
calculated with this model has a value of 3.031*10-4 (Fig. 5.28). As the three models 
attain a very similar value for the asymptotic unavailability, they can be regarded as 
trustworthy (assuming that the reference values used as parameters in the models are 
also trustworthy). The considerations explained for the duplicated OPS protection 
scheme regarding the DPT are also applicable in this model, as both protection schemes 
are basically the same. 
 
The performance analysis (Fig. 5.29 and Fig. 5.30) shows very interesting results. In 
Fig. 5.29 (relative SM/BE load is fixed), when the total load is 0.5, the delay decreases 
as the percentage of GST traffic increases, basically because SM/BE packets can find an 
available wavelength very quickly. But, when the total load increases, the trend is the 
opposite: the delay increases as the relative SM/RT load increases. Basically this is 
because the number of SM/RT packets increases, and these packets interrupt almost 
every SM/BE packet. In fact, very large SM/BE packets can be interrupted more than 
twice. Thus, the SM/BE traffic could be severely penalized if the relative SM/RT load is 
high. Fortunately, forecast for future traffic profiles expect most of the traffic to be 
video traffic (GST), and SM/RT traffic is expected to be a small percentage of the total 
traffic flow. When the percentage of SM/RT traffic is fixed (Fig. 5.30), the trend is 
always the same: the delay increases with the relative GST load and with the total load. 
This behavior does not deviate from the expected performance, because GST traffic has 
priority over SM/BE traffic, and thus the SM/BE packets should remain in the buffer 
waiting for a wavelength not being used by a GST packet or by a SM/RT packet. 
 
Another very remarkable result is that the delay experienced by SM/BE packets is 
smaller when SM/RT traffic is handled by the EPS, even if SM/RT packets have 
priority in the buffers. Interruptions of SM/BE packets are the explanation to this 
behavior. When SM/RT packets are handled by the EPS, they cannot interrupt SM/BE 
packets, and thus when a SM/BE packets starts its transmission, the probability of 
finishing it without interruptions is very high (it can be interrupted by a GST packet, but 
this is not so common). In normal operation, especially when the load is high, SM/BE 
packets are constantly interrupted by SM/RT packets, and thus the time it takes to finish 
the transmission of a SM/BE packet grows when the SM/RT traffic increases. 
 
This protection mechanism is not very expensive, at least compared to the duplication 
of the OPS; as the electronic part of the EPS is a mature device already mass-produced. 
The failure recovery time is small (only few milliseconds to switch the optical switches) 
and the node will continue working as in a normal operation situation. Nevertheless, the 
backup EPS should remain synchronized with the active EPS, and will be an unused 
resource consuming energy when the active EPS is working.      
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6.3 Optical Packet Switch Partial Failures 
 
 
In this section, the availability results for the five proposed OPS architectures are 
discussed. Again, the five OPS structures have been analyzed considering two 
approaches: without and with signaling between adjacent nodes. 
 
 
6.3.1 Broadcast-and-Select Architectures 
 
When no communication between adjacent nodes is assumed, both the TAS and the 
DAVID architecture present an asymptotic unavailability in the order of 10-5 (6.4*10-5 
and 3.7*10-5), as can be seen in Fig. 5.31 and Fig. 5.32. However, it must be taken into 
account that the availability figures for the DAVID architecture can be seen as more 
trustworthy than the figures for the TAS design. This is due to the high uncertainty 
about the reliability of the TWCs. The elements that make up the DAVID architecture 
are well-know (amplifiers, regenerators and SOAs) while the TWCs are still is 
laboratories. 
 
The reference availability attained by the TAS design is 6.4*10-5 (Fig. 5.31). But, as this 
figure shows, the asymptotic unavailability of the whole design could increase quickly 
if the unavailability of any of the building components grows. The DAVID architecture, 
on the other hand, presents an asymptotic unavailability of 3.7*10-5 (with the reference 
availability values for the components) and it does not depend on the unavailability of 
the SOAs as shown in Fig. 5.33. The dependency of the asymptotic unavailability with 
the amplifiers is very similar in both cases. 
 
When communication between adjacent nodes is allowed, the asymptotic unavailability 
of both architectures decreases, and only depends on the unavailability of the amplifiers, 
as is depicted in Fig. 5.32 and Fig. 5.34. However, considering communication between 
nodes does not represent a great improvement in the availability. 
 
Although both architectures achieve unavailabilities in the order of 10-5, they present 
some other drawbacks. The main important one is the astronomical number of SOAs 
that both architectures need. Remembering Table 3.1, neither the DAVID not the TAS 
design scale on number of SOAs. Although this problem is less serious in the TAS 
design, it requires N*M TWCs. Another problem of these architectures is the high 
splitting ratio, which can grow very quickly with the number of ports, at least for the 
DAVID design. On the other hand, the main advantages are that both switching 
matrixes are non-blocking. In addition, multicast is very simple to achieve in the 
DAVID design. 
 
 
6.3.2 TWC-AWG Based Architectures 
 
Considering the first scenario, when no signaling between nodes is allowed, the 
asymptotic unavailabilities achieved by the two TWC-AWG based architectures with 
the reference values for the different components are 2.44*10-5 for the OpMiGua OPS 
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(Fig. 5.35) design and 3.04*10-5 for the multiport solution (Fig. 5.37). These values are 
also very similar to the ones achieved by the B&S architectures. The main threat to the 
availability of these two designs is the large dependency with the TWCs, especially the 
case of the multiport solution, which employs TWCs with a wider tuning range. 
Although both design also depend on the AWG, this element is passive, and typically 
presents a very high unavailability (in the order of 10-7) so it can be regarded as a very 
reliable element. 
 
Not surprisingly, the unavailability of both designs decreases almost two orders of 
magnitude when signaling between adjacent nodes is allowed. Both the OpMiGua OPS 
and the multiport solution present an asymptotic unavailability of 4*10-7 (Fig. 5.36 and 
Fig. 5.38). That is, the two architectures present the same unavailability as the AWG, 
because, as can be seen in Fig. 4.23 and Fig. 4.24, the wavelength converters constitute 
a parallel structure from the dependability point of view. However, this is a very 
optimistic point of view. Considering the wavelength converters as parallel structures 
implies that these two designs can provide service even if only one wavelength is 
available. It is not unreal to consider that if one or two wavelengths are not available 
(the wavelength converters fail), the OPS can continue providing service without a 
severe degradation on performance; as the traffic handled by the OPS is a very small 
percentage of the total traffic. But considering that all the traffic can be handled with 
only one wavelength is quite exaggerated. Nevertheless, even if the value of 4*10-7 is 
considered as exaggerated, Fig. 5.36 and Fig. 5.38 show that the availability of these 
two designs can be significantly improved employing signaling between adjacent nodes; 
while this improvement cannot be accomplished in the B&S architectures.  
 
These results show that the TWC-AWG based architectures have better availability 
figures than B&S architectures, assuming that the calculated availability figures for the 
TWCs are logical. However, the OpMiGua OPS does not scale on the number of TWCs, 
and the TWCs in the multiport solution have an excessive tuning range. In addition, the 
OpMiGua OPS is blocking, and presents the same splitting ratio as the TAS 
architecture. In principle, the fact that the OpMiGua OPS is blocking should not be a 
problem, as SM/RT traffic is expected to be a small part of the total traffic flow. 
 
 
6.3.3 Multiplane Architecture  
 
The asymptotic unavailability of the multiplane architecture with no communication 
between adjacent nodes, represented in Fig. 5.39, has a reference value of 6.74*10-5. 
This is the highest value for unavailability of the five architectures, very close to the 
unavailability achieved by the DAVID architecture. As the AWG is a very reliable 
component, the dependency of the total unavailability with the availability of the AWG 
does not represent a cause for concern. On the other hand, the variation of the total 
unavailability with the unavailability of the rest of components (concentrators and 
TWCs) should be taken into account. As the availability of these three types of 
components has been calculated, it cannot be regarded as very trustworthy, and 
therefore may vary from the reference value. 
 
When signaling between adjacent nodes is allowed, the total asymptotic unavailability 
is very small. In fact, as depicted in Fig. 5.40, Matlab does not have the necessary 
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precision to calculate it, and is approximated by 0. Of course, it cannot be regarded as a 
100% reliable architecture, but at least mathematically the unavailability is very close to 
0. This is because the model considers the 32 planes (one plane for each wavelength) as 
a parallel structure. As was explained for the TWC-AWG based architectures, this 
figure is quite exaggerated, but it proves that the unavailability of the multiplane 
architecture con be largely improved employing signaling between adjacent nodes.  
 
The main advantage of this architecture is its simplicity. The number of TWCs needed 
is not excessively large, and also its tuning range is not exaggerated. The AWGs 
employed in each plane are also very small, and perform the same function as a 
demultiplexer, thus a demultiplexer could be used instead of AWGs. In addition, as 
SM/RT traffic is also considered to be a small percentage of the total traffic flow, the 
concentrator can also be made up with a small switch and a small number of couplers, 
also achieving a reasonable splitting ratio. However, this architecture is still in the 
“thinking” stage, and more studies should be carried out in order to determine if it will 
be able to fulfill the requirements demanded by the 3-LIHON concept. 
 
 
 
6.4 Detect Packet Type Subsystem 
 
 
This section assesses the results presented in section 5.5 for the different protection 
mechanisms for the DPT. It is important to remember that the considered scenario 
models one input fiber with M incoming wavelengths (with M equal to 32), thus at least 
M DPTs must be working for the whole system to be regarded as working. In this 
scenario, signaling between adjacent nodes is not considered. 
 
 
6.4.1 Unprotected DPTs 
 
The results for the unprotected case, which is the normal structure of a 3-LIHON node 
input, were depicted in Fig. 5.41.This approach is very simple to analyze, and is used as 
reference in order to measure the gain in availability that can be achieved with the three 
protection mechanisms for the DPTs. 
 
The reference unavailability of the unprotected case is 6.446*10-4 and highly depends 
on the unavailability of the DPTs, as the 32 DPTs are considered as a series system in 
the reliability block diagram. As it is shown in Fig. 5.41, the asymptotic unavailability 
of the system can increase dramatically if the DPT is not very reliable, situation that is 
very likely to happen. It is also true that the asymptotic unavailability can decrease if the 
DPT is reliable, but this is not a reasonable assumption. The dependency with the 
unavailability of the demultiplexer is not a case of concern, as this element typically 
present high availability figures. 
 
It has been pointed out in previous sections that typically, the DPTs can be regarded as a 
burden for reliability. The asymptotic unavailability calculated as reference for the 
unprotected DPTs represents this fact, as it is larger enough to compromise the 
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reliability of a 3-LIHON node. In addition, the DPT is the element that classifies the 
traffic at the input of a 3-LIHON node. Because of that, if the DPT fails, the service 
provided by the three types of traffic (GST, SM/RT and SM/BE) will not be available. 
These are the main reason why protecting the DPTs must be considered and analyzed. 
 
 
6.4.2 One Backup DPT 
 
The first protection mechanism consists in using one spare DPT as backup for the rest 
of DPTs. The results, illustrated in Fig. 5.42, confirm that an improvement of more than 
one order of magnitude can be achieved with this protection mechanism, with a 
reference unavailability of 5.622*10-5. 
 
In addition, the availability of the DPTs does not affect the total unavailability as much 
as in the unprotected case. Thus, larger unavailability figures can be assumed for the 
DPTs, and still an acceptable unavailability could be achieved for the total system. The 
splitters/couplers and the demultiplexer does not have a severe impact on the total 
unavailability neither. However, this protection mechanism requires high reliable 1x2 
and 2x1 switches. Because of the high number of switches needed (M + 3*M, with M 
equal to 32 gives a total number of 128 switches), the total unavailability depends 
highly on the availability of these devices (pink line in Fig. 5.42). In principle, these 
small switches are well-known, high reliable elements, and they will not represent a 
hazard to the protection mechanism, but the penalty to unavailability that they might 
cause must be kept in mind. 
 
The main drawback of this protection scheme is the cost. In a node with N incoming 
fibers and M wavelengths, considering that all the incoming fibers deploy this 
protection mechanism, the number of switches becomes astronomical: N*(M+3*M). In 
a simple node with 4 incoming fibers and 32 wavelengths in each fiber, the total number 
of switches is 512. In addition, N additional DPTs are used as backup, also increasing 
the cost. Thus, although an important increase in availability could be achieved, 
protecting all the incoming fibers could be very costly.  
 
6.4.3 Two Backup DPTs          
 
The two backup DPTs scheme has been analyzed in order to decide if the gain in 
availability of employing two backup DPTs will be worth the cost. 
 
The results, depicted in Fig. 5.43, demonstrate that employing two DPTs as backup does 
not represent a high gain in the asymptotic availability. The reference unavailability 
achieved is 5.6*10-5, practically the same as in the previous scheme. It is true that the 
total unavailability is not affected by the unavailabilities of the splitters and DPTs 
unless these elements have a very high unavailability, but the switches still play a major 
role. In fact, the switches employed in this mechanism are a little bit more complex than 
in the previous scheme, because they are 3x1 switches instead of 2x1. 
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The number of switches remains the same, but the number of spare DPTs and 
splitters/couplers doubles. Splitters and couplers are typically cheap components, but 
the cost of the additional DPTs must be taken into consideration. 
 
 
6.4.4 Group Protection 
 
The main idea of the group protection mechanism consists in splitting the M DPTs in 
groups, and then protecting the different groups independently. The particular case 
analyzed in this thesis divides the DPTs in two groups, and the each group is protected 
by one backup DPT. 
 
For this particular case, the obtained results (Fig. 5.44) are very similar to the case in 
which only one DPT is used as backup for all the DPTs present in a fiber. The reference 
unavailability is 5.611*10-5, and the dependency of the asymptotic unavailability with 
the availability of the rest of elements is almost equal to the one backup DPT protection 
scheme. 
 
The main point of this protection mechanism is its flexibility. GST packets follow 
virtual optical circuits in a static WRON. Thus, the wavelengths being used by GST 
packets are known, and could be protected; while the rest of the wavelengths, mainly 
used by SM/RT and SM/BE packets, might remain unprotected. This will represent a 
reduction in both cost and components, while the highest priority traffic is still 
protected. Furthermore, fibers with low utilization might remain unprotected while 
fibers with high utilization are protected. If a failure occurs in the unprotected fibers, the 
traffic could be rerouted following a protection path. As these fibers have a low 
utilization, the rerouted traffic will not affect the performance, achieving a better cost-
availability trade-off. 
 
 
 
6.5 Fiber Cuts 
 
 
Fiber cuts have been briefly analyzed in the previous chapters, including the main 
causes for cable cuts and a small compilation of the most common availability figures 
and methods employed to calculate the availability of a fiber. 
 
The main causes for fiber cuts could vary a lot, depending on the type of deployment. 
Diggings and excavations are the main cause of cuts among buried fibers, but rodents 
and misbehavior of workmen also play an important role in buried fiber cuts. A 
remarkable aspect of buried cable cuts is that usually cable cuts caused by excavations 
do not damage every fiber in the cable. Commonly, when a dependability analysis 
regards fiber cuts, a failure in a cable is considered to bring all the fibers down. This 
way of proceeding can be seen as conservative, and in most cases, a simple point-to-
point fiber redundancy between nodes (which is component redundancy) could be 
sufficient to prevent service outages due to fiber cuts. 
 
155 
 
Aerial fibers, on the other hand, present a smaller number of cuts. Obviously, this is 
because aerial fibers are not threatened by excavations. Aerial fibers are also easier to 
maintain, and failures are also easier to identify and locate. However, rules and 
regulations about aerial fibers are usually stricter than the ones applying to buried fibers. 
 
Although the information about causes of fiber cuts is taken directly from a 
manufacturer and it is actually data from the field, the validity of this information is 
compromised because it is dated from twenty years ago. Thus, even though it can give a 
general idea about fiber cuts, it should not be taken as trustworthy. 
 
In order to measure the availability of a cable, two parameters are used: the failure rate 
in FIT/km or the CC parameter. The CC parameter gives more flexibility when 
calculating the availability and the MTBF, as it can be adjusted depending on the 
collected data. Intuitively, it is common to suppose that buried fibers are more likely to 
fail than aerial fibers. Curiously, the collected availability data is not clear about this 
point. In [76], the failure rate for aerial fibers is much smaller than the failure rate for 
buried cables, but this information is very old and has been taken from an aerial fiber 
manufacturer. In [36], the CC for aerial fibers is 20 km. while the CC of buried cables is 
300 km. This means that, on average, 20 kilometers of aerial fiber suffer 1 cable cut 
every year, while 300 kilometers of buried cable present the same ratio. The information 
from [36] is far more recent (2005), and can be considered as independent, and thus 
more trustworthy. However, all the sources seem to agree about the fact that the MTTR 
is smaller in aerial fibers than in buried fibers.                 
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Chapter 7 
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis aims to tackle the problem of how to locally improve the survivability of a 
3-LIHON node. In order to fulfill this task, several protection mechanisms have been 
proposed to handle failures in the OPS, the EPS and the DPT subsystem. In addition, 
five different architectures for the Optical Packet Switch have been analyzed. Finally, a 
small research regarding causes and availability figures for fiber cuts has also been 
performed. 
 
The difficulty of selecting the most suitable way of improving survivability relies on the 
trade-off between cost and effort put into making a system dependable and the 
consequence of a less than perfect system. Furthermore, several implications should 
also be taken into account: complexity, impact on performance, scalability and energy 
consumption, for example. This thesis has tried to consider all these factors when 
analyzing the different protection mechanisms. 
 
In order to protect a 3-LIHON node against OPS total failures, two methods have been 
discussed: duplicating the OPS and rerouting SM/RT traffic to the EPS. The availability 
results have shown that similar unavailability figures can be achieved for both 
mechanisms. Furthermore, both solutions present a similar failure recovery time. 
However, rerouting SM/RT traffic to the EPS has turned out to be the most suitable 
solution to protect SM/RT traffic. First, it takes advantage of the resources already 
deployed in a 3-LIHON node: the EPS and the DPT. The EPS can handle SM/RT traffic 
without affecting severely the requirements of this type of traffic. In addition, rerouting 
SM/RT traffic to the EPS can be done easily thanks to the use of Optical Codes in the 
DPT. Rerouting traffic to the EPS is simpler, less expensive, consumes the same energy 
as in a normal operation situation and is able to maintain the QoS required for each type 
of traffic. 
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Duplicating the EPS to protect the SM/BE traffic has revealed itself as an inappropriate 
option. The unavailability figures calculated for this protection mechanism do not 
achieve the 10-5 order of magnitude. Consequently, the availability achieved is not 
worth the cost. Furthermore, the two EPSs must remain synchronized, consuming 
energy even if the active EPS is operative. As the SM/BE traffic is the lowest priority 
traffic, and its QoS requirements are very relaxed, the failure of the EPS can be treated 
at a network level without the users noticing it. However, deploying a spare EPS in a 3-
LIHON node could still be a suitable choice if this spare EPS is used to protect SM/RT 
traffic and SM/BE traffic at the same time. This point has not been studied in this thesis, 
but it may be a mechanism that might be taken into account for future research. 
 
It is also important to remark the fact that SM/RT traffic must be kept as a small 
percentage of the total traffic flow. The results obtained with the simulator show that 
when SM/RT traffic increases, the delay experienced by SM/BE packets could grow to 
unacceptable values. This fact is especially worrying when these two types of traffic are 
handled by different switches, because large SM/BE packets could be interrupted 
several times before completing its transmission if the node has to process a big amount 
of SM/RT packets.    
 
The unavailability results obtained for the five OPS architectures under study show that 
any of them can fulfill the availability requirements for the OPS. However, B&S 
architectures present several drawbacks. This kind of architectures displays an 
important lack of scalability and an excessive splitting ratio. Furthermore, the number 
of components required leads to a high cost and a large amount of unused resources. 
What is more, B&S architectures do not improve its unavailability significantly when 
signaling between adjacent nodes is employed. TWC-AWG architectures, on the other 
hand, present lower unavailability figures, and could benefit from communication 
between adjacent nodes. In addition, these architectures are becoming more important in 
literature, due to the improvements in the field of Tunable Wavelength Converters. The 
multiplane architecture can be regarded as one promising solution. It is simple, does not 
employ a large number of components, presents almost the same unavailability as the 
B&S architectures and the tuning range of the TWCs is kept under reasonable values. 
Nevertheless, it still has to be proven if this architecture is able to provide the QoS 
requirements demanded by the SM/RT traffic class. If the multiplane architecture could 
not achieve the necessary QoS, the OpMiGua OPS architecture is also a well suited 
solution. It was proposed for the OpMiGua concept, so it will be able to handle SM/RT 
traffic without degrading the QoS. Its unavailability figures are the best among the five 
architectures studied, and although the number of TWCs is high, its tuning range is not 
exaggerated. 
 
When signaling between adjacent nodes is not implemented, the DPT subsystem 
becomes an important bottleneck for the availability of a 3-LIHON node. Furthermore, 
a failure in a DPT provokes a service outrage in the three types of traffic supported by 
the 3-LIHON architecture. Thus, protecting the DPT should be taken into account in 
order to improve the availability of a 3-LIHON node. Employing one spare DPT as 
backup for the M DPTs present at each input fiber ensures a good protection, and 
achieves a reasonable unavailability. The gain in availability accomplished when two or 
more spare DPTs are used as backup is not worth the cost, thus it can be dismissed. 
However, employing one DPT as backup requires a high number of switches, increasing 
cost. Consequently, the group protection mechanism is better suited because of its 
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flexibility. With this protection mechanism, only the highest priority wavelengths 
(typically employed by GST packets following a static WRON) could be protected, 
while the other wavelengths could be left unprotected. Nevertheless, as the traffic 
pattern has not been perfectly established, which wavelengths (DPTs) should be 
protected is still open to further investigation. 
 
Finally, the small research performed for fiber cuts can be considered as a point of 
departure for future research regarding availability of connections through an optical 
transport network. The fact that not all cable cuts represent a failure in all the fibers 
deployed in a duct, could give a new boost for considering point-to-point fiber 
redundancy as a valid protection mechanism against link failures. The results also show 
that aerial fibers are easier to repair and to maintain. However, as it usually happens, the 
failure rates and CC parameters collected differ substantially from one source to 
another, making the comparison between aerial and buried fibers a difficult task, 
without a trustworthy conclusion about which fiber is best suited for a backbone optical 
network.       
 
 
 
7.2 Future Work 
 
 
To conclude the work performed in this thesis, this section aims to give some possible 
directions for future work. 
 
A more thorough analysis of the performance when the EPS handles all the SM traffic 
should be performed. In this thesis, the buffers in the EPS were assumed to be of 
infinite length, thus the PLP has not been measured. In addition, the simulations carried 
out in order to measure the delay do not include the time needed for the O/E and E/O 
conversion in the EPS. Also some time is needed to add the correspondent OCs to each 
packet. Because of that, a more exhaustive analysis is required.  
 
Deploying an additional EPS to protect both the EPS and the OPS in case of failure 
could lead to good trade-off between cost and availability. The spare EPS is not an 
expensive element, as it is based on current existing technology, and it could perfectly 
cope with all the SM traffic. However, the architectural implications should be studied, 
in addition to the performance issues explained in the previous paragraph. 
 
A better description of the expected traffic pattern will allow a better analysis of the 
group protection mechanism for the DPT subsystem. If GST packets follow already 
established optical circuits, knowing which wavelengths are mainly used by GST 
packets could permit a better protection for this kind of traffic, reducing the cost of 
employing additional DPTs for protecting all the wavelengths in a fiber. 
 
The small research carried out about fiber cuts could be used as point of departure for 
future work. In addition to calculate the availability of individual connections trough the 
3-LIHON optical network, parameters such as the total expected lost of traffic and the 
average expected loss of traffic could be used to discuss and compare different network 
topology designs. 
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Moving to protection mechanisms that can be deployed in higher layers, the use of 
GMPLS and MPLS for protecting GST and SM/RT traffic should also be taken into 
consideration. This will permit the deployment of more comprehensive dependability 
methods in higher layers. However, the coordination between the different protection 
mechanisms deployed in different layers is not a trivial issue, and must be analyzed with 
special attention.  
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Appendix A 
A. Collected Availability Figures 
 
 
 
In this appendix, all the availability figures found during the execution of this thesis are 
collected. These figures are shown exactly as they can be found in the correspondent 
source. The missing parameters can be calculated using (2.18) and (2.20), as it has been 
done in Table 2.1. 
 
In the following tables, failure rates are presented in FIT, while MTTR and MTBF are 
presented in hours. Failure rates are referred to the useful life period of the components. 
 
 
Component: 
Switch 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
2x2 Ti:LiNbO3 
Switch 
200 6 - - [40] 
2x2 InP Switch 100 6 - - [40] 
4x4 Ti:LiNbO3 
Switch Matrix 
3630 6 - - [40] 
2x2 Optical Switch - - - 0.9999996 [52] 
1x2 Optical Switch - - - 0.9999996 [52] 
Optical Switch 200 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Table A.1: Availability figures for optical switches 
 
 
Component: 
Coupler / Splitter 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
1:4 or 4:1 Coupler 100 6 - - [40] 
2x4 Planar Splitter 
(Supplier A) 
50 - 500 - - - [38] 
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2x4 Planar Splitter 
(Supplier B) 
14 - 125 - - - [38] 
2x4 Fused-fibre 
Splitter 
(Supplier C) 
500 - 1000 - - - [38] 
2x8 Planar Splitter 
(Supplier B) 
14 - 125 - - - [38] 
2x2 Fused-fibre 
Splitter 
(Supplier D) 
20 - 285 - - - [38] 
Splitter - - - 0.9999999 [52] 
1:2 Coupler 50 - - - [39] 
1:W/4 Coupler 25*(W/4) - - - [39] 
1:(N-1) Coupler 25*(N-1) - - - [39] 
Fiber Optic Coupler 
Splitter 
180 (725) - - - 
[53], taken 
from [42] 
1:2 Fusing-stretching 
Couplers 
25 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
1:N (N < 6) Fusing-
stretching Couplers 
50 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
1:N Integrated 
Optical Couplers 
60 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Splitter 50 6 - - [50] 
Table A.2: Availability figures for couplers/splitters 
 
 
 
Component: 
Multiplexer / 
Demultiplexer 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
WDM-coupler (8 
wavelengths) 
200 6 - - [40] 
WDM-coupler (4 
wavelengths) 
100 6 - - [40] 
WDM-coupler 100 6 - - [41] 
Mux/Demux (W 
wavelengths) 
25*W - - - [39] 
Multiplexer 
Demultiplexer 
Fusing-stretching 1 
to 2 
25 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Multiplexer 
Demultiplexer 
Fusing-stretching 1 
to n 
50 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Multiplexer 
Demultiplexer 
Fusing-stretching 
micro-optic 
60 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
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Bidirectional WDM 
line-system 
- 6 5*105 - [35] 
Multiplexer 
Demultiplexer 
200 6 - - [50] 
Table A.3: Availability figures for multiplexers/demultiplexers 
 
 
Component: 
Amplifier 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
Erbium Doped Fiber 
Amplifier 
2850 6 - - [40] 
EDFA 2850 - - - [39] 
Optical Amplifier 1000 - 
2000 
- - - [55] 
Amplifier 
(EDFA) 
650 6 - - [49] 
Bidirectional 
Optical Amplifier 
- 24 5*105 - [35] 
Amplifier (EDFA) 650 6 - - [50] 
Table A.4: Availability figures for amplifiers 
 
 
Component:  
Optical Gate 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
Laser Amplifier 1000 6 - - [41] 
Laser Amplifier 1000 6 - - [40] 
Table A.5: Availability figures for optical gates 
 
 
 
Component: 
AWG 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
Arrayed Waveguide 
Grating 
- - - 0.9999996 [52] 
Table A.6: Availability figures for arrayed waveguide gratings 
 
 
Component: 
Laser 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
DFB Laser (Tunable 
Laser) 
500 6 - - [40] 
Tunable Transmitter 745 - - - [39] 
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Fix Transmitter 186 - - - [39] 
Transmitter < 500 - - - [55] 
Fiber Optic Laser 
Module 
1000 
(1500) 
- - - 
[53], taken 
from [42] 
Elementary Emitter 
Module 
GaAlAs/GaAs 0.8 
µm 
3000 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Elementary Emitter 
Module 
(with electronics) 
InGaAs/InP 1.2-1.6 
µm 
40 (60) - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Emitter/Receiver 
module (laser, PIN 
diode, electronics) 
InGaAs/InP 1.2-1.6 
µm 
80 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Integrated 
Modulator Laser 
Module 
InGaAs/InP 1.2-1.6 
µm 
100 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Pump Laser Module 
(p ≤ 250 mW / p > 
250 mW) 
InGaAs/InP 1.48 µm 
200/350 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Pump Laser Module 
InGaAs/GaAs 0.98 
µm  
300 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Table A.7: Availability figures for lasers 
 
 
Component: 
Filter 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
Multi-Wavelength 
Selective Filter 
400 6 - - [40] 
Tunable Filter 400 6 - - [40] 
Tunable Filter 400 6 - - [41] 
Wavelength Filter - - - 0.9999999 [52] 
Optical Filter 
1500 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [42] 
Tunable Filter 
330 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Table A.8: Availability figures for filters 
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Component: 
Detector 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
Tunable Receiver 470 - - - [39] 
Fix Receiver 70 - - - [39] 
Detector Module 100 - - - [55] 
Photodetector 
(Transistor) 
15 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [42] 
Photodetector 
(Diode) 
10 - - - 
[53], taken 
from [42] 
Fiber Optic Detector 
Module 
500 
(1400) 
- - - 
[53], taken 
from [42] 
PIN Diodes 
Si 0.7 – 1.1 µm / 
InGaAs 1.2 – 1.6 
µm 
(with Electronics)   
5/10 (30) - - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
APD Diodes 
Si/Ge/InGaAs (with 
Electronics) 
20/40/80 
(100) 
- - - 
[53], taken 
from [43] 
Table A.9: Availability figures for detectors 
 
Component: 
E/O or O/E 
Converter 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
E/O or O/E 
Converter 
100 6 - - [40] 
Table A.10: Availability figures for E/O O/E converters 
 
Component: 
EPS (electronic 
router) 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
Ethernet Router - 48 3.066*105 0.999843 [54] 
Ethernet Router - 48 8.322*104 0.9994232 [54] 
IP Router (Route 
Processor) 
5000 4 2*105 - [35] 
Table A.11: Availability figures for the electronic part of the EPS 
 
Component: 
Regenerator 
Failure 
Rate 
(FIT) 
MTTR 
(hours) 
MTBF 
(hours) 
Availability Reference 
Regenerator - - 2.162*105 - [56] 
Regenerator 3355.21 2 - - [48] 
Regenerator - 6 5*105 - [51] 
Table A.12: Availability figures for regenerators 
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Appendix B 
B. Transition Intensity Matrixes 
 
 
 
This appendix depicts, in the following figures, the transition intensity matrixes of the 
different Markov models employed in this thesis. 
 
Fig. B.1 shows the transition intensity matrix of the Markov model that models the 
duplicated OPS protection scheme. 
 
Fig. B.2 presents the transition intensity matrix of the Markov model for the rerouted 
SM/RT traffic protection scheme. 
 
Fig. B.3 depicts the transition intensity matrix of the Markov model for the duplicated 
EPS protection scheme. 
 
Note that Fig. B.4 is the transition intensity matrix of the Markov model used in the 
lukewarm standby subsystem of the combined model for the duplicated OPS and the 
duplicated EPS protection schemes.  
 
Finally, Fig. B.5 shows the transition intensity matrix of the Markov model for the 
OPSEPS subsystem employed in the combined model of the rerouted SM/RT traffic 
protection scheme. 
 
With this matrixes, the steady state probabilities p = {p1, … ,p6} are obtained by solving 
p * Q = 0, where one of the columns is substituted by the normalization condition 
∑ >- = 1-  
 
The next two pages are written broadside for the sake of readability.   
. 
 
 
176 
 
 
Fig. B.1: Transition intensity matrix for the Markov model of the duplicated OPS protection scheme 
 
Fig. B.2: Transition intensity matrix for the Markov model of the rerouted SM/RT traffic protection scheme 
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Fig. B.3: Transition intensity matrix for the Markov model of the duplicated EPS protection scheme 
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Fig. B.4: Transition intensity matrix for the Markov model of the lukewarm standby subsystem 
in the combined model of the duplicated OPS and the duplicate EPS protection schemes 
 
 
Fig. B.5: Transition intensity matrix for the Markov model of the OPSEPS subsystem in the 
combined model of the rerouted SM/RT traffic protection scheme 
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Appendix C 
C. Attached Files 
 
 
 
This appendix lists and explains the files attached to this thesis, namely the figures, the 
Matlab scripts and the codes for the two simulators. The zip file contains three folders: 
“Figures”, “Matlab Scripts” and “Simulator”. 
 
The folder “Figures” contains all the figures employed in this thesis, organized by 
chapters and cases of study. 
 
 
 
C.1 Matlab Scripts  
 
 
The folder “Matlab Scripts” contains the Matlab scripts developed to assess the 
availability of the different cases of study. In the folder “DPT”, the scripts for 
calculating the unavailability of the four cases of study for the DPT can be found: 
 
• “Unprotected_DPT.m”: the unprotected case. 
• “Protected_DPT.m”: one backup DPT. 
• “DoubleProtected_DPT.m”: two backup DPTs. 
• “GroupsProtected_DPT.m”: DPTs protected by groups. 
 
The folder “EPS Tot Fails” contains the scripts for the three analyses performed for the 
duplicated EPS (DEPS) protection scheme: 
 
• “Blocks_DEPS.m” and “Blocks_DEPS_Signaling.m” assess the unavailability 
without and with communication between adjacent nodes. 
• “MM_Figures_DEPS.m” calls “MM_DEPS.m” and solves the Markov model 
for the duplicated EPS. The parameters can be changed in 
“MM_Figures_DEPS.m”, while “MM_DEPS.m” is only a function. 
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• “CM_Fig_Total_DEPS.m” calls “Fig_Input_DEPS.m”, “Fig_Luke_DEPS.m” 
and “Fig_Output_DEPS.m” and assesses the total unavailability of the combined 
model. 
• “Fig_Input_DEPS.m” calls “Input_DEPS.m” and solves the Markov model for 
the input subsystem. The parameters can be changed in “Fig_Input_DEPS.m”, 
while “Input_DEPS.m” is only a function. 
• “Fig_Luke_DEPS.m” calls “Luke_DEPS.m” and solves the Markov model for 
the lukewarm standby subsystem. The parameters can be changed in “Fig_ 
Luke_DEPS.m”, while “Luke_DEPS.m” is only a function. 
• “Fig_Output_DEPS.m” calls “Output_DEPS.m” and solves the Markov model 
for the output subsystem. The parameters can be changed in “Fig_ 
Output_DEPS.m”, while “Output_DEPS.m” is only a function.     
 
The folder “OPS Tot Fails” contains the scripts for the duplicated OPS (DOPS) and for 
the rerouted SM/RT (REPS) traffic protection schemes. The scripts follow the same 
architecture as for the “EPS Tot Fails” folder: 
 
• “Blocks_DOPS.m” and “Blocks_DOPS_Signaling.m” assess the unavailability 
without and with communication between nodes for the duplicated OPS. 
• “Blocks_REPS.m” and “Blocks_REPS_Signaling.m” assess the unavailability 
without and with communication between nodes for the rerouted case. 
 
• “MM_Figures.m” calls “MM_DOPS.m” and “MM_REPS.m” and solves the 
two Markov models. The parameters can be changed in “MM_Figures.m”, while 
“MM_DOPS.m” and “MM_REPS.m” are only functions. 
 
• “CM_Fig_Total_DOPS.m” calls “Fig_Input_DOPS.m”, “Fig_Luke_DOPS.m” 
and “Fig_Output_DOPS.m” and assesses the total unavailability of the 
combined model for the duplicated OPS. 
• “Fig_Input_DOPS.m” calls “Input_DOPS.m” and solves the Markov model for 
the input subsystem. The parameters can be changed in “Fig_Input_DOPS.m”, 
while “Input_DOPS.m” is only a function. 
• “Fig_Luke_DOPS.m” calls “Luke_DOPS.m” and solves the Markov model for 
the lukewarm standby subsystem. The parameters can be changed in “Fig_ 
Luke_DOPS.m”, while “Luke_DOPS.m” is only a function. 
• “Fig_Output_DOPS.m” calls “Output_DOPS.m” and solves the Markov model 
for the output subsystem. The parameters can be changed in “Fig_ 
Output_DOPS.m”, while “Output_DOPS.m” is only a function. 
 
• “CM_Fig_Total_REPS.m” calls “Fig_Input_REPS.m”, “Fig_OPSEPS 
_REPS.m” and “Fig_Output_REPS.m” and assesses the total unavailability of 
the combined model for the rerouted case. 
• “Fig_Input_REPS.m” calls “Input_REPS.m” and solves the Markov model for 
the input subsystem. The parameters can be changed in “Fig_Input_REPS.m”, 
while “Input_REPS.m” is only a function. 
• “Fig_OPSEPS_REPS.m” calls “OPSEPS_REPS.m” and solves the Markov 
model for the OPSEPS subsystem. The parameters can be changed in “Fig_ 
Luke_REPS.m”, while “Luke_REPS.m” is only a function. 
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• “Fig_Output_REPS.m” calls “Output_REPS.m” and solves the Markov model 
for the output subsystem. The parameters can be changed in “Fig_ 
Output_REPS.m”, while “Output_REPS.m” is only a function.     
 
Finally, the folder “OPS Part Fails” contains the scripts that calculate the unavailability 
of the different OPS architectures: 
 
• “DAVID.m” and “DAVID_Signaling.m” assess the unavailability without and 
with communication between nodes for the DAVID architecture. 
• “TAS.m” and “TAS_Signaling.m” assess the unavailability without and with 
communication between nodes for the TAS architecture. 
• “OpMiGua.m” and “OpMiGua_Signaling.m” assess the unavailability without 
and with communication between nodes for the OpMiGua OPS architecture. 
• “Multiport.m” and “Multiport_Signaling.m” assess the unavailability without 
and with communication between nodes for the multiport solution. 
• “Multiplane.m” and “Multiplane_Signaling.m” assess the unavailability without 
and with communication between nodes for the multiplane architecture. 
 
 
 
C.2 Simulator Codes 
 
 
The folder “Simulator” contains the codes for the two simulators and the all the results 
shown in chapter 5, sections 5.2.1.4, 5.2.2.4 and 5.3.1.4.  
 
The file “Normal_Operation_negexp_v5.sim” in the folder “Normal Operation” 
simulates a normal operation situation, which corresponds to the duplicated OPS and 
duplicated EPS cases. 
 
The file “Reroute_negexp_v2.sim” in the folder “Rerouted EPS” simulates the rerouting 
of the SM/RT traffic to the EPS. 
 
The different parameters of the simulation (total load, percentages of each type of 
traffic, average length of packets…) have to be changed directly in the code. 
 
All the results are also collected in its respective folders, organized by the simulated 
total load. The results are presented in .txt files. The four numbers at the beginning of 
the name of a file indicate the total load, the percentage of GST traffic, the percentage 
of SM/RT traffic and the percentage of SM/BE traffic. The following word indicates the 
type of simulator: “reroutp” (rerouted case with priority) or “normal” (normal 
operation). The next number is the simulation time. The next word indicates that the 
packet arrivals and the packet lengths are negatively exponentially distributed. The last 
three numbers indicate the average length of each type of traffic: 625000 bits for GST 
packets, 555.6 bits for SM/RT packets and 20000 bits for SM/BE packets.   
 
For example, “05_3_7_90_normal....txt” presents the results of a normal operation 
simulation with a total load of 0.5, where a 3% of the total traffic is GST, a 7% of the 
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total traffic is SM/RT and a 90% of the total traffic is SM/BE. The other parameters 
never change. 
 
The simulation data is printed when the simulation time is equal to 2*109, 4*109, 6*109, 
8*109 and 1010. The data shown in chapter 5 is taken at the end of the simulation 
(simulation time equal to 1010). In the two simulators, “Life time BE” counts the total 
time spent by a SM/BE packet inside the node, including reception time, time in the 
buffers and time lost due to interruptions. “B time BE ac” indicates the time spent by a 
SM/BE packet in the buffers per access (a SM/BE packet may access the buffers several 
times due to interruptions). “B time BE pa” indicates the total time spent by a SM/BE 
packet in the buffers (adding all the times it access the buffer). In the simulator for the 
rerouted case, “Life time RT”, “B time RT ac” and “B time RT pa” are defined in the 
same way, but for SM/RT packets. Note that as SM/RT packets are never interrupted, 
they only access the buffer once. Consequently, “B time RT ac” must always be equal 
to “B time RT pa”. As there are not buffers in the OPS, “Life time RT”, “B time RT ac” 
and “B time RT pa” are not defined in the normal operation simulator.  
 
 The delay of a SM/BE packet (in both simulators) is equal to “Life time BE” minus 
“BE length” and the delay of a SM/RT packet (in the rerouted simulator) is equal to 
“Life time RT” minus “RT length”.    
 
